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The formula is more international cooperation. 
António Guterres, UN Secretary General, in September 2019, 
on his formula for addressing critical global issues 
 
 
Development policy and the system of international cooperation are in constant 
flux and change, just like the world and its global order itself. Nevertheless, 
some of its features and structures remain rigid and untouched, often due to a 
lack of alternatives, whether perceived or real. This as such is not new and we, 
who have been working in this field for many years, are constantly dealing with 
these discrepancies, trying to minimise the gaps between normative intentions, 
societal necessities and political reality, together with our clients and partners. 
However, the world has become much more complex in recent years, and fun-
damental changes are happening at a faster pace. New actors are taking their 
places on the main stage – be it emerging countries, popular movements or pri-
vate sector giants – while routine partnerships have come under new scrutiny. 
New technologies are connecting people and changing access to information, 
knowledge and solutions, but may also create risks that we haven’t imagined 
yet. Many of today’s challenges, such as inequality, societal reconciliation or 
the effects of climate-related events, are facing countries in the North and South 
alike.  
This publication circles around a topic that combines the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ 
in international cooperation.  
Since 1969, the concept of Official Development Assistance (ODA) has been 
the framework for cooperation between ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ coun-
tries, based exclusively on the assessment of their income per capita. A new 
situation in our growing world economy has emerged out of this very categori-
sation: an increasing number of countries, including G20 members such as 
China, Brazil or Turkey, but also a range of medium-sized and small (island) 
countries, are moving towards the high-income category – and thereby towards 
‘graduation’ from ODA. Regardless of the categorisation of these countries, 
serious challenges to sustainable development often persist, such as high de-
grees of social or regional inequality or great exposure to external shocks. 
Moreover, with the world facing serious global crises with respect to climate 
change, violent conflict and the spread of infectious diseases, it is more im-
portant than ever to invest in global partnerships. 
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These transition processes must be also embedded in the broader political 
context and the major reforms of the development cooperation logic, set out 
mainly through the 2030 Agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs). Under the new paradigm of universality, must we not question tradi-
tional structures, such as the donor-recipient logic and the narrow focus on in-
come as a measurement of a country’s development? Countries like Mexico, 
Chile, Uruguay or Indonesia have long demanded a different understanding of 
cooperation, including a truly mutual approach to learning and contributing so-
lutions, and additional ‘developing’ countries are joining this call. It is im-
portant for international partners to understand and consider the demands and 
needs of countries moving towards graduation from ODA. How can the expe-
riences and lessons of graduated countries feed into our modes of cooperation 
with other countries in transition? How can well-established, trustful relation-
ships be secured and modernised in a post-ODA setting in order for us to jointly 
achieve our goals, as set out in the 2030 Agenda?  
Together, we need to go even further and raise the question of to what extent 
the concept of graduation from ODA and the changing development coopera-
tion system mutually affect and shape each other. How can we organise our 
work in a setting where the dichotomic distinction between ‘donor’ and ‘recip-
ient’ no longer exists, to ensure that all actors needed to find the right solution 
can bring their share to the table? How can we make the best of our complex 
world, not without ODA, but with smart options for sustainable development 
and cooperation beyond categories? Last but not least: what does that mean for 
the ODA-regime itself? 
By setting up a research-oriented project in 2018, the Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) aimed to shed light on ODA graduation 
processes and their implications for countries in transition, for international 
partners and for the development cooperation system as such.  
As a first component, GIZ supported the Overseas Development Institute 
(ODI) in conducting case studies to analyse the experiences and needs of four 
countries at different stages of graduation (Botswana, Mexico, Chile and South 
Korea). These were published by ODI in December 2019, and we would like to 
express our gratitude to the authors Annalisa Prizzon and Rachael Calleja for 
their thorough and enriching research, and to our colleagues involved – specif-
ically at the respective country offices – for their dedicated support. 
In the second part of the project, the findings of these studies served as a 
fundamental basis from which to enhance and expand the discussion on ODA 
graduation. In a series of fresh and fruitful dialogues, policymakers, practition-
ers and academics from more than 15 African, American, Asian and European 
countries embedded the topic in the global political context and the ongoing 
changes in development cooperation, focusing on a range of systemic questions 
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surrounding the matter of ODA graduation and linking the topic to other de-
bates on cooperation in the SDG era. 
The result of these discussions is the collection of ideas and perspectives that 
you are holding in your hands. We hope it may contribute inspiring thoughts to 
the realisation of the ‘new’ system of international development cooperation: 
living out universality and vivid global partnerships, while leaving no one be-






Eschborn, May 2020 
 
Dr Elke Siehl, Director of Corporate Development, Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH 
 
Dr Dirk Aßmann, Director General of the Sectoral Department, Deutsche Ge-
sellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH 
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The editors of this publication would like to express their sincere gratitude to 
each of the authors and discussants for their time, interest and enthusiasm, their 
openness – both in terms of format and content – and their commitment, which 
is reflected inter alia in their willingness to make a virtual dialogue happen from 
New York to Seoul, or from Montevideo to Beijing. Thank you also to our co-
moderators, who greatly enriched the team by adding specific, up-to-date and 
detailed expertise to our broader picture. Special thanks go out to Andrés Sara-
via, a close member of our team, who always went the extra mile to support, 
test, draft and do whatever was needed.  
In addition, we would like to thank Michael Krempin, Astrid Bräu and Elke 
Siehl for initiating and kicking-off the project within GIZ; Annalisa Prizzon 
and Rachel Calleja at the ODI for their brilliant groundwork and great cooper-
ation; our internal reference group, which contributed to critical reflection on 
the topic and to raising the systemic questions; our ‘networkers’ Annalisa Priz-
zon, Nadine Piefer-Söyler, Lothar Rast, Hagen Ettner and Martín Rivero, who 
were of great help in finding the right people for this piece of work; and those 
in Brussels, Washington and New York that were unable to join our talks for 
various good reasons. Tanja Randau saved us weeks of time thanks to her well-
trained ears and precise transcription; Martyn Ford ensured that even the most 
complex train of thought was kept in correct British English, and Beate Bern-
stein at Nomos was of great support by finding solutions to every odd question. 
Finally: thanks to modern technology, which saved everyone time and emis-
sions, and enabled us to even consider this format. 
Without you all, this result would not have been possible, and the process cer-
tainly would not have been as much fun. 
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Juliane Kolsdorf, Andrés Saravia and Ulrich Müller 
At first glance, the overarching topic of this publication, graduation from Offi-
cial Development Assistance (ODA)1, describes a quite simple technical proce-
dure, defined through the criteria set out by the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development’s (OECD) Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC): when a country passes the threshold of approximately 12,000 USD in-
come per capita and is therefore listed in the high-income category for three 
consecutive years, it is no longer eligible to receive ODA-financing. This ‘ODA 
graduation’ does not mean that any form of cooperation with these countries 
must cease, but that it cannot be counted as ODA anymore and does not con-
tribute to reaching the 0.7% ODA/GNI target.2 
However, a closer examination reveals that ODA graduation relates to a va-
riety of political and economic questions. These connect with different topics, 
such as identities and alignments of countries in transition, policy implications 
for both graduating countries and DAC donors, financing tools for develop-
ment, innovative modes and instruments of cooperation and the role of private 
actors and civil society. In that way, graduation links with some current major 
debates in international cooperation, embracing both a macro and a micro level, 
a global, regional and national scale, as well as a northern and a southern per-
spective. 
 
A list published by the OECD in 20143 expected 29 countries and territories 
with a total population of 2 billion people to graduate from ODA by 2030. The 
list included China and other G20 countries such as Brazil, Mexico and Turkey, 
medium-sized and small countries such as Malaysia, Gabon and Uruguay, as 
well as a range of small island countries. Economic circumstances have 
changed and not all the countries listed have continued their growth, so ODA 
 
1  ODA is defined as “official government resources that promote and specifically 
target the economic development and welfare of developing countries under con-
cessional financial terms”. See contribution by Ida Mc Donnell in this publication. 
2  Most DAC members (with the exception of the United States and Switzerland) 
commit to the target of raising ODA spending to 0.7% of their national income. 
See OECD 2019. 
3  OECD 2014. 
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graduation is not easy to predict. Therefore, and for other reasons, several coun-
tries and scholars have criticised the criteria for ODA graduation as too narrow.4 
Within the current changes in the international system, emerging countries, 
many of which appear on lists for ODA graduation, play an outstanding role. 
Global world orders and relations of power are shifting. The number of im-
portant players in the multipolar international landscape is increasing. The tran-
sition in the global system has created feelings of insecurity, and the multilateral 
system is being challenged from various sides. At the same time – with the 2030 
Agenda for Sustainable Development – the international community has agreed 
on an ambitious set of goals and principles that address sustainable develop-
ment from at least three different angles, economic, social and ecological, 
which affects the responsibilities of several policy areas and poses substantial 
questions relating to policy coherence. There is broad consensus that emerging 
countries are crucial for achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 
and for protecting and providing global public goods. ODA still has an im-
portant place within the 2030 Agenda, especially regarding support for Least 
Developed Countries (LDCs). However, under the new paradigm of universal-
ity enshrined in the 2030 Agenda, every country must tread its own path to-
wards sustainable development, regardless of national income levels. This con-
trasts with the traditional donor-recipient logic which ODA stands for. The 
Agenda also emphasises the importance of partnerships on an equal footing and 
new forms of collaboration, such as South-South and triangular cooperation5, 
which have been repeatedly underlined since then, e.g. at the Second High-level 
United Nations Conference on South-South Cooperation (‘BAPA+40 Confer-
ence’) in 2019.6 
In this context, several questions arise with regard to the implications of an 
increasing number of countries reaching high-income status and graduation 
from ODA: How do these implications differ in relation to a transitioning coun-
try’s size, economic structure and political weight? How is the process of tran-
sition related to reflections on identity and affiliation, different needs and ex-
pectations, and priorities and strategies? What will happen with respect to de-
velopmental challenges that persist even post-graduation, such as high levels of 
social inequality and high exposure to external shocks? How do countries in 
transition prepare and position themselves for the process of graduating from 
ODA, and how does that connect with the South-South cooperation many coun-
tries increasingly provide? 
 
4  See, for example, Ravaillon 2013 or Vignolo/Van Rompaey 2020. 
5  South-South cooperation is defined by the UN as “a broad framework of collabo-
ration among countries of the South in the political, economic, social, cultural, 
environmental and technical domains”. Triangular cooperation “is collaboration 
in which traditional donor countries and multilateral organisations facilitate South-
South initiatives through the provision of funding, training, management and tech-
nological systems as well as other forms of support”. See UNOSSC 2018. 
6  See UNGA 2019. 
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Questions have also come up about how the graduation process of a country 
affects its international partners. Do they develop exit strategies that help to 
preserve development successes, established networks and links of trust? How 
will they sustain long-term relations with the countries in transition and foster 
value-based partnerships in a strategic manner, for instance to address global 
challenges together also beyond ODA? How do they learn from emerging coun-
tries’ experiences regarding development challenges, like internal social and 
economic inequalities, environmental threats, etc., which are increasingly af-
fecting them as well? Should they rethink their priorities and initiate structural 
changes in order to adapt to these new situations? 
All these questions link ODA graduation to the changes and innovations 
that are currently taking place in the international (development) cooperation 
system, with regard to both systemic and technical issues. In terms of modali-
ties, these include the rise of multi-stakeholder partnerships, global funds and 
networks or triangular cooperation. Next to international organisations and gov-
ernmental institutions, this involves non-state actors like private companies, 
civil society, multilateral development banks and transnational networks. Im-
plementing new knowledge sharing approaches – that are developed both 
within and without the current development cooperation system – also requires 
additional sources of and tools for financing sustainable development. These 
discussions are driven by the need to find new ways of achieving sustainable 
development between an ever-closer North and South and exchanging solutions 
regardless of a country’s developmental status, and they become even more ur-
gent when ODA-based relations are coming to an end. 
 
The points mentioned underline the relevance of ODA graduation from both an 
academic and a political perspective and explain the motivation which lies be-
hind this publication. In 2018, the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale 
Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) launched an internal research-oriented project which 
aimed to analyse ODA graduation processes, their implications for countries in 
transition and international partners, as well as the effects on the future of the 
development cooperation system. As a first component of this project, GIZ sup-
ported the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) in conducting case studies in 
four countries at different stages of graduation from ODA: Botswana, Mexico, 
Chile and the Republic of Korea. Based on semi-structured interviews with rep-
resentatives from governments, non-governmental organisations (NGO) and 
academia, the researchers explored the experiences and needs of these countries 
and made recommendations for managing transition processes, cooperation 
with development partners and cooperation beyond ODA.7 
This publication is the result of the second component of the project, which 
draws on the findings of the first part. Based on the insights of the country 
studies, it aims to broaden the discussion on ODA graduation and highlight its 
 
7  The key results of the studies are outlined in the contribution by Annalisa Prizzon 
in this publication. 
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systemic and political implications, in order to enhance current debates on in-
ternational cooperation and discuss a variety of analytical and practice-related 
questions.  
This is done through moderated dialogues8 on key topics in which the ex-
perts invited share personal views on graduation and the transition in interna-
tional (development) cooperation. Following only a few guiding key questions, 
the purpose was to create space for a fruitful dialogue and an open exchange of 
ideas – to experience and mirror the “beauty of the imperfect”, as one of the 
contributors remarked. In total, seven discussions were recorded and tran-
scribed in January and February 2020. Complementary “spotlights” zoom in to 
specific (sub-)topics related to the focus of the dialogues by emphasising a crit-
ical or particular aspect of the respective theme, or by presenting an exemplary 
initiative or programme. 
The selection of the discussants and authors emphasises diversity. Among 
the contributors are 18 women and 13 men, living and working in 15 different 
countries (and 9 different time zones) in Africa, Asia, Europe, and North and 
South America. They are academics, analysts, practitioners, development bank-
ers, social entrepreneurs and representatives of ministries, implementing agen-
cies and international organisations. This opens the stage to a broad scope of 
perspectives that shed light on the topic from various angles and mutually en-
rich each other, in order to reflect the multiple facets that ODA graduation can 
entail.  
 
The first spotlight text by Ida Mc Donnell defines Official Development Assis-
tance and provides a brief history and some key statistics that underline ODA’s 
economic and political relevance. She discusses the role of ODA in adapting to 
the 21st century’s challenges and contributing to the SDGs.  
In the second spotlight, Annalisa Prizzon, who was the principal researcher 
at ODI to conduct the four case studies mentioned above, outlines their key 
findings. She identifies common trends and lessons in the transition from aid, 
which are a reference point for the following sections. 
In the first dialogue, Imme Scholz and Elizabeth Sidiropoulos assess the 
global ‘status quo’ and embed ODA graduation into the shifting global system.9 
They examine roles and settings in international relations, highlight ongoing 
changes in world politics, such as the contestations of multilateralism, address 
the major challenges that both northern and southern countries are facing and 
draw conclusions for international development cooperation. 
The second dialogue focuses on the implications, challenges and opportu-
nities of ODA graduation for countries in transition.10 Noel Gonzalez, Xiaojing 
 
8  Each discussion was held in a virtual format, co-moderated by an expert and the 
project manager. The latter also gave a general introduction to the topic of gradu-
ation – similar to the messages given in this introduction. 
9  Dialogue 1 was facilitated by Andreas Proksch and Juliane Kolsdorf. 
10  Dialogue 2 was facilitated by Carolina de la Lastra and Juliane Kolsdorf. 
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Mao and Karen van Rompaey look at graduation processes from the perspective 
of countries approaching graduation or having graduated. They underpin the 
different implications that ODA graduation can have for a country depending 
on its size and political relevance. The discussants debate the consequences of 
graduation for national and global developmental challenges, potential shifts in 
identities and affiliations and the transition from being a recipient towards being 
a provider of development cooperation. 
Two additional spotlights complement this section. Thorsten Giehler dis-
cusses the case of China from his German development cooperation perspec-
tive. He argues that (former) donors have difficulty justifying the provision of 
development assistance to China, but due to strategic considerations still have 
a substantial interest in remaining engaged with the country and seeking new 
forms of cooperation.  
Rachel Hayman highlights the role that civil society plays in achieving sus-
tainable development and analyses the effects of ODA graduation on this par-
ticular group of actors. She also provides some suggestions as to how interna-
tional cooperation actors can strengthen civil society, and civic space more gen-
erally, in countries in transition. 
The third dialogue takes the perspective of DAC donors.11 Corinna Küsel, 
Ivan Pavletic, Annalisa Prizzon, Anna Rahm and Markus Schrader share their 
tools and experiences in practice and research on managing transition processes 
and exiting from partner countries. They further discuss the strategic and polit-
ical implications of ODA graduation for ‘donor’ countries’ governments and 
implementing agencies, debating how long-term relations with graduating 
countries can be sustained after withdrawing and which modes of cooperation 
can be pursued beyond ODA.  
The fourth dialogue emphasises the systemic aspects of ODA graduation 
and focuses on global goals and strategic partnerships.12 Joseph D’Cruz, Yuefen 
Li, Stephan Klingebiel and Philani Mthembu identify persisting patterns and 
recent trends in the international landscape. They analyse the role of ODA and 
transition processes in the 2030 Agenda, taking southern perspectives and the 
principle of universality into account. Thereupon, they discuss how the system 
of international (development) cooperation could be transformed and what 
forms of cooperation are needed to achieve the SDGs in and through graduating 
countries. 
The fifth dialogue links ODA graduation to questions of financing for de-
velopment.13 Fanwell Bokosi and Shari Spiegel embed processes of transition 
from aid into international and domestic financial systems and discuss current 
trends and challenges in that respect. They highlight the Addis Ababa Action 
Agenda as the central framework for financing sustainable development and 
indicate ODA’s catalytic role in the international financial architecture. The 
 
11 Dialogue 3 was facilitated by David Nguyen-Thanh and Juliane Kolsdorf. 
12  Dialogue 4 was facilitated by Luiz Ramalho and Juliane Kolsdorf. 
13  Dialogue 5 was facilitated by Ana Kemlein and Juliane Kolsdorf. 
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discussants also point out possible new sources of financing beyond ODA and 
suggest systemic reforms needed to achieve sustainable development. 
This debate is complemented by a spotlight on transition finance by Olivier 
Cattaneo and Cecilia Piemonte. The authors outline OECD’s recent work on 
this issue, which intends to support DAC members in managing transition in 
partner countries better by finding adequate financial support. 
In the sixth dialogue, Riad Ragueb Ahmed, Citlali Ayala, Semih Boyaci and 
Ulrich Wehnert debate modes of, ideas for and innovations in cooperation be-
yond ODA.14 The discussants emphasise the necessity of new visions and per-
spectives that break with the traditional donor-recipient logic and move towards 
partnerships on an equal footing. Thereby they reflect the role of different actors 
and explore new tools and instruments to exchange knowledge on and find so-
lutions to sustainable development. 
Two additional spotlights illustrate the experiences of global networks and 
the incorporation of the private sector in this regard. Nora Sieverding presents 
the Global Alliances for Social Protection, a global project of German develop-
ment cooperation that aims at fostering international dialogue and technical ex-
change on social protection, with a special focus on middle- and upper-middle-
income countries. 
Semi Boyaci introduces the Impact Hub, a network with 102 representations 
around the world, which builds communities of social entrepreneurs, empow-
ering private actors especially from the South and facilitating and scaling inno-
vations for sustainable development.  
The seventh dialogue finally resumes a topic that has been mentioned in 
various occasions when it comes to new forms of international cooperation: the 
role of South-South and triangular cooperation.15 Orria Goni, Nadine Piefer-
Söyler, Martín Rivero and Rita Walraf discuss prospects and challenges for 
South-South and triangular cooperation, referring to different regional and in-
stitutional contexts. They argue how these modalities could be further promoted 
and improved in relation to transition processes and in a setting beyond ODA. 
This is exemplified in a spotlight by Shams Banihani that briefly presents 
the UN South-South Galaxy, a global knowledge sharing platform set up by the 
UN Office for South-South Cooperation (UNOSSC) which aims to scale up 
South-South and triangular cooperation through digital technologies.  
In their conclusions and outlook the editors, together with Carolina de la 
Lastra, reflect the different sections and identify key topics that can be found in 
all dialogues and connect with each other in multiple ways. Drawing on these, 
this publication gives an outlook on the pathways to a possible future beyond 
ODA and discusses parameters of change with the vision of a new universal 
partnership based on global goals and knowledge sharing. 
 
 
14  Dialogue 6 was facilitated by Ulrich Müller and Juliane Kolsdorf. 
15  Dialogue 7 was facilitated by Christof Kersting and Juliane Kolsdorf. 
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Spotlight i: Official Development Assistance in 2020 – 
debated, disrupted and relevant, still. 
Ida Mc Donnell, OECD 
Official development assistance (ODA) is defined by the OECD Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) as official government resources that promote 
and specifically target the economic development and welfare of developing 
countries under concessional financial terms16.  
In 2018, the 29 member countries of the DAC provided 153.3 billion USD 
as official development assistance, accounting for 0.30% of gross national in-
come (grant equivalent measure)17. ODA flows are significantly higher now 
than at the turn of the 21st century. In 2000, total ODA for DAC countries as a 
percentage of GNI was 0.22%. However, growth has levelled out since 2008, 
averaging 0.30% of DAC countries’ GNI over the period. As a whole, global 
ODA efforts fail to match the collective ambition of the 2030 Agenda for Sus-
tainable Development or the development finance commitments and ambitions, 





16  All ODA-related definitions are available here: http://www.oecd.org/dac/financ-
ing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/officialdevelop-
mentassistancedefinitionandcoverage.htm (15.04.2020). 
17  OECD 2020.  
Box 1: Top five ODA providers in 2018: volume and share of GNI 
Top five by volume: United States (34.2 billion USD), Germany (25 bil-
lion USD), the United Kingdom (19.4 billion USD), Japan (14.2 billion 
USD) and France (12.1 billion USD).  
Just five DAC members met or surpassed the UN target for a ratio of 
ODA to GNI of 0.7%: Denmark (0.72%), Luxembourg (0.98%), Norway 
(0.94%), Sweden (1.04%) and the United Kingdom (0.70%). 
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A “gold standard” in flux 
 
The DAC adopted ODA as the “gold standard” of so-called foreign aid in 1969. 
This statistical measure has provided transparency to improve development co-
operation policies while also enabling countries to set targets for increasing 
their development cooperation effort (e.g. 0.7% ODA/GNI target, 0.15-0.20% 
GNI for least developed countries, and input targets in some sectors). Still, the 
definition’s broad focus on promoting economic development and welfare 
means it is open to interpretation. There has always been debate about the ap-
propriateness and credibility of the ODA concept18. These discussions tend to 
be highly technical and highly political, as illustrated in 2017 when the DAC 
could not reach a consensus on the rules for counting ODA contributions in 
private sector instruments19 or debt relief under the new grant equivalent meth-
odology.   
Fifty years since its creation, the strategic role and added value of ODA 
continues to be debated. ODA priorities are shaped by shifting geo-politics, 
economic and fiscal constraints in provider countries as well as progress and 
challenges to international development. In some cases, this translates into de-
mands to adjust ODA rules, which could boost (or undermine) the integrity of 
this gold standard. For example, the 2015 surge in the flows of refugees into 
many DAC member countries led them to clarify the rules for in-donor refugee 
costs two years later20. Similarly, important boundaries have been set on mili-
tary aid or cultural programmes21. Typically, updates to the DAC statistical re-
porting directives promote greater transparency and accountability as well as 
legitimacy for specific issues. The ODA policy markers on gender equality and 
women’s economic empowerment, biodiversity targets and climate change pro-
vide crucial comparative data and an impetus for DAC members to deliver on 
these priorities. The latest marker for ‘The inclusion and empowerment of per-
sons with disabilities’ responds to the pledge in the 2030 Agenda to leave no 
one behind22.  
At recent ministerial level meetings of the DAC (e.g. in 2014 and 2017), 
members emphasised the critical financing role of ODA in countries most in 
need (such as least developed countries, small island developing states, fragile 
contexts), which tend to struggle to attract other external investments, espe-
cially private ones. In least developed countries, ODA represents 60% of 
 
18  Hynes/Scott 2013. 
19  OECD 2018a; OECD 2018b.  
20  OECD 2017. 
21  For more information, see OECD: Official development assistance – definition and 
coverage.  
22  OECD 2018c. 
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external finance compared to 13% for non-LDCs23. Yet, the share of ODA to 
LDCs dropped from 32.5% of the total ODA in 2010 to 29% in 201724. New 
ODA rules, agreed in 2017, give more ODA credit for lending to poorer coun-
tries, reflecting the greater risk providers take in these contexts while serving, 
potentially, as an incentive for them to invest more. The extent to which these 
rules will bear fruit is unclear, but there are promising signs: final OECD data 
for 2018 show that the total ODA from DAC countries to least developed coun-
tries was 45.9 billion USD, an increase of 3% in real terms.  
While the new rules strive to create fairer global distribution of the total 
ODA between countries, the DAC also stresses that ODA plays a critical and 
evolving role in middle-income countries and countries transitioning25 through 
income levels, which face specific challenges and continue to be eligible to re-
ceive ODA26. 
 
Adapting to 21st century challenges  
 
A key question pre-occupying DAC members is how to ensure development 
cooperation is most effective in helping countries deliver the SDGs for all and 
reaching the furthest behind first. The answer depends on its capacity to take 
on the 21st century’s complex development challenges, such as inequality, 
forced displacement, the impacts of climate change or protecting international 
public goods. It also depends on the catalytic role that development cooperation 
plays in the evolving international landscape, where the diversity of public and 
private actors and financial instruments is growing, while ODA budgets appear 
to be plateauing. Providers of development cooperation will need to team up 
with other actors more effectively in this complex global development system27.  
ODA alone cannot provide the trillions needed to fund the 2030 Agenda, 
but it helps in a unique way, thanks to its concessional nature and specific focus. 
DAC members need, however, to shift their focus on assessing performance 
according to the size of budgets; what matters more is maximising and showing 
the unique contribution development cooperation policies, knowledge, ideas 
 
23  OECD 2019. 
24  Ibid.   
25  For more information, see contribution by Cecilia Piemonte and Olivier Cattaneo 
on Transition Finance in this publication. 
26  The threshold for high-income countries graduating from the DAC List of ODA 
recipients is a GNI per capita higher than 12,235 USD for three consecutive years. 
For additional information about graduation from the DAC List of ODA Recipi-
ents, see OECD: History of DAC Lists of aid recipient countries and also the DAC 
HLM Communiqué of 2017. 
27  See Ingram/Lord 2019. 
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and finance (ODA and beyond) actually make to progress in well-being, resili-
ence and sustainability in developing countries.  
Today’s narratives and priorities for development cooperation tend to em-
phasise national, bilateral interests (including commercial) over other principles 
for effective development cooperation28, and multilateral cooperation for peace, 
prosperity and the planet. Yet, when countries signed up to the SDGs, they sup-
ported a shift in thinking about the universal nature of sustainable development: 
ideas of charity, of “us” and “them” and “developed” and “developing”, which 
have underpinned official development assistance since the 1960s, are outdated 
in the face of today’s problems and solutions that are rarely contained or found 
within national borders. Development cooperation, including the mix of official 
financing for development, needs a fresh narrative that explains to a wider pub-
lic what it is, how it operates and why it is needed. The 2019 OECD Develop-
ment Cooperation Report “A Fairer, Greener, Safer Tomorrow”29 proposes a 
call to action to bring the full capacities and resources of the development sys-






28  For more information, see: http://effectivecooperation.org/about/principles/ 
(15.04.2020).  
29  OECD 2019b. 
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Spotlight ii: Moving away from aid – trends from the ex-
perience of Botswana, Chile, Mexico and the Republic 
of Korea 
Annalisa Prizzon, ODI 
Several countries are expected to graduate from ODA and many others to tran-
sition from aid as they approach ODA graduation up to 2030. However, we 
know little about how countries that have completed the transition and gradua-
tion process from aid managed to do so while ensuring that development results 
are sustained when ODA declines or disappears. We also have scarce evidence 
about how development partners should support such countries to maximise the 
effectiveness of their resources, or how countries could engage in global dia-
logue when ODA falls or is no longer an option. 
Calleja and Prizzon30 addressed this gap in policy literature by analysing the 
experiences of four countries: Botswana, Chile, Mexico and the Republic of 
Korea. The economies of these countries reflect three different stages of the 
transition from aid and graduation from ODA: mid-way through the graduation 
from ODA but not yet there (Botswana and Mexico); a recent graduate from 
the list of countries eligible for ODA (Chile in January 2018); and the entire 
transition process, from recipient economy to fully fledged donor (Republic of 
Korea). 
From the four selected countries’ experiences, Calleja and Prizzon31 identi-
fied a series of common trends and valuable lessons in the transition from aid 
and for the new partnerships beyond ODA. We summarise these findings here 
across three dimensions.  
 
Managing the transition from aid 
 
How have these countries sustained development outcomes in managing the 
transition from aid? 
• Management of the transition from aid was not treated as a separate issue 
but was implicit in national development plans, the main instrument for 
ensuring development results. 
 
30  Calleja/Prizzon 2019a. 
31  Ibid. 
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• Government officials from the case study countries did not express con-
cerns about losing access to funding after graduation from the list of coun-
tries eligible for ODA, even at early stages of the transition from aid. In-
stead, the main concerns were about losing access to channels for policy 
dialogue and technical assistance that often accompany loan and grant as-
sistance. 
• Transition from aid disproportionately affected domestic non-governmen-
tal organisations (NGOs), which were often the first to feel the effects of a 
donor’s exit. 
 
Cooperation with development partners 
 
What were the approaches development partners applied and what were the de-
mands from recipient country governments when aid flows fell? 
• Several countries continued to demand technical assistance from develop-
ment partners, particularly for knowledge transfer and skills development, 
including technical vocational education and training. 
• Donors continued to work with countries in transition to support the devel-
opment of international cooperation agencies and strategies for outward as-
sistance and partnerships. 
• Countries have found particular tools useful for transitioning from donor-
recipient relationships to development partnerships – namely, joint funds 
for development cooperation and innovative financing mechanisms. 
 
Cooperation beyond official development assistance 
 
Finally, what were graduating and graduated countries’ expectations for future 
bilateral and multilateral cooperation as they moved away from aid and after 
their graduation from the list of countries eligible for ODA? 
• Triangular cooperation is often considered an important modality for main-
taining relationships with development partners during the transition from 
ODA and beyond, although this importance decreases as the country be-
comes a more established donor. Regional cooperation was also viewed as 
an approach for cooperation beyond ODA, particularly when bilateral rela-
tions are being phased out. 
• Countries in transition expect beyond-aid relations to include economic en-
gagement, scientific and technical cooperation, and support for global and 
regional public goods. 
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• Multilateral spaces – including the OECD, G20, Pacific Alliance and 
SADC – were considered key forums for dialogue and technical change 
post-ODA. 
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Dialogue 1: ODA graduation in times of changing global 
relations and partnerships 
Any political phenomenon can only be properly understood in its broader con-
text. Questions of international cooperation are thus necessarily framed by his-
torical processes and relations of power. We therefore start our first discussion 
with an examination of the global ‘status quo’ and embed the topic of this pub-
lication, ODA graduation, into the shifting world order, analysing current roles 
and settings in international relations and identifying changes in positions, sta-
tus and categories. What are the overarching issues determining world politics 
and who are the old and the new actors driving them? What is the impact of 
these global shifts on international cooperation, especially development coop-
eration? Of what relevance are roles, status and categories and what is the im-
pact of changes in positions and relations? What challenges face multilateralism 
and what ways exist to maintain and renew strategic partnerships and shared 
values?  
The discussion was held between Imme Scholz, Deputy Director of the Ger-
man Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE), 
and Elizabeth Sidiropoulos, Chief Executive of the South African Institute of 
International Affairs. It was facilitated by Andreas Proksch, Director General 
of the Department for Sector and Global Programmes at GIZ and Juliane 
Kolsdorf, editor of this publication. 32  
 
Let me start with a brief anecdote. After finishing university, I myself [Andreas 
Proksch] was at the German Development Institute for the Postgraduate 
Course. On the first day of the course, there was a very flamboyant head of 
department talking to us about possible world models, as he called it at that 
time. He wanted to give us an idea of the latest thinking on the future develop-
ment of our world, of our political system on our planet. At that time, the world 
was still very clearly divided into the rich and the poor, the North and the South, 
and already one of his ideas about the future was that this easy and clear dis-
tinction would gradually become lost in the years and decades to come, up to a 
point where we would have to face the possibility of arriving at a completely 
chaotic system in which it is no longer possible to make a clear distinction be-
tween the roles and positions of all the different nations and countries. I still 
 
32  For better distinction from the discussants, the inputs and questions by the facili-
tators are displayed in italic without naming the respective person. 
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see him standing at the flipchart, thinking decades ahead, and today, nearly 40 
years later, we are discussing similar issues, also with the same institute.  
We all know that the status quo is changing rapidly, and we would like to 
use the time with you to look in a bit more detail at what the global status quo 
is, and what the major ongoing changes are. We would naturally like to shed 
some light on the issue of different countries moving towards ODA graduation: 
bigger, powerful players like China, Brazil, Turkey and also smaller actors, 
like Chile, Malaysia, small island countries, etc. We want to discover what role 
these two groups could play in shaping international orders, relations and part-
nerships. Let us start with how the shifting world order is affecting international 
cooperation. How would you describe the current global order at present? 
Elizabeth Sidiropoulos: It is in transition. It is highly unpredictable. It is remi-
niscent of Gramsci’s analysis in the 1930s that the old is dead but the new is 
not yet born.33 It is also an environment where identities, distinctions and clas-
sifications are becoming much more diffuse and much less defined. If I reflect 
on conversations that are happening here in South Africa, some of the debates 
are almost a bit anachronistic in that they are occurring and reflecting a narra-
tive that is 30, 40 years old, but at the same time, the way in which countries 
like South Africa are engaging pragmatically takes account of the fact that this 
is now a very different world from the 60s and the 70s, as you alluded to in your 
introduction. It was a North-South world, a very clear polar distinction. That is 
now much less the case; it has become much more mixed. And certainly, in the 
debate that is happening in the North, there is also a very clear realisation that 
there are significant developmental challenges even in wealthy countries; and 
that is the whole debate around inequality.  
Basically, everything that we have learned at university and that we have 
engaged with over the last few decades is now being questioned: international 
cooperation, which development economists and people working in the devel-
opment field thought was an important contribution by the North to help the 
South, to help poor economies. Southern actors would say it was also a histor-
ical responsibility, the result of the legacies of colonialism, that the North has 
an obligation to do that.  
With all the geopolitical changes happening, that more altruistic dimension 
of a discussion around international cooperation has also been questioned and 
perhaps eroded. In certain countries less, in others more, but I would argue that 
it is a very clear trend across the world. Some of that has been a result of the 
rise of new actors from the developing world, who take a very different ap-
proach to international cooperation. It is all about mutual benefit and it is about 
commercial opportunities, not about charity.  
 
33  See Gramsci et al. 1971. 
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Imme Scholz: I think there are several sources of these changes. One is that 
rising powers – not only the large regional powers and new global players you 
alluded to but a second grouping, middle-income countries – are moving to-
wards graduation from ODA while retaining many characteristics of what we 
used to call underdevelopment, regarding state capacities, redistribution of in-
come, social and economic infrastructure and knowledge capacities, although I 
would say except for China, which is really a special case. There are changes 
in economic shares and participation in trade and in finance, but I want to high-
light the remaining disparities.  
A second source of this changing world order is the weakening of the mul-
tilateral system as we used to know it, its principles, its rules, its institutions, its 
procedures, which has to do especially with the emergence of China and Russia 
and with the recent political divisions within “the West”. These trends question 
the Westphalian system and the expectation of the “West” that economic de-
velopment goes along with a development of institutions and political regimes 
towards democracy, participation and human rights.  For me, the changes we 
are now witnessing in political references, nationally and globally, are fright-
ening because our only historical reference is that in such situations, war will 
break out. We do not know what war will look like, but I think this is clearly 
on the cards.  
And third, I would add the degree and plurality of environmental changes 
we are facing. The fires in Australia have shown that vulnerability to global 
environmental change is not only a feature of developing countries or of ex-
tremely poor and vulnerable countries. 
So, I would see these three sources and, of course, they interact. The ways 
of understanding short-term crises or deep crises and dealing with them which 
we have used in the past do not seem to hold anymore. We had an approach in 
2008 and 2009 to the global crisis of the financial system – but will it work next 
time? The references are unclear today. 
Elizabeth Sidiropoulos: Just to take this further: about ten years ago, there was 
a lively academic debate about the fact that the liberal international order is 
constructed in such a way that it is open enough to be able to adapt and to bring 
in people and countries who can feel that they are part of it.34 The liberal inter-
national order, as it was constituted, particularly in the immediate post-Cold 
War time, was beneficial to emerging economies. Suddenly, China benefitted 
significantly from the system, as did many other developing economies. And 
certain academics wrote that the liberal order as such is open enough to be able 
to adapt – so that we do not have to deal with the Thucydides trap, what Graham 
Allison referred to in his book a few years ago, about the fact that when a rising 
 
34  See Ikenberry 2008. 
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power disrupts the dominant hegemon, it often ends up badly, or even in war35. 
But what we have really seen in the last seven or eight years is that this is not 
the case. It is not the case because countries like China, emerging superpowers, 
do believe that they need to be able to stamp their authority and their particular 
views on norms on the system. This has gone together with the coming to power 
of president Xi; he has taken a much more assertive approach in international 
affairs.  
So, the response from those that have all the power in the global system has 
been: we will give as much as we have to give but not more, and it will take a 
long time. For example, if you look at the way in which the reforms to the quota 
system in the IMF happened from 2010 onwards: it took forever to bring incre-
mental changes to the voting proportions within the IMF. As China particularly 
has risen and has asserted itself, becoming the second largest economy, it has 
also felt much more confident about being able to cooperate in certain areas but 
to contest in others. You can call this contested cooperation. And you see that 
with several other developing regional powers or emerging powers from the 
global South. South Africa is an example of that. The country is not very pow-
erful, but you find that it cooperates in certain institutions and helps to build 
them up, but in other cases, it complains about the fact that these institutions 
are not changing quickly enough. And then it works with China or Russia, who 
it believes are able to push for change or to create alternative global institutions 
in parallel, maybe not to replace but to contest the traditional ones. 
 
Both of you have already hinted at repercussions on international cooperation 
and development cooperation. Do you dare to look a little bit into the future? 
What do you think will happen in this regard?  
Imme Scholz: Let me start with a clarification of what I said before: the global 
order is also changing because it is being questioned by Western powers. The 
influence of Donald Trump cannot be underestimated, and I really thought I 
should reread the G-Zero book by Ian Bremmer36 – it is not US and China, it 
really seems to be Zero what we are seeing.  
If we think of the impact of these changes on international cooperation, I 
see that sometimes the terms international cooperation and development coop-
eration are used interchangeably. The international cooperation system needs 
to be reformed and the 0.7% target37 which you mentioned in your introduction 
could really be a disincentive for modernising this system. In a way, it is part 
 
35  Allison 2017. 
36 Bremmer 2012. 
37 Refers to the commitment stated by most DAC donors to achieve the target of 
spending 0.7 per cent of their GNI on ODA measures. For further information, 
see: https://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/the07odagnitarget-ahistory.htm (15.04.2020). 
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of the old narratives, the outlived narratives that Elizabeth mentioned. Of 
course, I do not dismiss the claim of Least Developed Countries (LDCs). But 
questioning the 0.7% target is often, just for political reasons, interpreted as 
questioning the need for international cooperation for poverty reduction. But 
that is not the point.  
What is becoming clear now is that the global system is changing very much 
and so many foundations we took for granted are shaking. International coop-
eration and development cooperation, you mentioned the altruistic justification, 
have always been part of the multilateral system of cooperation. So, if multilat-
eralism is now being weakened – because more and more countries adopt a 
short-term perspective or see their national interests as juxtaposed to interna-
tional cooperation because they understand it as a zero-sum game – then, inter-
national cooperation for preserving peace and the rule of law, and for working 
jointly towards what we define as shared interests or the global common good, 
will become more and more difficult. Elizabeth mentioned the keywords: it is 
mutual interests, it is commercial interests, and the need to reform multilateral 
institutions but it is not clear how to reach it. This means that we are in transi-
tion, but it is not clear where we are going exactly. Democratic countries inter-
ested in maintaining and reforming multilateralism need both a value-based and 
a pragmatic approach towards international cooperation at the same time. We 
cannot afford a purely value-based approach because we need to cooperate with 
countries with different value systems such as China and Russia. And we can 
no longer base this cooperation on the illusion that the richer China gets, the 
more liberal it will be and that by some miracle it will suddenly turn into a 
democracy. If you imagine democratic elections now in China, what would be 
the effect? Who and what types of programme would the Chinese electorate 
vote for? After decades without free public debate, without a free media, how 
would this large and heterogenous society achieve consensus on how to solve 
the challenges of the 21st century? What role would they like to see their country 
play on the global arena? The need for renewed and energetic international co-
operation is large and immediate which means that you have to look out for 
new partners and maintain old ones. It is new territory we are walking on. In 
that sense, depending on the objectives, we will have to look for a flexible ge-
ometry in international cooperation with variable alliances, and at the same time 
reform existing alliances. This is true as much for negotiations within the G20 
as within the UN at large, within conventions (e.g. on climate) as well as within 
the G7, and at regional level. 
Elizabeth Sidiropoulos: To pick up on the question of international versus de-
velopment cooperation: in terms of development cooperation, I see it has be-
come much more mercantilist, much more interest-driven. In terms of interna-
tional cooperation, if we think about it in the bigger context of the global public 
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goods, it is going to be a bit of a hybrid, and I suppose development cooperation 
will be as well. It is not that everybody has turned their back on recognising the 
importance of the SDGs or that there is not a need to cooperate to tackle today’s 
challenges, whether we are talking about climate change or trade. I do not think 
that this is going to become what Ian Bremmer says in his book, ‘every nation 
for itself’, notwithstanding what is happening in the US. The problem is that 
the US acts almost as a lightning rod to which people or countries respond. 
When it takes on this highly nationalistic insular approach, other countries tend 
to respond accordingly, and that is critical. At the same time, at some levels 
there is international cooperation, there is political will. And I do not think that 
is going to be taken away.  
But we need to let go of the belief that we are going to develop an entirely 
harmonised, universal approach to international cooperation, more importantly 
to measuring international cooperation or progress, etc. That is the bit about 
pragmatism that Imme was talking about. For me, the big challenge in the dis-
cussions around the SDGs is that we are coming in with different approaches 
to how to measure development and who is responsible. Imme used the example 
of the 0.7 per cent. If we are going in with certain red lines in this current milieu, 
we are not going to get results; we are not going to create opportunities to move 
beyond the deadlocks. 
 
I fully agree. Let us look into the group of countries heading for ODA gradua-
tion. Do you think that the label of being eligible for ODA or being a high-
income country affects the policy of their governments? How is ODA gradua-
tion affecting these countries internally?  
Imme Scholz: Looking at the 2030 Agenda, the metrics for saying “international 
cooperation is needed to achieve those goals” is not the per capita income be-
cause it is a universal agenda which needs active participation by all countries. 
The metrics for graduating, 12,000 US dollars income per capita for three years 
in a row, are extremely simplistic. They are also part of the old narrative be-
cause we all know that a certain level of income per capita does not say anything 
about real income distribution, and it does not say much about the quality of 
public services. The need for cooperation and knowledge sharing and, to a cer-
tain extent, resource-sharing to solve urgent and major problems do not disap-
pear when you reach this level of 12,000 US dollars income per capita for three 
years in a row. So, that is a mismatch in criteria.  
In Europe today’s variations of social security systems, workers’ rights and 
collective rights and democratic institutions emerged in the 19th and 20th cen-
tury. After two world wars the West found a way to achieve what Karl Polanyi38 
 
38  Polanyi 1957. 
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described as the “great transformation” of capitalist economies into societies 
with social regulation and inclusive political institutions. Today, we know that 
this is not sufficient, and that the relationship between economies, societies and 
nature also needs to be transformed, as described in the flagship report of the 
WBGU in 2011.39  History usually does not repeat itself and developing coun-
tries are going through their own historical processes of conflict and learning. 
In the aid system, we did not find an answer yet to how to really promote or 
support the change in regulating systems to improve both the distribution of 
income and the provision of public services. A recent blog from the Centre for 
Global Development40 focuses on the impacts of graduation on the financing of 
public health services and universal health coverage. They looked at the expe-
riences of several African countries with the Global Fund against AIDS, Tuber-
culosis and Malaria (GFATM) and specifically the dialogue instruments the 
Global Fund uses for reducing donor dependency and supporting partners in 
defining own priorities in health policy and practice. But its engagement in di-
alogue remained, as they called it, ‘theatre’ played with the donors – donor-
driven processes could not solve the fundamental problems of giving political 
priority to health issues and mobilise sufficient domestic financial resources 
which GFATM funding would have complemented in specific areas.  
This is the difficulty we are facing. There were many efforts to solve the 
dependency problems aid creates, including the Accra Agenda on aid effective-
ness, with weak results. At the same time, we see continuous need for investing 
in international cooperation for tackling common and global problems and have 
to become more effective jointly. The costs of failure will have a global dimen-
sion. 
Elizabeth Sidiropoulos: I cannot speak for what the debate in many of these 
graduating countries may be, whether it is a debate happening at a very closed 
elite level, whether it matters or not. But you are looking at significant varia-
tions; countries in transition may have very different societies and public sys-
tems in place. Per capita income is an arbitrary figure and one that absolutely 
does not tackle the problem. In my own country, South Africa, we have the 
highest Gini coefficient in the world41. We are a middle-income country, but 20 
minutes outside my office we have the poverty of any low-income country. The 
ODA categorisation by income per capita is a metric that maybe makes sense 
for economists, but it is increasingly being contested. Lorenzo Fioramonti from 
the University of Pretoria tackled many of these issues in a book called ‘GDP’ 
 
39  WBGU 2011.  
40  Sabino et al. 2020. 
41  The Gini index measures the extent to which the distribution of income among 
individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal dis-
tribution. 
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in 2013. GDP referred to ‘gross domestic problem’ rather than the ‘gross do-
mestic product’42.   
As regards the effect of graduation on actual policies, particularly if we look 
at countries in Africa, we are talking about states and governments that have 
begun, for example, to tackle some of the issues around domestic revenue gen-
eration in terms of taxation. But a lot of that is still, certainly if you are looking 
at lower-middle-income countries, coming from the commodity sector and 
from extractives. That link between a government’s accountability to citizens 
as a result of taxation is still not there; that social contract is often missing. And 
that is part of addressing the issues around aid and dependency, which has not 
been overcome. Some of the discussions we have had here in southern Africa 
underline that you cannot take that metric at face value. But you also need to 
think about specific targeted engagements that are critical for development that 
ODA would have been able to help, even in countries that have reached a par-
ticular level of income. Health is one, issues around the justice system are an-
other, or education and so on. And I am now looking at the South African case, 
which is often sui generis in the continent. Some of the development coopera-
tion that is still coming in is highly targeted through government agencies to 
address these very significant structural problems. Graduation does not address 
the structural problems, whether they are economic or social. I think the criteria 
need to factor that in.  
 
Allow me a very brief side question. If you look at the list of the 29, in a number 
of these countries people have called the entire set-up of their society into ques-
tion in recent months. For instance, in Chile, a country that graduated in 2018, 
the people went onto the streets and said: we do not accept this system, we do 
not accept this government and we do not accept the way our society is struc-
tured any longer. I find this extremely interesting and I ask myself: should it 
give us hope that pressure changes things and that these countries will speed 
up on their route of development or is it a symbol of the danger that they are 
all caught in the middle-income trap?  
Imme Scholz: The specific process of transformation and of changing the econ-
omy, the rules, the institutions and the capacities for having a more just society 
and a society which is more capable of change will be a specific story in each 
country. In Chile, of course, the story is very much linked to the dictatorship 
and how the transition from dictatorship to democracy was structured by the 
new constitution put in place under Pinochet. This constitution made it very 
difficult to revise the deregulation and privatisation decisions made in the 1970s 
and 1980s.  That is what people are demonstrating against, and it is not clear 
 
42  Fioramonti 2013. 
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what the result of the constitutional reform process will be. I was asked by Chil-
ean friends what German cooperation can do to help Chileans to understand and 
actively shape the process of the new constitutional assembly they will have. I 
contacted several NGOs, and apparently the political party foundations have 
most liberty to act in this case. The large NGOs which receive funding from the 
official development budget cannot act because the country is no longer ODA-
eligible. In that sense, the graduation process means we are kicking the instru-
ments we have for funding international cooperation out of our hands. I think it 
will come to the question of what the incentive can be for countries like Ger-
many to continue investing in international cooperation, even if it does not fac-
tor into the 0.7% target.  
But you were asking: Will we see positive changes in these countries? I 
think that we will see popular protests, but it is extremely unclear how they will 
be translated into political decisions and whether they will trigger a change for 
the better. The 2030 Agenda is innovative because it reminds us of the connec-
tions between altruism and realism. The 2030 Agenda is built on the conviction 
that in the 21st century, most challenges that countries and societies are facing 
are of a global nature – either because they are caused by many and have an 
impact on all, or because they are common challenges shared by most. Interna-
tional cooperation helps to address both kinds of challenges, especially those 
which are of a systemic nature and too large for national problem-solving. Local 
failure will not only be felt locally.  Therefore, it is both a matter of supporting 
fellow human societies and in our own social, economic and political interest 
to cooperate. With regards to Chile or other countries with social protest move-
ments: If we are interested in keeping a peaceful order and in keeping the law 
of the jungle under control, we need to support the processes which help such 
protests have a productive outcome. 
Elizabeth Sidiropoulos: Absolutely. There have been popular protests in many 
parts of the African continent as well in recent times. We saw some of them in 
the Arab Spring. South Africa, over the last six or seven years, experienced a 
mushrooming of popular protests, many of which are not even documented; 
some were only at local government level. The challenge that we have seen on 
the continent is to take the mobilisation of people on the streets into the corri-
dors of power. There needs to be leadership and there needs to be a path to 
convert the popular protest into something tangible. You are not going to have 
anything concrete in the short term. Particularly where you have a military, a 
deep state – Egypt and probably Zimbabwe are interesting examples in that 
regard – you have people pushing for this change, but actually there is no 
change. Instead, it is simply the elite wearing a different outfit and re-entrench-
ing itself. We also see that to some extent in South Africa. I do not think we 
have a deep state yet; we have state capture, but I think there is a recognition 
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among some in the political elite of the need for change. But that change is 
coming very slowly. And it is going to be very different in different countries, 
given their different historical contexts.  
In terms of the rationale for international cooperation, it is absolutely about 
the law of the jungle not being allowed to take over. And what does that mean? 
We have also been thinking about this in the conversations around a project on 
what South Africa’s international relations should look like in the 2020s. And, 
maybe with the exception of the US and China, I think the rest of the world 
really does benefit from a system where the rule of law exists. It may not always 
be applied, we know that, but at least there are rules – it is not about “might is 
right” but about rules and regulations and norms. 
Imme Scholz: And accountability. 
Elizabeth Sidiropoulos: Yes. Especially in the Europe-Africa context, there 
should be a convergence of interests in international cooperation from northern 
as well as emerging countries because we have common interests. We also have 
certain common values; they might not be entirely the same, but we recognise 
that, for instance, if we do not tackle climate change effectively, we are all go-
ing to suffer. Similarly, having rules regulating trade ensures you do not have a 
sort of gunboat diplomacy (when Major Perry arrived with his gunboats in Ja-
pan in the 1860s and said: “Open up your market.”) We do not want that kind 
of thing. We should all be working together: like-minded countries who are 
small, who are middle powers, who are regional powers, because it is in our 
interest to ensure that the unilateral G-Zero, the ‘everybody for himself’ kind 
of world is not in our interest; not at a time when some of the biggest challenges 
we are facing are transnational.  
Going forward, if we are having a conversation about international cooper-
ation, that is also about how we are engaging and cooperating at a domestic 
level with the said graduating countries because they can be important drivers 
in their region, and also about how we can make sure that there is a balance 
between domestic and global cooperation, on issues like climate change, spe-
cifically. 
 
We have been talking already about the value-based approach and briefly 
touched upon the role of a country like Germany. What role should it assume 
vis-à-vis the countries moving towards graduation? What should Germany 
change in its international approach and in its international cooperation? 
Imme Scholz: From the perspective of a universal agenda for change, the coop-
eration system should transit towards a goal-based system and not a country-
grouping-based system. At the same time, we know that geographic location 
makes a big difference, and everybody agrees that it is Europe which should 
invest especially in cooperation with Africa and with the Mediterranean and 
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Near or Middle East. On the other hand, the ties Germany has with China are 
completely independent from it being on a graduation list or not. In that sense, 
Germany as a country needs a nuanced approach, both geographically, what we 
call the neighbourhood and the broader neighbourhood around the EU, and with 
respect to policy areas. It should also look at what the importance of German 
engagement is in comparison with other powers. What is the EU doing, what is 
Germany doing and what are other strong actors doing? In that sense, it is great 
that we have the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs because they are relevant domes-
tically and internationally across ministries, and we have seen that very clearly 
in Germany. The Agenda is not embraced only or most strongly by the Ministry 
for Economic Cooperation and Development, BMZ. We have the Ministry of 
the Environment, we have the Ministry of Health, but then we do not see con-
comitant increases in funding for international cooperation across these minis-
tries. That is clearly lagging behind. But it will be a mixture of policy-area-
oriented goals like climate and also geographical targeting.  
In that sense, you have to think of the broader picture, beyond how it always 
was – Europe and Africa, or North America and South America. For Latin 
Americans, their relationship with Europe has always been important as a coun-
terweight to North America. But the signs are not looking so good for the 
broader picture because our capacities are absorbed between China, the US, the 
Middle East and Africa. From the perspective of maintaining and defending the 
multilateral cooperation system, that is not satisfactory. 
I think that Germany needs to step up its capacities for international coop-
eration, knowledge-wise but also policy-wise. We have underdeveloped capac-
ities for that across the board and in the ministries. They have sector capacities 
but not country capacities and, typically for a large economy, we look inwardly 
too much and not sufficiently outwards. 
Elizabeth, you are from South Africa. What do you recommend Germany to do 
regarding our international policy on countries moving up the income ladder 
and eventually approaching graduation? 
Elizabeth Sidiropoulos: First, it is important to note that Germany, probably 
unlike many other European countries, is viewed fairly positively on the Afri-
can continent. That is important in terms of cooperation. Notwithstanding Na-
mibia perhaps, Germany is viewed differently from, for example, France, and 
that is important to recognise – also in the context of two key issues that domi-
nate the discussion between Africa and Europe: migration and violent extrem-
ism. The two are interrelated and have an impact on how European and bilateral 
cooperation plays itself out in Africa, particularly around development support. 
A lot of the assistance is being securitised and linked to migration. A lot of the 
support to countries in East Africa, in North Africa and to the Sahel is based on 
that linkage. And that also addresses the issue of what values Europe and 
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Germany are advancing, and it is not necessarily seen through the prism of hu-
man rights or good governance or democracy. Moreover, just to mention it 
briefly, talking about international cooperation, Europe as a whole needs to 
think about the fact that European taxation systems actually enable some of the 
theft and growing inequality in certain countries. 
I think there are a number of areas where Germany is really well positioned 
to take advantage of the upcoming graduation of countries, in terms of cooper-
ation. Technology cooperation, science and innovation cooperation play an im-
portant role and could be linked again to climate, to specific SDGs. This kind 
of cooperation, both at a research level and at a technical level in agencies, 
could be extremely useful, and could also help to create sectoral opportunities 
in those countries for investment, because, ultimately, that is also key for many 
of these countries. Some of them might be graduating, but they need to also 
build up their economic sectors in terms of services and manufacturing at the 
same time. This requires a highly nuanced approach.  
I think the point is about looking at this through a different lens: it is not just 
about whether a particular country has reached a particular level in terms of 
income, but about which of the big challenges, as reflected in the SDGs, are 
acutely felt in particular countries and regions – some of the issues around en-
ergy, water, climate change and resources on land. It makes sense to look at the 
broader ramifications for the region and develop international cooperation that 
takes those issues into account. It is important to look at these challenges re-
gionally because that also includes graduating countries which can act as mo-
tors, and you can probably get ‘more bang for your buck’ than if you think about 
it only in one particular country. 
 
We have already discussed that multilateralism is not in a very good state right 
now and my question is: Will the changes in the international system and a 
number of countries moving towards ODA graduation be helpful or detrimental 
to the multilateral system? You mentioned that emerging countries want to 
leave their individual imprint and may become less willing to be bound by ex-
isting international law. Do we have to fear that a higher number of countries 
reaching high-income status might mean a death blow to multilateralism?  
Imme Scholz: Well, if we take Turkey, we are talking about Erdogan Turkey 
and if we are talking about Brazil, we are talking about Bolsonaro Brazil. But 
two years ago, it was not Bolsonaro Brazil. That is why I said we need to step 
up our knowledge capacities. We need to understand those countries much bet-
ter. I do not think it is automatic that countries move to a higher income status 
and then suddenly become unilateralists or apply ‘my country first’ approaches. 
Even Bolsonaro has seen that Trump does not do many things in his favour.  
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So, I think in a way we are confronted with our own legacy, because we in 
the West thought that we could just pretend that the multilateral and rule-based 
system would go on as it was although it did not work well for all countries 
across the globe. We did not have war between rich countries, but we had a lot 
of wars in developing countries, and it is this kind of blindness and double 
standards which are now falling back down onto us. And they are falling onto 
the multilateral system. It will not help us to defend multilateralism if we deny 
that part, the dark side of the history, of the last few decades, and how develop-
ment cooperation was also a part of that. That is what I like about Macron’s 
approach. I think it was in 2018 when he claimed in a speech before the UN 
general assembly: We need to change the multilateral system.43 And changing 
it also means accepting that our role in it and our weight will be diminished. As 
Elizabeth said, there are two large countries which can try to impose their will, 
but the rest of us are small.  
Elizabeth Sidiropoulos: I think the first point is that multilateralism is a very 
important principle that all African countries subscribe to. Having said that, I 
believe it is also important for Europe and others to recognise that the current 
institutions of multilateralism must change. If I just look at my country, South 
Africa is a committed multilateralist. But it does not always agree with the way 
in which things have been run, or who calls the shots, or the informal rules of 
multilateralism, and believes these need to change. There is a big challenge for 
Europe and for the US worth discussing today. At some point, some of the 
countries that are committed multilateralists will just give up trying to reform 
the present system, if the present system does not change markedly and quickly 
enough. If it takes you eight years to agree on whether you are going to give up 
five percentage points of voting rights in the IMF or whatever it is, that is a 
problem. Because at some point someone will say: to hell with you, I am going 
to set up my own structures. Of course, South Africa cannot do that on its own, 
Egypt cannot do it on its own and Brazil cannot do it on its own, but they can 
hitch their wagon, as I said, to other countries that are perhaps less committed 
multilateralists. The first big challenge and the urgency is for key countries that 
have power in the multilateral institutions, and it is not just the US, to really 
drive a reform agenda together with developing countries, with key developing 
countries. It is about relinquishing power, and perhaps the best example hap-
pened in my country with Frederik Willem de Klerk in 1990. Nobody thought 
on 2 February 1990 that he would start a process whereby the National Party 
would actually relinquish power. But it happened and it happened peacefully. 
If the West keeps on holding onto power and giving as little as it possibly can, 
the polarisation within the multilateral system is going to grow.  
 
43  France Diplomatie 2018. 
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On the role of graduating countries: in many ways, their development can 
enrich the multilateral system, but it will also make it much more difficult. If 
you are looking at countries that are now moving up the income chain, these 
countries are also developing more agency. And if you develop more agency, 
you will also feel more empowered to come in with your own positions and 
articulate them, whereas in the past you may have had a position, but you were 
a little unsure of yourself and did not want to play that role. That means that it 
is going to become messier, if it was not already messy enough, in terms of 
global negotiations or any agreement on metrics or how you evaluate this or 
how you move forward on that. But that does not necessarily have to be bad for 
multilateralism, provided we are all moving in the same direction. Some of my 
colleagues and South Africans have been very keen on the arrival of the multi-
polar world. But the arrival of the multipolar world does not necessarily mean 
that it is going to be easily more multilateral. 
 
As a last question, or closing statement, what aspect do you think has been 
missing? What would you like to add about ODA graduation in times of chang-
ing global relations and partnerships?  
Imme Scholz: Maybe we should look into the incentives or how to motivate 
other ministries to invest more in international cooperation and, at the same 
time, learn from what did work in the aid world and what not. Let me give 
another example: I am part of the Global Health Hub Germany44, a multi-stake-
holder platform created around the German Ministry of Health’s approach to 
embracing a global health policy and for enabling all types of actors to cooper-
ate in global health. This is a very laudable initiative and badly needed in a 
globalized world where health systems are weak in many countries with large 
or growing populations. The platform was welcomed by many scientists, NGOs 
and health professionals. It is, however, unclear how the voluntary engagement 
of these stakeholders in identifying new areas of cooperation in global health 
will be linked to the health ministry’s own activities in this area or whether 
there will be additional funding for non-state activities.  If things are kept sep-
arate that way, the Hub will work below its potential.  There is clearly room for 
more engagement and innovation to strengthen multilateral international coop-
eration under new framework conditions. 
Elizabeth Sidiropoulos: To look at that from the opposite point of view, it is 
also important from the side of graduating countries to engage and develop 
 
44  The Global Health Hub Germany is a platform funded by the Federal Ministry of 
Health. It aims to connect people and organisations who are “committed for a [sic] 
better health for all people all over the world” and enable them to work together 
for interactive and interdisciplinary solutions. For more information, see 
https://www.globalhealthhub.de/en (15.04.2020).  
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domestic constructions and frameworks for international cooperation. Some 
emerging donors and powers are establishing their own agencies and systems 
to carry out international cooperation. And this could also be about exploring 
the opportunities of how international actors like GIZ might engage to encour-
age that, also in graduating countries, and about linking it back to some of their 
national development objectives as well as the SDGs.  
In the end, this is a changing world and we have been discussing here about 
a framework that has been in existence from before this time, from before the 
huge seismic shifts of the last four to five years. We need a bit of a paradigm 
shift in that as well. This discussion, I think, is part of that. But we really need 
to be moving some of the big international institutions into a new sphere of 
thinking about ODA. 
Imme Scholz: I have been thinking about the processes which Polanyi describes 
in “The Great Transformation”. He paints a very stark picture of how long the 
wealthy and the powerful could not see how they could spare a pound or a mark 
for the redistribution of incomes and social systems. They could not see it. And 
I think this is exactly our blindness now. We cannot see how important it is to 
invest in this international cooperation. We prefer to go on with our spending 
routines within Germany, and we do not see the need to invest more and differ-
ently in international cooperation. That is the blindness we have now. 
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Dialogue 2: Implications, challenges and opportunities 
of ODA graduation for countries in transition 
According to current DAC rules, countries graduate from being eligible to re-
ceive ODA when they have been classified as high-income countries for three 
consecutive years by the World Bank. However, the group of countries pro-
jected to reach this stage by 2030 is highly diverse: it includes countries with 
small populations but stable economic conditions, like Botswana, Gabon or 
Costa Rica, medium-sized growing economies like Colombia and Malaysia, re-
gional powers and G20 members such as Brazil and Turkey, and also the global 
superpower China. Therefore, the implications of ODA graduation for these 
countries differ widely, depending on the country’s size and economic strength, 
its internal challenges and geopolitical importance. 
Contrasting the perceptions of Uruguay, which graduated from ODA in 
2018, Mexico and China, both of which have been projected to graduate by 
203045, we explore particular views on the topic. How have these countries ex-
perienced the process of graduation or how are they preparing for it? What are 
their needs and expectations, in the process as such and towards international 
partners? What are the challenges and opportunities surrounding ODA gradua-
tion? Highlighting each country’s individual perspective, we want to discuss 
the transition towards becoming a provider, a potential shift in their identities 
and positioning in the system of international development cooperation, and 
their vision for a post-ODA world. 
The discussion was held between Noel González Segura, Deputy Head of 
the Mission of Mexico to the European Union, Belgium and Luxembourg, 
Xiaojing Mao, Senior Research Fellow at the Chinese Academy of International 
Trade and Economic Cooperation, and Karen van Rompaey, Knowledge Man-
ager at the Uruguayan Agency for International Cooperation. It was facilitated 
by Carolina de la Lastra, a Chile-based development consultant, and Juliane 
Kolsdorf, editor of this publication.46  
 
Let us begin by talking about how you would interpret the graduation process 
from the different perspectives of your countries. We all know the technical ex-
planation of the OECD and the per-capita-income criterion. Karen, as a 
 
45  OECD 2014. 
46  For better distinction from the discussants, the inputs and questions by the facili-
tators are displayed in italic without naming the respective person. 
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pioneer in graduation, how was the process? How were you prepared and what 
consequences have you experienced since graduation? 
Karen van Rompaey: I consider that the process of “graduation” lacked clarity 
and formality. We learned that Uruguay was in the process of being graduated 
from ODA through our regional partner Chile47, because Chile is a full member 
of the OECD and they had been filled in with this information. The process at 
this stage was that every time the Development Assistant Committee revised 
the list of countries eligible for ODA, they would put an asterisk in the list, and, 
in very small print, they would put the names of the countries that were in the 
process of graduation. This was a rule that we were not aware of. So, if we had 
not had our close relations with Chile, we would not even have been properly 
informed until who knows when. Of course, as Uruguay had been classified as 
a high-income country by the World Bank, we were aware that this would entail 
some changes, but we did not know how fast these changes were going to hap-
pen and we were not aware of the rules of the DAC since they are a closed 
group. And it was not only the Uruguayan government that was not aware of 
that rule, but also our cooperation partners on the ground. It was something they 
were maybe predicting for the future, but the future was coming faster than we 
all thought. So, early in 2016 there was no explicit exit from ODA strategy on 
the part of the government, but there was also no strategy from the DAC donors 
to support Uruguay during the graduation process. 
When we realised that we were going to be graduated from ODA, we started 
to ask ourselves: What does this imply? What are the consequences of being 
graduated from ODA? What are the wider implications? Are we going to be 
perceived as a ‘developed’ country now? Are we going to have to give 0.7 per 
cent of our GDP to others? We started to seek documents or studies, but there 
were none. In consequence, we thought this was something that really needed 
to be studied further. Some people researching at universities were starting to 
look into this matter and we formed alliances with them so that they could pro-
vide us with thoughts and information on the wider consequences of being grad-
uated as a basis for informing our policymakers. Was it good news? Was it bad 
news? What was behind the title of being ‘graduated from ODA’? From that 
moment on, we defined a two-fold strategy: advocacy at the international level 
and a white paper (“Política de Cooperación Internacional de Uruguay para el 
Desarrollo Sostenible al 2030”) together with our national stakeholders and in 
dialogue with those DAC donors on the ground who acknowledged that Uru-
guay still needed to strengthen capacities to transition towards sustainable de-
velopment. 
 
47  Chile graduated at the same time as Uruguay in 2018. 
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From my perspective, the process was somewhat frustrating because it was 
automatised and unilateral. We wanted to have a conversation with the donors’ 
community on this. And we thought that by sending a letter, a formal note to 
the president of the DAC, we were going to have an opportunity to explain our 
concerns and discuss this matter. It was going to be the first graduation of coun-
tries since the 2030 Agenda on Sustainable Development had been adopted. 
And that Agenda also changed the way the international community perceives 
development. There is a consensus now that sustainable development is not 
about economic growth, but that the perspective needed to be widened and that 
sustainable development is multidimensional and global in nature. The momen-
tum was ideal to have that conversation, but we were not able to have this con-
versation. Chile was allowed to participate in the DAC meetings, and they were 
able to make the case, but there was no room for a real conversation and the 
process was fast; we were graduated the following year. Antigua and Barbuda, 
which were also on the asterisk list with us, did not graduate because of the 
hurricane which devastated the islands, showing us that some countries are, de-
spite their per capita income, very fragile and vulnerable to these external 
shocks and that GDP per capita is not a good indicator of the development level 
of a country.  
In my view, graduation has been rather untimely. It is true that Uruguay had 
been growing steadily for the previous ten years but at the time we were grad-
uated, the country had started to slow down its economic growth in 2017 and 
to stagnate. In a sense, we were cut off from ODA when we started needing it 
again. Of course, Uruguay has never been dependent on aid. Aid was never 
about how much money donors gave to the country. Aid for us has always had 
a strategic value that is beyond its economic worth. It is about agenda setting; 
it is about putting all the people/stakeholders together that can design the best 
policy to solve a problem. It is about providing for public goods overall and 
strengthening capacities for sustainable development; it is not about the money 
that it brings in, but the knowledge and the facilitation role that comes with it. 
If that is taken away, important topics like, for instance, the environment and 
human rights, are most probably going to be neglected in the overall budgetary 
struggle, and the most vulnerable groups of the population are going to be left 
behind. With the support of international cooperation, we had made sure that 
these topics were talked about, capacities were strengthened and some of the 
most pressing issues were addressed with the facilitation of international aid.  
In addition, the decision to graduate Uruguay and Chile was also decontex-
tualised because it was not the same as when Eastern European countries grad-
uated from ODA. They received structural funds from the EU afterwards or 
they even had transition funds for a few years too. We graduated in a region 
where we do not have alternative support mechanisms. We had MERCOSUR, 
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which has a structural fund, but MERCOSUR´s structural fund is now in diffi-
cult circumstances. The context of a country has to be taken into account and, 
in our case, it was not.  
Finally, graduation seems incoherent and unfit for purpose if you look at the 
bigger picture. We have agreed, all of us, to achieve 17 global sustainable de-
velopment goals by 2030, and no one can be left behind in the process. Of 
course, the ones that have the lesser capacities and greater needs, need to have 
the most support, but that does not mean that others should have the strategic 
support they were given taken away. In my view, this does not correspond to 
the purpose we all agreed on, that is, to make a transition towards global sus-
tainable development, which is a really urgent matter. 
Noel, how is the process now going in Mexico? Do you already feel a with-
drawal effect? How are you managing this process? And have you been able to 
learn from what happened to Uruguay?  
Noel González: Indeed, I think that we have learned. We have been having this 
discussion for a while now; the first debate that I can recall on this issue started 
in 2007/2008 in some ministerial meetings on the issue of middle-income coun-
tries that took place in both San Salvador and Madrid. The idea of transition 
comes from this graduation from low-income to middle-income and then from 
middle-income to high-income status. I can understand the discussion, even 
from an ethical perspective, because I think that in many donor countries, within 
these countries in their constituencies, they request that they concentrate on 
those countries that are most in need of international support.  
However, I think that the discussion is being misunderstood from this per-
spective. Some of the ideas and experiences that Karen just shared were very 
telling. There is not a very clear road map for graduation. We do not really 
know how to cope with that. Mexico will, in fact, ‘graduate’ even without 
reaching the income level status that is required for graduation because we have 
already been told that our bilateral programmes are ending. But we have not 
become a high-income country yet. So, why should we have to receive fewer 
resources if we have not actually changed our development status? Even our 
income status is the same as it was before; it has not evolved in any significant 
manner. There are a lot of contradictions in this concept of graduation, which 
we think is more related to a political concern than to a real technical concern. 
I personally do not think it is based on facts; I think it is based on a misunder-
standing of development on the part of some countries. There are countries that 
are more ‘purist’ in the sense that they would like to concentrate 100 per cent 
of their development cooperation on low-income countries or least developed 
countries. But the discussion is very easy to understand when you put it next to 
some of the discussions that you have within the countries which are providers 
of development cooperation. For instance, if you have that discussion in the UK 
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or in the US and you give so many million dollars or pounds to a country 
abroad, why do you not give them to those in need within your own country? 
And then, the answer is very simple: If we spread the resources that we give to 
other countries, the benefits to our national population will be marginal. Basi-
cally, it would be, let us say, an increase of one dollar per student or one dollar 
per person, which is not bad if these people are in need of help; it is one dollar 
more but then, if you see it as development impact across the world, it is basi-
cally not significant. So, this idea comes from a difficult misunderstanding of 
the technicalities of development cooperation.  
But we have been having these discussions for a few years due to, again, 
mostly political misperceptions; we are moving in the direction of graduation 
and we are preparing for that. And basically, we are trying to see how we can 
shift from, for instance, bilateral to bi-regional development cooperation pro-
grammes. We are moving towards different mechanisms of cooperating with 
donor countries. For instance, we are looking at co-financing certain pro-
grammes; we are looking at triangular cooperation; we are looking at horizontal 
programmes. We are also looking at regionalising within Mexico itself, taking 
a look at regional, sub-regional or subnational programmes, trying to focus on 
those regions which are most in need within our own country, like the states in 
the south-west of Mexico, Oaxaca or Chiapas. We are also trying to work on 
the narrative of development cooperation; for instance, I am sure that you have 
heard about the effort Mexico is undertaking in Central America to address the 
issue of forced migration from Central America to Mexico and then on to the 
United States. We are trying to convince our international partners that we need 
to work together in a more structured manner in order to create better conditions 
for countries nationally before we have to deal with very delicate issues like 
forced migration that have political but also humanitarian implications, impli-
cations for all the administrations that are affected.  
So basically, after this long answer, the short answer is: We know that it is 
coming. We think that this is happening for the wrong reasons. We feel a certain 
frustration because we have not been able to communicate or our partners have 
not been open to having this discussion, notwithstanding the efforts that we 
have been undertaking. And we are adjusting our strategies to make the most 
out of the situation that we know will come.  
Xiaojing, China has also been changing a lot. How has China been experienc-
ing the process of moving towards graduation? Have some of the forms of co-
operation changed in this context? 
Xiaojing Mao: China, as an upper-middle-income country, is still on the DAC 
list of countries eligible for ODA. Several years ago, especially after China had 
hosted the Olympic Games in 2008, a lot of donors witnessed the development 
of China, so they began to stop providing new assistance to China. So, even 
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though China has not yet graduated from the DAC recipient list, ODA to China 
has already been reduced. I think the net disbursement of ODA to China is al-
ready negative because most of ODA is provided in the form of concessional 
loans instead of grants. If I remember correctly, around 80-90 per cent of all the 
aid to China are loans, and China is already now repaying more loans than it is 
receiving aid from the international community.  
That is the status quo of China in receiving aid. Many Chinese institutions 
which used to receive aid from the international world were also somewhat sur-
prised when the donors suddenly stopped their aid to China. China used to re-
ceive quite a constant and comparatively large amount of ODA, which was 
channelled to these institutions. In my more recent interviews with them, they 
were a bit surprised about aid not coming in anymore, especially for those min-
istries working on specific sectors like agriculture, health or disaster prepared-
ness. It was not a good situation for them without either financial support or 
technical support coming in.  
When the traditional donors stopped their aid to China, they turned to seek-
ing trilateral cooperation with China. The UK had some trilateral cooperation 
projects with China, but those funds cannot be used for China. They cooperate 
with Chinese institutions, but for the benefits of other developing countries. I 
participated in a mid-term review of UK trilateral cooperation projects with the 
Ministry of Civil Affairs of China and, to begin with, they did not understand 
the concept. They thought the money was intended for the Ministry of Civil 
Affairs, that it could be used in China. They only understood when the UK 
explained that this is not traditional aid anymore and that it must be used in 
third partner countries. It took some time for the Chinese institutions to under-
stand that China had already been taken off the recipient lists of many donors.  
As a researcher, and you also asked about the concept of graduation, I reflect 
on the purpose of graduation. Probably the DAC wants to encourage its mem-
bers to focus more on low-income countries which they think may need aid 
more. But there have also always been debates in the international community 
about whether ODA should focus more on poor countries or poor people. Ac-
cording to the UN’s criteria, China still has a large poor population, just like 
India, with the second largest population in the world. Many donors are phasing 
out their aid to India, but India still has a large poor population and is, in fact, 
a lower-middle-income country, just like some other emerging economies. So, 
when we are thinking of graduation from ODA and its main purpose, how 
should we address the poor populations in those graduating countries? You also 
mentioned small island countries, which remain very vulnerable to natural dis-
asters, even if they graduate or reach a high-income status, and then they may 
relapse into an upper-middle-income country or even a middle-income country. 
How should their needs be addressed by the international community? 
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From my point of view, the topic of graduation needs more discussion, also 
for traditional donors. After they all phased out their aid to China, they engaged 
in trilateral cooperation with China as a donor, but I am not sure what kinds of 
cooperation other countries, like Uruguay or Botswana, can maintain in devel-
opment areas. There are a lot of concerns in this respect. 
Karen outlined that the problem in graduation for Uruguay is not the loss of 
financial resources, but losing access to policy dialogue, to knowledge ex-
change, etc. In the case of China, you mentioned the actual transition – regard-
less of its official graduation – since 2008. What were the factors that were 
missed by the Chinese when donors withdrew from the country? I can also im-
agine that – with China being China – there is great interest among former 
donors to come back and strengthen international cooperation ties in different 
ways. How is China going into these new forms of cooperation? 
Xiaojing Mao: We are currently working on a research project on EU-China 
trilateral cooperation, where we conducted interviews with Chinese ministries 
and with the institutions in charge of international cooperation in their sectors. 
For those phased out of ODA, like Karen mentioned, aid not only meant finan-
cial support but much more. They valued the technical exchange, the sharing of 
experience, learning and management skills development, which came through 
the aid from traditional donors. Even in the 1990s, when China was the largest 
recipient country, ODA only accounted for a small proportion of China’s either 
GDP or even total national budget. The value for the Chinese institutions was 
much more in the incoming knowledge and management skills.  
In many Chinese ministries, there were also institutions established to man-
age the incoming aid. After all that had been phased out, they needed to find 
new tasks and many of these institutions are now active in applying for the 
implementation of China’s own aid projects. This way, they hope to support 
other developing countries by using the knowledge they gained through the in-
coming aid. From my point of view, this is also an area where China can con-
tinue its collaboration with traditional donors, through trilateral or diversified 
kinds of cooperation. There is still a lot of potential in this. 
 
We have heard about different forms of cooperation and institutional changes. 
What should international relationships and international cooperation systems 
look like in a post-ODA world? How do you see it? How should it be from the 
side of your countries and also from the traditional donors’ side? 
Noel González: The world is already moving in a direction where you have a 
more horizontal setting in international relations. In the past, we were living in 
a world where mostly those so-called ‘liberal democracies’ would set the pace, 
establish institutions and set the standards. But we are moving away from that 
world. By moving towards a more horizontal approach to development 
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cooperation, we are moving towards a more horizontal world overall. I do not 
think that is particularly bad; on the contrary, we as developing countries have 
been requesting to play a more meaningful part in the setting of international 
rules and standards for a while. That is perhaps what we are moving towards, 
but I also hope that we move towards a world where, while being more hori-
zontal, we continue to cooperate, continue to exchange and continue to find 
ways to support each other’s development efforts. Technological exchanges, 
scientific exchanges, student exchanges and so forth are beneficial for every-
body. We have many issues to tackle as humanity; for instance, climate change 
is clearly one concept that we need to work on together because otherwise, we 
will simply not be very effective. So, if we establish more protectionist rules or 
if we establish mechanisms in which we must each solve our problems alone, 
then that, in my view, is not conducive towards being better off as humanity 
overall. We still need to make significant steps towards achieving the SDGs in 
2030, and that requires efforts in international development cooperation. So, 
from my point of view, we are moving towards a more multipolar, more hori-
zontal world. My hope is that this will not entail fewer cooperative international 
arenas; on the contrary, I think that we need to work more on the basis of coop-
eration and exchanges to achieve our common goals. 
Could you illustrate the institutional changes to us? You already mentioned the 
bilateral funds that you were establishing with other countries. What is chang-
ing in the institutional world in Mexico regarding ODA? 
Noel González: Mexico is a country that has been working on international de-
velopment cooperation for decades, our first institutional arrangements on tech-
nical cooperation go back to the seventies. We established the Mexican Agency 
for International Development Cooperation (AMEXCID) in 2011 and we have 
been working on the basis of the national law on international development 
cooperation, which gives a lot of strength and solidity to the work that we un-
dertake. We have a certain autonomy in terms of budget. In my view, lately we 
have been moving away from being more of a coordinating actor in Mexico. 
We have been organising, for instance, the bilateral commissions that were re-
sponsible for establishing the bilateral development programmes with our part-
ners, both developed and developing countries, in line with more traditional 
schemes of cooperation but also South-South cooperation towards other Latin 
American countries. We have been moving away from that role, without for-
saking that role, towards more of an implementation role. By doing so, we are 
becoming more active on the ground. Notably, we have been working on the 
implementation of programmes in Central America. We have been planning for 
a year and are now starting the implementation of some programmes which are 
being directly implemented by AMEXCID on the ground. That means working 
with the local authorities in order to establish the goals, the rules of cooperation 
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748908388, am 26.10.2021, 10:19:07
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
Implications of ODA graduation for countries in transition 
55 
and then the implementation of the programmes. Normally, what you would do 
in the past would be to rely on an international organisation, for instance the 
United Nations or an NGO that would be our implementation partner, but now 
Mexico is undertaking this work as well.  
We are becoming more of an implementation agency, but at the same time 
we are not losing grasp of political discussions – with the establishment of the 
bi-regional programmes, for instance with the European Union, establishing the 
way that we are going to cooperate, with Germany, with France, with Spain or 
with other main development partners, on the ground. We continue to work 
with them in order to establish priorities and bilateral development pro-
grammes. These programmes are going to change in nature and scope, as we 
were discussing before. Instead of having big umbrella programmes under 
which we would establish projects within Mexico, we will be working in a more 
specific and targeted manner, for instance, working on issues like sustainability 
or water management. We are going to have to work in a more coordinated 
manner with all actors, not only the federal administration in Mexico, but more 
with local authorities in order to achieve more specific goals.  
In my view, those are the most notable changes that are going to be opera-
tionalised in the coming years: moving away from being a coordination agency 
towards becoming an implementation agency, and working in a more focused, 
more results-based way on the ground with, for instance, subnational authori-
ties.  
Karen, looking into post-ODA relationships, a more horizontal setting and a 
continuation of cooperation, what is your perspective? What has happened in 
the case of Uruguay, which is a small country and may experience a different 
situation than Mexico and China? 
Karen van Rompaey: If you want to understand this post-ODA world, there are 
some conceptual issues around ‘graduation’ that need to be further addressed. 
The concept of ‘graduation’ is based on a misunderstanding of what the nature 
of development is. The DAC graduation is based on the idea that a country 
magically develops when it surpasses for three consecutive years an arbitrary 
threshold put forward by the World Bank in the eighties, through a methodol-
ogy that has never been sufficiently explained, nor adequately updated. Martin 
Ravaillon, who used to be the World Bank’s head of research, has been very 
critical of the bank´s income classification because of its lack of clarity, rigor, 
and transparency. The World Bank sought to establish in the 1980s a country 
classification by “finding a stable relationship between a summary measure of 
well-being and economic variables and the annual availability of Bank's re-
sources”, as per stated by the Bank itself. However, there is no documentation 
on the World Bank’s site about this “stable relationship” and how it has changed 
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over time. According to Ravaillon48, it is also unclear what a “stable relation-
ship” means and why the Bank’s resources (in the 1980s) are relevant to defin-
ing whether a country is a LIC, MIC, or HIC, either in the 1980s or now. More-
over, he has criticized the bank’s use of the outdated Atlas method instead of 
purchasing power parity exchange rates for currency conversion. Moreover, a 
research paper by Fantom and Serajuddin from the World Bank Group argued 
in 2016 that the World Bank’s methodology for keeping the per capita thresh-
olds ‘fixed’ in real terms does not fully reflect inflation experienced by low and 
middle income countries, resulting in thresholds that are too low and may have 
pushed countries into higher income groups prematurely.49 But unfortunately, 
this income classification of countries has been very influential for operational 
and analytical purposes and is the sole criterion that informs the process of 
ODA graduation.  
In the case of Uruguay, the good news is that the country has been steadily 
growing with sound macroeconomic and social policies that improved the qual-
ity of life of many people in Uruguay. That is the good news. But, having grad-
uated from ODA, and the knowledge and the facilitation role it brings with it, 
only because of our income level, is an extreme measure. We do not see our-
selves as a graduated country; we identify ourselves as a country in transition 
towards sustainable development and we see ourselves as a country with a dual 
role in international cooperation. Uruguay has been strengthening its capacities 
and has started to play a more pro-active role in South-South cooperation and 
triangular cooperation, but even in South-South cooperation, Uruguay has a 
dual role. We also receive cooperation from other southern countries, even from 
other countries that could be considered to have a lower development level than 
Uruguay. But all countries learn lessons and make progress in different policy 
arenas and seek to solve common problems together. This is what we share 
through South-South cooperation, and this is the ethos that the 2030 Agenda 
requires. 
Coming back to the post-ODA international relationship question, Uruguay 
is a small country, has high human development indicators and has been pro-
gressing in the closing of some of its most pressing structural gaps, but it also 
has great challenges ahead if we really want to transition towards a more sus-
tainable model of development. Our economy is still heavily organised in terms 
of intensive exploitation of natural resources, which really needs to change. 
Sustainability needs to be embedded in the way we produce and consume, oth-
erwise it is going to jeopardise not only Uruguay’s development but also the 
achievement of sustainable development regionally and globally. For instance, 
 
48  Ravaillon 2013. 
49  Fantom/Serajuddin 2016. 
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most of our technical experts on the environment are still funded by interna-
tional cooperation projects and through the Global Environmental Facility 
(GEF). In Uruguay, the state does not yet have this capacity itself. It is all pro-
vided by international cooperation, and this needs to go on for a few more years 
until we really find the ways to embed this within our own domestic resources. 
Gender violence, for instance, was declared a national emergency last year and 
we still do not have the adequate institutional capacity and resources to tackle 
this problem and make the necessary cultural shift to address this very big issue. 
And yet, we are no longer eligible for the UN Trust Fund to End Violence 
against Women (UN Women) because only ODA eligible countries can apply 
to this fund. 
We lack both the connection to international knowledge and the access to 
financing, because for instance as far as the environment, climate change adap-
tation and mitigation, and natural resources management, conservation or res-
tauration are concerned, we do not have the funds so far. The economy needs 
to grow to provide more resources, and the country also needs to become more 
conscious that these areas need to have a higher priority level in the budgetary 
struggle. We need funds for the environment and climate change, for global 
public goods in general. Still, technical cooperation is also needed, and in that 
respect funds and technical cooperation often come hand in hand. They are 
never purely funds and purely technical cooperation. They come entangled, in 
most cases.  
What else do you think has changed, for instance in terms of communicating, 
of negotiating? Because Mexico is a regionally very strong country, China is a 
superpower and many countries are striving to have contact with China. What 
is the case for a small country like Uruguay? Do you think something has 
changed in your general relations in this post-ODA world? 
Karen van Rompaey: Well, it has only been a year since we were graduated but, 
yes, we were going to be excluded from the regional cooperation of the Euro-
pean Union because the EU’s international development instrument was linked 
to the ODA list of eligible countries. Our then President Vázquez wrote a letter 
to Jean-Claude Juncker, then President of the European Commission, saying 
that we did not want to be graduated from the regional cooperation of the Eu-
ropean Union, because we did not want to be excluded from a set  of strategic 
dialogues that the EU is promoting through regional cooperation, surrounding 
climate change and security – like for instance the COPOLAD programme, 
which is about fighting transnational organised crime – , migration and all the 
social cohesion topics that the EUROSOCIAL programme is addressing in the 
region.  
There is something else, which is not directly related to ODA but has an 
indirect impact: Uruguay is no longer a middle-income country. Where does it 
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stand in all the political negotiations in the UN, for instance? Where do we align 
ourselves? Are we a developing country? Are we a developed country? Are we 
part of the G77? Are we part of the group of middle-income countries? Our 
graduation from ODA has also led to us living slightly in limbo. So, we are also 
trying to make sense of these political implications of graduation from ODA, 
but it is a bit too soon to grasp all the effects of graduation. 
After the graduation, we managed to negotiate with the European Union and 
we are back in regional cooperation; they have also maintained the funds for 
our civil society, and we are negotiating a bilateral co-fund to address Uru-
guay`s transition priorities and to keep the political dialogue vibrant. We have 
also managed to negotiate with Japan to keep the funds and cooperation 
schemes that they had with Uruguay, including triangular cooperation. Schol-
arships and scientific cooperation are also highly critical for us because Uru-
guay is a small country and has no critical mass in all the cutting-edge disci-
plines. This is why we need to be part of this cooperation schemes, to strengthen 
our human capital abroad and to make use of these new knowledge in our coun-
try. So, this is how we can close our knowledge gaps and boost innovation to 
make this transition towards sustainable development.  
 
Xiaojing, we were talking about the new relationships, the post-ODA relation-
ships and the possibility of having a more horizontal setting, continuing to co-
operate. We were also speaking about being included or excluded from im-
portant spheres of knowledge management. But what in China’s case, which 
might be very special, does the post-ODA world and the cooperation system 
look like?  
Xiaojing Mao: China, even though it is already the second largest economy in 
the world, still faces a lot of challenges. But most donors have already left 
China. So, what can we do? As a researcher, I also think about what Karen has 
said: after graduation, when you are a high-income country, how do you posi-
tion yourself? This is also a question for China. China always said: we are the 
largest developing country in the world. So, after we have reached high-income 
status, how should we position ourselves? Also, rethinking China’s foreign as-
sistance and its role as a southern partner: would it still be South-South coop-
eration? There are a lot of questions on this, already now and especially after 
you have graduated from the ODA list. As a researcher, I am also reflecting on 
these questions and I agree with Karen: we need to develop a more comprehen-
sive methodology for measuring development because just using GNI per cap-
ita is a too simple way to measure a country’s development situation. There will 
be more and more countries graduating from that list over the years to come. 
That means there will be fewer and fewer ODA recipient countries. But on the 
other hand, we also see that more and more emerging economies have started 
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to provide aid, like Indonesia, which has established a fund to provide assis-
tance to its neighbouring countries, and also Mongolia. The main resource is 
still South-South cooperation, but there are more and more aid providers in the 
international community, while there are fewer recipient countries, if they take 
the DAC criterion for ODA-eligibility as a basis. So, how would this interna-
tional aid landscape change and how should we deal with this situation? What 
other innovative cooperation models are needed? As for aid itself, I think it is 
aiming to end itself. 
Another issue is that we are facing more emerging development challenges 
like climate change and epidemic diseases; you will all know that China is cur-
rently suffering from the new coronavirus. And despite China’s rapid develop-
ment over the past few decades, we are still facing a lot of challenges related to 
climate change, the spread of epidemic diseases and also other environmental 
issues. So, there is still a lot of room and there are important areas where China 
can collaborate with the international community, including developed coun-
tries but also other developing countries. I totally agree with what Karen said: 
that every country has knowledge to share and this holds true for emerging 
economies especially because they may face similar situations and similar chal-
lenges. Therefore, peer learning is extremely valuable for all those countries.  
Certainly, China is a large economy and there are high expectations from 
the international community. China is actively involved in a lot of global plat-
forms, including development fora like the UN Development Cooperation Fo-
rum and a lot of sub-sectoral fora. We think that those multilateral platforms 
can play a good role in bringing all South-South cooperation providers and also 
traditional donors together, and in allowing views on international topics, in-
cluding global public goods, to be exchanged. I think this is still very important, 
and even though we are facing some retreats in global cooperation, from my 
point of view most countries still consider multilateralism to be extremely val-
uable to the international community. So, global and regional platforms can 
play a very important role in strengthening those dialogues among different 
economies. In China, even though many countries have already stopped provid-
ing aid to the country, they still continue dialogues with us, like the UK, Ger-
many, the US and a lot of other countries. There are a lot of bilateral dialogue 
mechanisms, but development only plays a small role in them. They focus more 
on critical economic issues. But more and more, especially on the part of tradi-
tional donors, they hope that they can include developmental issues in this 
mechanism. So, I believe that also after graduation, there will remain a lot of 
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Noel, what would be the risks and the opportunities of graduation in your view?  
Noel González: Let me start with the risks. There are risks for developing coun-
tries having their development efforts not supported appropriately by interna-
tional partners. They will be basically left alone or not properly accompanied, 
which is not very conducive to achieving the 2030 Sustainable Development 
Agenda, as set by the UN in 2015, and not compatible with building the global 
partnership for sustainable development that we agreed to establish in, again, 
the 2030 Agenda and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda. The first risk is that we 
will not achieve our goals with a lack of support due to a misconception on 
development that comes from political and domestic, but not from technical 
considerations by donor countries. 
The second risk would be less support in tackling common problems. Also, 
for donor countries themselves: if you do not deal with the global and regional 
public goods as you need to, you are going to be less able to achieve goals like 
tackling climate change or achieving more managed and sustainable migration 
flows. So basically, if you simply leave countries on their own, then you are not 
going to be able to achieve the goals that you need to achieve. And we need to 
understand that they are not problems of developing countries or graduating 
countries or countries of the South, but problems that affect all humanity and 
we need to solve them together. 
The third risk I see is that some of the donor countries that are withdrawing 
their international support are going to become less relevant as bilateral part-
ners. When we have a broad understanding and a broad partnership on issues 
like development, then we can move together; we can increase the political di-
alogue with our partners. But if you cut off a very significant part of this part-
nership, then you are jeopardising the partnership as whole. So basically, if any 
given country simply stops providing development cooperation, then, not as a 
retaliatory measure but simply as a natural consequence, political dialogue is 
also going to be affected. This is not to be taken as a menace, it is simply a 
natural consequence of ‘us’ feeling that we are losing importance in our part-
ners’ agendas, so our partners cannot expect to have the same importance that 
they would have if they continued cooperating with us from a broader perspec-
tive. Therefore, these countries will lose relevance as international actors and 
this can have political consequences – because if we need to build new partner-
ships, then we are going to build them with whomever wants to support our 
national efforts. That is the fact of the matter; we are going to move towards 
this more multipolar world where we are going to build new partnerships. And 
then, the former role of certain actors, notably traditional donors, as standard 
setters and leaders in the world, is not going to be perceived in the same manner 
as it might have been before that. These are the risks.  
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In terms of the opportunities, I think that there are opportunities. There are 
opportunities again to build a more horizontal world and build on the concept 
of co-responsibility, with more countries playing a bigger role in norm- and 
standard-setting in the world. In my view, that is positive for democracy: more 
different approaches that are going to have to come to the table.  
There are certainly opportunities to increase South-South cooperation, a 
mechanism of development cooperation that has arisen since the 2000s. Trian-
gular cooperation is also becoming more and more utilised by countries because 
we can potentiate everybody’s assets and advantages. This has to be properly 
understood: it does not mean that southern providers have the knowledge, tra-
ditional donors have the resources and a third country is the beneficiary, from 
a more vertical perspective. Instead, the concept of co-creation in triangular and 
South-South cooperation is very important, combining both technical expertise 
and resources, human and financial resources, in order for us to find or create 
innovative and effective development solutions together. Therefore, triangular 
and South-South cooperation should also be strengthened in this coming era for 
international development cooperation.  
Unfortunately, I fear that through this misconception on the role of devel-
opment cooperation which we have been talking about, many of these potential 
benefits might be jeopardised by insufficient involvement or political will. And 
that will happen, again, for reasons that we do not think are technically sound 
or sufficiently thought-through, but more because of misperceptions that come 
from domestic political concerns. 
Karen, what are the risks and the opportunities in your view? Maybe they also 
have to do with China? 
Karen van Rompaey: We have just finished our last analysis of who our main 
cooperation partners are, looking at the data from 2018, and our main coopera-
tion partner after ODA graduation is China. For us, international cooperation is 
a means to internationally distribute wealth and knowledge, but it is also a form 
of soft power and a means for mutual trust-building and to address regional and 
common global challenges. This is something that the donor community should 
take into account if they really want to leave countries completely on their own 
and lose that area of policy dialogue and of strengthening multilateralism, and 
the common ground to work on all the structural and systemic changes that are 
needed to really enable development at a global level.  
In the end, I see one big opportunity that this graduation offers us. Perhaps 
it is a bit late for Uruguay, but I am glad that our graduation has led to us having 
a conversation at the global level on the issues that matter most: what do we 
understand as sustainable development, what needs do countries have relating 
to sustainable development, what are the capabilities and how can we build an 
international cooperation system that is based on those needs and the 
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capabilities of countries in terms of sustainable development goals that we have 
jointly agreed to? In my view, this is an opportunity for the ODA graduation 
criteria to be revised and updated in the light of the 2030 Sustainable Develop-
ment Agenda. In your introduction, you named that 2014 paper by the DAC 
committee. I remember reading this paper and the two scenarios it depicts in 
terms of what could happen if the DAC lowered the threshold for graduation to 
the World Bank’s IDA eligibility level (that was not 12,000 but 7,000 dollars). 
So, I am really glad that we are having a conversation now, six years onwards, 
on how we can revisit the ODA criteria so that we do not leave countries behind 
but engage with those countries that are in transition towards sustainable devel-
opment.  
As regards post-ODA relations, Noel has mentioned all the instruments that 
we are developing. We really need to be open-minded, considering that new 
challenges are always arising, for which we will always need international co-
operation. What is going to happen with the graduated countries that do not 
have the capacity to tackle these new challenges? Are they going to be left 
alone? This is something that I do not have an answer for, but we must also 
look into more innovative instruments. For instance, Uruguay has been giving 
the Netherlands cooperation on how to regulate cannabis production. So, this is 
South-North cooperation, something that was unthinkable a few years ago. Per-
haps we do not have the funds to set up a big scale cooperation project, but we 
do have the knowledge/experience, so there should be funds that make it possi-
ble for Uruguayan knowledge or experience to be transferred to a northern 
country, a more developed country. We must be very creative in this big global 
challenge of transitioning together to a sustainable development model. We all 
have knowledge and experience that can be useful and fruitful for other coun-
tries, but we need a system designed in such a way that we can all contribute in 
an equitable and integral way, and so that we can all be part of this conversation 
and cooperation scheme to achieve sustainable development. 
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Spotlight iii: China – the developed developing nation 
Thorsten Giehler, GIZ 
China has already been the focus of an emotional debate about its developing 
country status for more than a decade. This applies both to its ODA eligibility 
and to the developing country status it has enjoyed in the World Trade Organi-
zation (WTO) since its accession in 2001. At the WTO, this status affords China 
“special and differential treatment”. It enables China to provide subsidies in 
agriculture and set higher barriers to market entry than more developed econo-
mies. The WTO, in contrast to the OECD, does not apply clear criteria for the 
assessment of a developing country. The discussions on China’s status are 
therefore complicated and mainly of a political and economic nature. For in-
stance, in 2019 the United States of America proposed a couple of possible 
WTO criteria for excluding countries from the status of a developing country, 
mainly with the aim of taking China off the list50. 
The discussion on China’s status is based on objective criteria such as GNI 
per capita, but it also entails a lot of subjective and debatable issues. Let’s start 
with the objective criteria: With 9,460 USD GNI per capita in 201851, China is 
by DAC definition a developing country and eligible to receive ODA. Depend-
ing on its growth rate, it may take another decade until it joins the high-income 
group. Moreover, it is well-known that there are big interpersonal inequalities 
as well as asymmetries between China’s regions and provinces, as in many 
other countries. However, the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party 
set the goal of eradicating poverty in China by the end of 2020.  
This leads us to the emotional and subjective part of the discussion. Since 
China is already the second largest economy in the world, a top exporter, an 
innovator in digitalisation, an international donor, a G-20 member and an im-
portant investor, governments and taxpayers in DAC member countries ques-
tion its ODA status for good reasons. The discussion started around 2005 and 
gained momentum after the Beijing Olympics, when the degree of China’s de-
velopment became visible to every TV viewer. With its success in alleviating 
poverty and with the modernisation and innovation taking place, China is one 
of the few countries where even persisting inequalities may not be a good ex-
cuse to continue ODA. 
 
50  United States Fed. Reg. 2019. 
51  World Bank 2020. 
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As a consequence, many donor countries have reacted and began phasing out 
their development cooperation projects from 2008 onwards. Germany was one 
of the first countries to cease new public commitments on financial cooperation 
in 2008 and on technical cooperation in 2009. The fact that the decision about 
the “end of ODA with China”, made by the then Minister for Economic Coop-
eration and Development, Dirk Niebel, had been communicated to the yellow 
press52 without any prior consultation with the Chinese, included a clear state-
ment: Committing ODA to the second biggest economy was no longer justifia-
ble to the taxpayer.  
Today, most donors have left China – bilaterals first, EU DEVCO and 
UNDP rather late, multilateral development banks not yet, but soon53. This 
leads to a somehow unique situation that China’s forthcoming ODA graduation 
will probably neither affect it in any way nor its relations to DAC members. 
China will become a high-income country – so what? Just another step on its 
way to the top of the list of all countries even in absolute GDP terms. Just an-
other step towards overcoming the ‘lost’ two centuries after 1800 AD.  
 
Still, after more than a decade of donors phasing their aid out, the discussion on 
project-based international cooperation with China is still ongoing. Why? Many 
donor countries realised that, after the development cooperation projects ended, 
they had lost important communication and cooperation channels with the Chi-
nese government – and this was not in their own interest at all. These channels 
were, for example, those with G20 peers, such as the Chinese Ministry of Fi-
nance and the People’s Bank of China, or those with trading partners such as 
the Ministry of Commerce and those to the Ministry of Ecology and Environ-
ment, which is in charge of climate negotiations. And those channels used in 
the past for designing development programmes could have also been used for 
advocacy – important towards a country with worldwide relevance not only to 
achieve the SDGs or climate goals but also to shape global governance.  
These days, we observe the contradiction that while China is becoming ever 
more crucial in global terms or in bilateral economic relations, the formats of 
exchange are becoming fewer. Without joint projects, only diplomacy is left. 
However, this is not always the most effective instrument with which to design 
relations. Was it a good idea that many donor countries cut the dialogue on 
climate change because it was funded with ODA money? If it is still worth 
talking, debating, showcasing one’s own experiences and advocating one’s own 
 
52  Interview with the German newspaper ‘Bild’. See Pinzler 2009. 
53  See e.g. the World Bank’s new Country Partnership framework for China 2020–
2025.  
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748908388, am 26.10.2021, 10:19:07
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
China – the developed developing nation 
 
65 
principles, why not do so in an intergovernmentally agreed and funded project? 
If yes, how could a country come back without irritating taxpayers? This is the 
background to a discussion on a smart intervention into Chinese politics. To 
what extent is it possible to use the mutual framework development cooperation 
created – intergovernmental negotiations and intergovernmental projects – for 
policy areas beyond aid, such as foreign trade or climate policy? Finally, pro-
ject-based approaches, in the form of trilateral cooperation, could also be used 
for interaction on the principles of China’s outbound activities along the Belt 
and Road Initiative or on its development cooperation with Africa. 
Germany – being one of the first to phase out traditional development co-
operation with China – has also been one of China’s first bilateral partners to 
test new forms of project-based approaches beyond ODA, mainly activities 
funded by the German Ministry of Economic Affairs and the Ministry of the 
Environment. The Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development has 
paved the way for this handover. Germany still uses the development coopera-
tion agreement of 1982 to officialise new bilateral projects in areas which are 
beyond the initial framework: for projects on economic or climate policy or on 
exchange on law and justice. Important fields in the Sino-German intergovern-
mental cooperation are Industry 4.0, cybersecurity, mobility, emission trading, 
energy transition and trilateral development cooperation.  
Joint bilateral projects create the basis for a positive agenda with which to 
design common principles, norms and standards. And at the same time, they 
can serve to confront China with alternative ways of doing things or to promote 
countries’ own (vested) interests. These projects now cover issues of mutual 
concern, but in many cases with different objectives. This might be one of the 
crucial differences between development cooperation and cooperation in other 
policy areas. Whereas development cooperation is meant to assist on a basis of 
joint objectives, new forms of international cooperation do not necessarily share 
the same interests. One partner might want to get insights into alternative gov-
erning rules, the other might aim to advocate their own principles or a level 
playing field. Another essential difference to the former development coopera-
tion projects is the constant real-time conceptual – not only financial – moni-
toring and steering of their impact by the respective ministries funding these 
new project-based approaches. There is no standard indicator for these rather 
sensitive and political projects which is comparable to the Aid Effectiveness 
Agenda or the SDGs.  
 
Besides Germany, the UK Prosperity Fund and the EU Partnership Instrument 
follow the same approach. This mode of working requires a clear strategy on 
China. In addition, it requires the preparedness to engage in a debate with the 
general public, including the media, which may not always be able to 
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understand the differences between aid and advocacy projects. Using the former 
development cooperation shell is a smart way of engaging countries which have 
graduated or, like in the case of China, are a developed developing nation – a 
category of its own. 
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Spotlight iv: Civil society and ODA graduation – im-
pacts, roles and opportunities 
Rachel Hayman, INTRAC 
Civil society54 has a critical role to play in addressing pressing global issues, 
whether it be striving to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), 
tackling climate change, or championing fundamental human rights and free-
doms through a wide range of advocacy, monitoring, research and service pro-
vision activities.  
In countries transitioning or graduating from aid, it is now well documented 
that civil society organisations (CSOs) can be adversely affected. The point 
raised in the Moving Away from Aid summary report55 about CSOs being the 
first to feel the effects reflects a significant body of evidence that has built up 
over the past decade.56 Falling flows of funding from bilateral and multilateral 
donors early in the transition process, and limited support from governments, 
both financial and legislative, to ease the impact, are felt most by CSOs that 
have received support from the traditional aid sector (recognising that many 
CSOs operate without any funding from ODA). As grants available to interna-
tional non-governmental organisations (INGOs) to work in countries that are 
transitioning or graduating decline, there is a knock-on effect for local organi-
sations and implementing partners. 
 
The consequences are surprisingly similar across very different contexts. One 
is the increased ‘projectisation’ of funds that are available from public and pri-
vate sources, including through corporate social responsibility schemes or phi-
lanthropy. These funds are often focused on social development initiatives or 
are aimed at the provision of services on behalf of the state. Generally, such 
projects do not provide funding to cover the costs of the core functions of CSOs. 
Hence, a second consequence is an impact on organisational sustainability and 
 
54  CIVICUS, the global alliance of civil society organisations and activists, takes a 
broad definition of civil society, incorporating non-governmental organisations, 
activists, civil society coalitions and networks, protest and social movements, vol-
untary bodies, campaigning organisations, charities, faith-based groups, trade un-
ions and philanthropic foundations. https://www.civicus.org/index.php/who-we-
are/about-civicus (11.02.2020). 
55  Calleja/Prizzon 2019a: 31. 
56  Hayman 2016; Appe/Pallas 2018. 
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institutional stability. A further consequence is the rise in competition for fund-
ing between local CSOs, but also between local CSOs and INGOs or private 
sector service provision organisations. These effects are particularly well cap-
tured in a 2019 report from Innpactia and CIVICUS, which analysed funding 
opportunities for CSOs in Latin America.57 It highlights the limited funding 
opportunities that are targeted explicitly at local CSOs, and the competition 
CSOs face not only from international actors, but also from the private sector 
and state entities. 
Of particular concern to civil society actors is that the evidence consistently 
points to a decline in support for civil society-led activities in the fields of ad-
vocacy, human rights, minority rights, democracy and coalition building. Such 
activities were often funded almost exclusively by external actors, which added 
a layer of moral support and protection to CSOs working on topics that were 
considered either controversial or at odds with government policy or national 
political agendas. Reduced funding for such work affects the ability of civil 
society to maintain pressure on public and private sector actors to tackle trends 
in countries transitioning and graduating from ODA in relation to growing in-
come inequalities, ongoing challenges in human development (including 
health, education, youth opportunities and employment), vulnerabilities to cli-
mate change, weakening of public institutions and the deterioration of demo-
cratic rights and freedoms.  
 
International actors need to be particularly mindful of this latter point. The 
CIVICUS Monitor,58 which tracks civic space, warns of a deepening civic space 
crisis globally, with only 3% of the world’s population now living in countries 
that CIVICUS considers to have open civic space. Although hostility to civil 
society actors working on political issues is widespread across countries with 
very different income levels, CSOs in numerous countries going through eco-
nomic transition have faced an increase in both legal and extra-legal restrictions 
on their operations, such as censorship, crackdowns on protest movements, sur-
veillance and harassment.59 This includes India, Nigeria, Chile, Ecuador, Ar-
gentina, Kenya, Turkmenistan, Bolivia, Venezuela, the Dominican Republic 
and Cameroon. 
Nevertheless, some international and local CSOs are stepping up their roles 
as watchdogs of these trends, which can adversely affect the poorest and the 
most vulnerable. The CIVICUS Monitor project is one such initiative, produc-
ing real-time analysis of civic space everywhere. The Spotlight on Sustainable 
 
57  Innpactia/CIVICUS 2019. 
58  CIVICUS 2019: 5.   
59  Kumi/Hayman 2019; ICAI 2016; ICAI 2018.   
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Development initiative from Social Watch is another.60 Both of these initiatives 
involve and rely on data and analysis provided by national and local civil soci-
ety actors on the ground. A final example is the group of international NGOs 
that is maintaining pressure on bilateral and multilateral donors to ensure that 
health gains are not lost when countries graduate from instruments such as the 
Global Fund.61 Such initiatives ensure that public authorities and the private 
sector in countries that are transitioning from aid are held to account for up-
holding their domestic and international obligations.62 
 
On the positive side, in response to the changing environment, national and 
local CSOs are adapting and finding ways to mobilise more diverse and poten-
tially sustainable sources of funding and non-financial support. This includes 
community-level fundraising and income-generation activities, fundraising 
from diaspora groups, membership fees, volunteering, mobilising in-kind ma-
terial and infrastructure support, setting up social enterprises and community 
foundations, local philanthropy and corporate social responsibility schemes.63 
There are a growing number of initiatives in place to support resource diversi-
fication, as well as many examples of good practice from countries transitioning 
from ODA.64 Additional benefits from the mobilisation of resources from local 
and national sources are that it can help CSOs to reduce dependency on external 
actors, increase their autonomy and legitimacy to promote local agendas, and 
change – and sometimes improve – relationships with local authorities. These 
dynamics are also giving momentum to demands to decolonise development 
and rebalance power between international actors and local CSOs,65 requiring 
international NGOs and development funders to rethink their roles and behav-
iour in a global context, where poverty, inequality, repression of human rights, 
the democratic deficit and accountability failures are becoming universal. 
At the same time, alternative sources of funding can come with their own 
risks, including potential mission drift towards the priorities of new funders, 
co-optation by state actors and the prioritisation of service provision activities 
(which are more easily funded) over advocacy goals. Moreover, within the con-
text of the squeeze on civic space mentioned above, international actors cannot 
 
60  Social Watch: http://www.socialwatch.org/report2019 (15.04.2020). 
61  Northcote 2017; Sabino et al. 2020.  
62  Kumi/Hayman 2019. 
63  Kumi/Hayman 2019; Appe/Pallas 2018; Arhin et al. 2018; Bayalieva-Jailobaeva 
2018; Guttentag et al. 2018; Van Dyck 2017.  
64  See, for example, the programmes of the Change the Game Academy 
https://www.changethegameacademy.org/. Also, Martins 2020; Guttentag et al. 
2018.   
65  Hodgson et al. 2019. 
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make assumptions that CSOs will have the space and resources to remain resil-
ient and effective as ODA is reduced.  
 
It is therefore important that all those involved in international cooperation, as 
well as public and private actors in countries in transition, take three interrelated 
steps. Firstly, they need to work with civil society to assess thoroughly the po-
tential impacts of transition and graduation on CSOs and the wider civil society 
ecosystem, exploring which civil society activities and functions are likely to 
be most affected. They should consider the regulatory framework and govern-
ance practices that affect the ability of CSOs to operate, raise resources locally 
and campaign on issues that might be considered controversial. Secondly, they 
should make use of the growing body of evidence and practical advice for fun-
ders, international actors and CSOs around exit strategies and doing transition 
well,66 in order to avoid the poor practices that have undermined the sustaina-
bility of CSOs in the past. Finally, they should explore how to support civil 
society in more diverse and creative ways to enable CSOs in societies that are 
transitioning to continue to tackle global and local rights and development-re-
lated issues. This might include finding ways of providing funding and non-
financial support to CSOs through non-ODA channels, offering support for in-
ternational monitoring projects, solidarity exchanges and global forums that 
bring the voices of civil society activists from transitioning countries to the fore, 
and maintaining pressure on governments to open up civic space in order to 




66  Martins 2020. See also Hayman/Lewis 2018; Guttentag et al. 2018; Appe/Pallas 
2018. 
67  Suggestions for further reading: 
 Social Watch produces regular monitoring reports written by civil society actors 
on country progress related to the Sustainable Development Goals: http://www.so-
cialwatch.org/report2019 (27.03.2020). 
 The Stopping As Success project has produced a large number of case studies, 
reports, blogs, tools and guidelines on transition and exit planning. See Martins 
2020. 
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748908388, am 26.10.2021, 10:19:07
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
 
71 
Dialogue 3: Implications, challenges and opportunities 
of ODA graduation for DAC donors 
ODA graduation does not only affect the transitioning countries themselves, 
but also has consequences for international partners or ‘traditional’ providers 
of international development cooperation, in both practical and strategic terms.  
Most of the so-called traditional donors are or have been engaged in middle-
income countries that are on their way to ODA graduation. Governments and 
implementation agencies are therefore confronted with the practical considera-
tions of accompanying and cooperating with partners in that process. Here, we 
aim to exchange concrete examples of managing transition, based on the par-
ticipants’ experiences in practice and research.  
We also want to analyse the strategic and political implications of ODA 
graduation. Working in global partnerships is not only essential to implement-
ing the 2030 Agenda, therefore embodied in SDG 17, but has also been the 
modus operandi with many countries envisioned to graduate from ODA in the 
upcoming years. How can long-term relationships be secured when develop-
ment actors withdraw? And what does a shift in the range of development coun-
tries mean for the actors involved, the systemic set-up of the policy area and the 
way that implementing institutions work?  
In addition to the specific situation of partner countries graduating from 
ODA, the discussants shared general experiences from restructuring or phasing 
down development cooperation as a result of policy decisions.    
The discussion was held between Corinna Küsel, Director of the Regional 
Division South Asia at GIZ, Annalisa Prizzon, Senior Research Fellow at the 
Overseas Development Institute (ODI), and Anna Rahm, Head of Unit for Ef-
fective Aid Delivery at the Swedish International Development Cooperation 
Agency, Sida. It was facilitated by David Nguyen-Thanh, Head of Division for 
Corporate Policy, Strategy and Risk Management at GIZ, and Juliane Kolsdorf, 
editor of this publication. For logistical reasons, the experiences of the Swiss 
State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO) were added in a separate inter-
view with Ivan Pavletic (Head of Section Policy and Services) and Markus 
Schrader (Head of Section Countries and Global Portfolio) and subsequently 
merged into the dialogue.68  
 
 
68  For better distinction from the discussants, the inputs and questions by the facili-
tators are displayed in italic without naming the respective person. 
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As a starting point, could you each briefly share the context or situation in 
which you have been involved with ODA graduation issues? How has it affected 
your work in recent years, and even today? Corinna, what does this mean for 
you and for GIZ these days? 
Corinna Küsel: I would like to focus initially more on a perspective ‘beyond 
ODA’ before I come to a ‘post-ODA’ view because I think there are big differ-
ences in how relevant this is in general, and also for us in GIZ. By ‘beyond 
ODA’, we define everything beyond classical development cooperation. ‘Be-
yond ODA’ is already very much a normality and part of our daily life in GIZ, 
particularly in our cooperation with Asia and Latin America. In both regions, 
we implement various projects which go beyond a classical development coop-
eration approach, both for the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (BMZ) and for other German ministries and other donors. One 
example would be the Ministry for the Environment, with projects related to 
environmental and climate issues, i.e. on global public goods, such as climate 
change and biodiversity. We work for the Foreign Office on security issues, for 
instance in cooperation with regional partners like ASEAN, and also for other 
German ministries. The focus of these projects is strongly related to the rela-
tionship between Germany and our partner countries with a view to building 
partnerships, also in Germany’s interests. These forms and areas of cooperation 
are generally much more related to German or European interests on the one 
hand and to global interests and global public goods on the other, and less fo-
cused on a classical aid perspective. This is the case for German ministries, but 
also for projects which are partly co-funded by other development partners. One 
example is the ‘NAMA Facility’, a multi-donor initiative supporting partner 
countries to implement climate-related projects – ‘Nationally Appropriate Mit-
igation Actions’ – which is co-funded by different European donors.69  
For GIZ, this has always been part of our diversification strategy, of our 
strategy to change from development cooperation to a broader concept of inter-
national cooperation. This was also reflected in the changing of our name in 
2011. However, at the same time, a large part of this work is still funded by 
ODA funds. I mentioned the other German ministries, but BMZ also supports 
various projects which go beyond traditional development cooperation: they are 
related to aims and goals on global public goods, but also to strengthening part-
ner countries in their transition process. Examples are trilateral cooperation pro-
jects or advice to our partners in strengthening their own development cooper-
ation agencies. For example, from my experience in Mexico, we had and still 
have a project to enhance the capacities of the Mexican Development 
 
69  https://www.nama-facility.org/ (15.04.2020). 
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Cooperation Agency AMEXCID, which has been highly valued as a contribu-
tion to strengthening Mexico in its role as an international and regional player. 
As a brief follow-up question: To what extent has this GIZ role been shaped by 
commissions or desires by BMZ to look into these issues? In other words: Has 
this very much been a GIZ-driven interest to position ourselves beyond ODA? 
Corinna Küsel: For BMZ, it has always been part of its strategy to cooperate 
with ‘global partners’ and to strengthen them in their global role. Their strategy 
was very clear that working with these countries should not be traditional de-
velopment cooperation but should focus on climate and biodiversity issues, on 
strengthening their development cooperation agencies and on enhancing their 
cooperation with the private sector as a third pillar. At the same time, it has 
been the German government’s decisions to amplify the role of GIZ as an 
agency that also works for other German ministries as well as other European 
and international donors. But of course, GIZ has also actively pursued this di-
versification path. 
Anna, we are most curious to hear about the Sida perspective: What is the rel-
evance of ODA graduation to your organisation? 
Anna Rahm: We have not really developed a strategic policy for graduation so 
far. It is not that this issue has been unnoticed by Sida or that we have not exited 
from several countries, but I would say that, at present, it is not a discussion 
that is actively ongoing at Sida.  
When it comes to the steering selection of countries, it is, of course, a polit-
ical decision which lies with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. We can see that 
there has been a stronger focus in the past ten years or so on conflict-affected 
countries. We still aim to reach the poorest and most vulnerable, which means 
that we have rather broadened our portfolio of countries that are not moving in 
the direction of becoming middle-income countries. Therefore, we also have a 
much stronger focus on countries which are still very much dependent on aid.70  
Our strategies generally reflect the needs as expressed in national develop-
ment plans, and we strive to focus on the most important sectors and impact 
areas from the perspective of poverty reduction and vulnerability. So, in gen-
eral, we have untied aid, and the Swedish interests of, for instance, trade invest-
ment have a very limited impact on the choices in development cooperation. 
We have other agencies in Sweden that we collaborate with and that work more 
in this grey zone of development and trade and investment. However, there are 
examples and ongoing activities in several countries, where we work on how to 
link trade and development cooperation in a more explicit way. We did phase 
 
70  While many of Sida’s partner countries are on their way to reach lower-middle or 
middle-income status, they continue to receive relevant amounts of aid and there-
fore remain dependent on ODA in various sectors. 
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out our collaboration in India, Indonesia, China, Vietnam, Botswana, Namibia 
and South Africa between 2008 and 2013. The process that we carried out in 
the phasing-out of those countries was what we called partner-driven or actor-
driven cooperation. This means we tried to use the remaining years of develop-
ment cooperation to reach out to other groups in society and broaden our way 
of looking at development so that we could leave a basis for sustainable devel-
opment with more actors than the government and some civil society organisa-
tions. For example, we had more collaboration with trade unions and private 
companies. The reason for our withdrawal from these countries was mainly that 
we did not see that they were in as much need and we were entering into more 
conflicted-affected areas.  
This reflects a broader shift among many development partners, donors, over 
the past few years. Interestingly, your phase-out happened up to 2013, which is 
prior to the 2030 Agenda. Has there been any rethinking since 2015 in terms of 
some of these middle-income countries becoming more interesting to Sweden 
again? 
Anna Rahm: Well, to my knowledge, there are no real indications of that. Ra-
ther, there has been a discussion that more countries might be phased out in the 
coming years. For several years, whenever our strategies have been extended, 
there has been a discussion on these countries: Is this going to be the last strat-
egy and what will that mean in terms of our focus in those countries? It is an 
interesting question, but these decisions are taken by the Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs. 
Markus and Ivan, in which contexts or situations has the topic of ODA gradu-
ation and also cooperation beyond aid affected SECO’s work in recent years 
and what relevance is given to the topic from your perspective? 
Ivan Pavletic / Markus Schrader: The contexts are various and somewhat dif-
ferent. SECO underwent a strategic shift in 2008 when we decided to focus on 
middle-income countries. This was motivated by a clearer division of labour 
between us and the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC)71, 
which manages the bigger share of Swiss ODA. SDC focuses on least devel-
oped, low-income and fragile countries. The leverage and impact of SECO’s 
economic development cooperation is higher in middle-income countries. As a 
medium-sized donor SECO needs to make a good case for its engagement in 
middle-income countries, also towards the partner governments. It is important 
to identify those niches where SECO can add value. This is a continuous effort. 
We are trying to focus on activities that add value, are complementary to SDC, 
and differentiate us from other donors.  
 
71  The SDC is the agency for international cooperation of the Federal Department of 
Foreign Affairs. 
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Moreover, we have to explain to the public why we are engaged in middle-
income countries; the rationale behind our engagement is important. We in-
clude this in the strategic frameworks that we submit to our parliament, saying 
that those countries play an important role in their regional context both from 
an economic and a political perspective, but also regarding their contribution to 
global challenges. This has been well received and understood by the public 
because, at the end of the day, there is also something in it for us. In addition to 
genuine Swiss long-term interest, it also offers economic expertise to overcome 
the so-called middle-income trap. Assistance to Least Developed Countries is 
very valuable and nobody disputes these countries’ great need for ODA. But 
does this mean that should we neglect middle-income countries – which are on 
the verge of graduating but have not yet done so; or is there not also a genuine 
interest among the broader global community to support these countries? They 
are our partners in trilateral cooperation or cooperation beyond aid and are key 
or in assisting neighbouring, less developed countries, like Poland with 
Ukraine, or Colombia with Venezuela. With a relatively small investment, we 
can have a big impact. 
In a way, we are close to ‘beyond aid’ with the way we work and the very 
nature of what we do. The countries we are active in are Indonesia, Vietnam, 
South Africa, Ghana, Peru, Colombia and, since the Arab Spring, increasingly 
Tunisia and Egypt72. None of them is under immediate ‘threat’ of being re-
moved from the list of recipients of the OECD DAC but, at the same time, they 
are at different stages in their development as middle-income countries. Some 
are even G20 countries. Another example is when a government uses the ‘be-
yond aid’ narrative by itself, like Ghana. We highly welcome this in our coop-
eration, because that is the direction we would like our partner countries to go.  
Yet, Swiss economic development cooperation in those countries is not pri-
marily appreciated due to the amount of funding – the amounts are different 
compared to partners with higher ODA volumes – but because we bring specific 
experience and expertise, which countries can use to leverage other initiatives. 
One is: we can help you to spend your own money better. That is already closer 
to ‘beyond aid’ than general budget support. On the other hand, we invest a 
certain kind of risk capital. Partner countries may be hesitant to invest in – pre-
sumably helpful – development initiatives because their impact is still uncer-
tain, and it would be hard for them to justify such spending to their taxpayers. 
However, if the initial investment is covered by Swiss funding, with a proven 
effect they can happily take over and finance it with their own means. 
 
72  In addition, but with a slightly different reasoning, SECO is engaged in transition 
cooperation with Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine, Albania and Serbia. 
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Annalisa, could you put what has been said into the broader context of your 
research? Maybe you can add some particular insights from the various ex-
changes you had with development partners over the past few months. What is 
your perspective? 
Annalisa Prizzon: We started working on this about four years ago. Back then, 
transition from aid and graduation from ODA were, to a certain extent, a taboo, 
the former often being a political decision. However, in order to avoid jeopard-
izing development results achieved, we need to translate the transition from aid 
into principles and approaches, even though it may not necessarily be a priority 
within a government or an agency.  
First of all, while the transition from aid might be a relatively new concept, 
we should not overlook the other side of the coin: the criteria for aid allocation. 
Many bilateral agencies have aid allocation policies and criteria, with indicators 
surrounding needs, for instance on poverty or other dimensions of human de-
velopment. And when these indicators improve, the envelope allocated to cer-
tain countries tends to fall. So, we should not think about transition from aid as 
a new concept. De facto, that was happening when different criteria were ap-
plied to the allocation of aid across countries.  
However, there are a few elements that actually changed the narrative when 
it comes to the debates on exit from bilateral programmes. In recent years, many 
bilateral donors faced budget cuts or the reallocation of resources to other gov-
ernment departments. But it is also about increasing scrutiny on budgets for 
development cooperation. For instance, in the UK, about ten years ago, the ra-
tional for assistance to middle-income countries was put to the test.  
But we should also acknowledge some progress. The number of low-income 
countries was about 60 ten years ago, and now if fell by almost half. While 
income per capita is not necessarily the best proxy to measure access to inter-
national capital markets, it is usually a good benchmark. All in all, govern-
ments’ access to international capital markets has improved, expanding the vol-
ume of finance and shifting towards less concessional (and more expensive) 
financing instruments and modalities than traditional aid.   
Three or four years ago, hardly any donor had a strategy on transition in 
place – probably the only one was the European Commission with the Agenda 
for Change in 2011, with a nuanced approach for the Development Cooperation 
Instrument. Nowadays I could name a few more development partners that have 
defined or are about to define principles for transition or exit from bilateral 
programmes. For example, USAID has now a strategy called “A journey to self-
reliance”, whose name is quite eloquent. In the end, country partnership strate-
gies have the ultimate, albeit implicit, objective to support countries to develop 
and move away from aid. In the case of USAID, there are specific indicators 
that measure such process and define how USAID can best support those 
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efforts. It is not necessarily about defining a strategy to cut aid flows. DFID is 
another example. In the UK, the Independent Commission for Aid Impact runs 
regular reviews of how DFID operates. One of them was on transition and exit 
from bilateral programmes.73 The analysis of DFID’s approach prompted a re-
quest to specify the principles of transition. The system of Swiss Development 
Cooperation is developing a similar approach as well.  
So, three, four years ago, probably only the multilateral development banks, 
the vertical health funds and the European Union may have had transition and 
graduation criteria and policies in place. Nowadays, we can see many more 
bilateral donors that are considering the implications of transition and exit from 
bilateral programmes in the definition of their country programmes and in their 
overall strategy, as well as they are defining principles on how to operationalise 
transition and exit from bilateral programmes. 
 
With a number of bilateral and multilateral donors out there who have given 
themselves such a strategy, what are the lessons learned from their experience? 
For those donors who are yet to define their own strategy, what are recommen-
dations in terms of what they should look at? What should they consider when 
cooperating with countries that are in the transition phase of graduating from 
ODA?  
Annalisa Prizzon: These are often internal discussions. But if I were to summa-
rise the two main elements, the first one is about planning, and the second one 
is communication. On planning, I could name a few positive examples. One of 
them was Sida, but also DFID and SECO, all of them in Vietnam as well as 
Denmark in India. Two of the key elements of the success in terms of transition 
from aid across these samples was first the ability to hand programmes over to 
other development partners or to the government without disruption and second 
the long-term planning. By long-term, I mean three to five years. In the case of 
Sida in Vietnam, the long-term approach meant mapping what other develop-
ment partners were doing and the needs of the country, but also planning the 
medium-term request from the government and identifying who was going to 
take the partnership over. This could be done by other parts of the governments, 
like the climate or environmental ministry, or the trade ministry, but also civil 
society or, in a few examples, a multilateral development bank or a multilateral 
donor within the parameters that I mentioned earlier on. 
About communication: there was a very interesting point that emerged in 
the case studies that we conducted in 2019 in the “Moving from aid” report74. 
Yes, the decision to leave and phase out the country was communicated to the 
 
73  ICAI 2016. 
74  Calleja/Prizzon 2019a. 
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government. But when we were talking with the government, some actors 
acknowledge that, at that time, they were not aware of it. So, the communication 
should be two-way and verified. We know that each government is a big entity 
and we should be concrete. Usually, we are talking about the Director of the 
DG Cooperation within a Foreign Affairs ministry. Line agencies should be 
informed too about a programme being phased out. I can give you an interesting 
example from Chile which is outlined in the case study. Many donors commu-
nicated that they would phase out their programmes, for instance BMZ (but also 
DFID with cooperation moving to the FCO), but the government did not nec-
essarily consider the long-term implications of programmes being phased out 
at that time. The alarm bells only began ringing when the European Union an-
nounced that they would phase out the Development Cooperation Instrument. 
That was the moment when the government started trying to get the European 
Union back on board and also to challenge the criteria for ODA graduation 
within the OECD Development Assistance Committee.  
This is quite an excellent assessment, Anna, of Sida’s performance back then in 
Vietnam. Do you want to add to that or share another example of how you 
managed the phase-out? What were the key issues that guided your work in 
moving out and phasing down your portfolio in these countries? 
Anna Rahm: One thing that we started to experiment with and learn more about 
in those countries is something that we have picked up and started to do in other 
countries as well: it is to take on a role as facilitator, which means that we both 
facilitate partnerships between actors – we may create platforms for actors to 
meet –  and ensure a broader view on who should be involved in discussions 
about how specific development problems could be solved or how development 
could take place. In Vietnam, but even in other countries, we started to take on 
such a role a few years ago.  
This includes making sure that private funding is involved in achieving de-
velopment objectives, for example by sharing risks, but also by creating win-
win opportunities. In 2007 / 2008, we developed some ‘tools’, and I know that 
GIZ and other agencies have also experimented with these. These are the pub-
lic-private development partnerships, challenge funds, guarantees and different 
types of business development funds. These have been a way for us to make it 
interesting for the private sector to be involved and invest in areas where they 
would not have been involved otherwise, but also to look into new business 
models at times. We have sometimes been mediators in making sure that the 
private actors and the government discuss, that the government involves the 
private sector and invites them to be part of policymaking and discussions about 
industrial policy, for example. Sida has not done this alone; it was in partnership 
with many other bilateral actors, but it was a shift in these countries that we 
started to think about this role – not necessarily just in the phased-out countries. 
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In Zambia, where I worked for a few years, we were trying to identify links 
between the trade section and the development sections of the embassy, so we 
arranged breakfast meetings with various actors from the society to talk about 
development problems. Today, in our new vision for Sida, it has been high-
lighted that we should have this facilitative role more often and try to under-
stand how we can be that actor. 
You obviously did not choose to abruptly discontinue work and move out, but, 
as you said, get involved in these facilitation platforms, etc. Although for those 
countries that until then had received substantial funds from Sida, it may be 
hard to adjust to a situation where you ‘only’ facilitate. How was that shift 
received by these countries?  
Anna Rahm: There are certainly different situations, but most serious discus-
sions were with the governments in these countries, because in many countries 
we had general budget support or at least sector budget support; we supported 
the governments in various ways. We worked a lot on capacity-building with 
sector ministries or large departments, so that has been a source of secured 
funding for many of these agencies for a long time. There was a big debate on 
how we can make sure that the funding that we withdraw will be covered from 
other sources quickly enough. In some countries, for example on tax reform, 
we have been collaborating with other bilateral actors engaged in that matter 
and trying to work on developing the capacity of governments to set up a firm 
taxation system that can generate enough income to at least maintain the basic 
structures of governments. But I think the discussions with the governments 
have probably been the most serious ones – although many of the civil society 
organisations that we work with suffered a big blow from not getting funding 
anymore as they may not have other sources of funding to draw on75. 
Ivan and Markus, Annalisa just mentioned that SECO is working right now on 
principles of transition. Could you elaborate a bit on this process? 
Ivan Pavletic / Markus Schrader: We have certain basic principles of how and 
when we engage with countries and we will put these forwards as a proposal 
for criteria to enter but also to leave a country with our ODA means. The first 
criterion is the country’s needs. The second one is: do we as Switzerland bring 
an added value? Why does it have to be Switzerland? How do we make a dif-
ference, given our nature and the instruments we have at hand? And the third 
one, which has been in place since 2006: How will it benefit Swiss interests? 
We have a strong middle- or long-term interest in working with these countries 
because with a stable, well-functioning country like Ghana, we also create mar-
kets and we can also trade with these countries. In today’s globalised world, 
 
75  For an extended analysis of this matter, see Rachel Hayman’s contribution on the 
role of civil society in transition in this publication. 
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any country’s ‘failure’ will have global repercussions, and we will all be better 
off, including Switzerland, if countries around the globe develop well in an 
economic sense.   
Apart from that, we developed two further criteria for cooperation. The first 
is that the country needs to figure on the OECD DAC recipients list. Otherwise 
it does not qualify for ODA and would not be in our mandate. That is a crystal 
clear one. And second, we prefer to work with countries where certain mini-
mum standards exist in terms of economic governance, human rights, and the 
willingness and potential to reform. These criteria are rather minimal, but we 
cannot work in countries at war or where it is highly difficult to be active as a 
development partner. There also needs to be a certain reform willingness in the 
area of work that we are in. If the country does not want us or if there is an 
interest but no willingness to reform on a political level, why should we be 
there? We are not desperate to just stay and hang on with that country. There 
are many more countries which show this willingness, and we should work with 
champions and those eager to cooperate with us and to incorporate the joint 
lessons learned. The last one, apart from the reform willingness, is the potential 
for reform, which is yet a different aspect.  
We try to provide a few clear-cut criteria and, within them, to understand 
what our priorities are and develop a certain subset of criteria, which makes it 
possible for us to evaluate the remaining countries. 
 
The process of transition does not happen overnight, and many of us operate in 
contexts where partner countries grow into middle- or high-income status but 
still qualify for ODA. Corinna, in addition to your initial input: What does this 
mean for us? What are GIZ’s modes of cooperation in these contexts? Do they 
change? For countries that are about to graduate in the next five, six, seven 
years, does GIZ work any differently compared to low-income or least devel-
oped countries?  
Corinna Küsel: Cooperation with these countries definitely does change. I al-
ready mentioned that our focus is more on topics related to global but equally 
German or European interests. But also, the modes of cooperation change: our 
focus is much more on building capacities, advising on policies or processes. 
These countries are very demanding in relation to the expertise we provide, 
both technically and related to process management. Policy dialogues between 
Germany and its partner countries or building networks between these countries 
also play an important role. At the same time, funding as part of our cooperation 
becomes far less important as these countries often contribute funds from their 
own resources. Even in those countries which are not official partner countries 
of German development cooperation anymore, cooperation has been continued 
through regional or global approaches and funds.  
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Following up on that, one of the findings in the ODI case studies was that the 
respective graduating countries all voiced their concern about possibly losing 
access to specific technical cooperation, knowledge exchange and policy dia-
logue. There was a strong interest in continuing cooperation in that sense. In 
your views, how can donors and implementing organisations address that very 
clear demand? How can technical cooperation still happen in circumstances 
where a country is yet or just about to graduate? 
Corinna Küsel: We do have some experience with these modes. For various 
German ministries, we are already implementing projects to facilitate the dia-
logue between the respective partner country and the relevant German minis-
tries and agencies. This is a different mode of operation in comparison to how 
we have worked in most countries in the past, but we use these forms of plat-
forms and dialogue approaches. 
Anna Rahm: In most countries where we have ongoing development coopera-
tion, we have also had a parallel collaboration with other Swedish government 
agencies, such as the tax agency, statistics office, police and so on. They are not 
part of our strategy and we do not fund them directly, though sometimes indi-
rectly. It is part of the government’s agenda to broaden the number of actors 
that work with development, and also to include technical cooperation. Many 
of these types or means of collaboration continue even after development co-
operation is phased out. In some of these countries, we still have ongoing part-
nerships in areas where we have a comparative advantage, and this is not lim-
ited to development cooperation. 
Ivan Pavletic / Markus Schrader: We do not yet have very refined instruments, 
but a similar discussion. The question for us is: if we want to make a statement 
of ‘mission accomplished’ when exiting from a country, how can we make sure 
that this is not received as a loss in our partner country? We will probably do 
extensive mapping in our partner countries in order to understand better what 
other Swiss interests there are in this country. Obviously, our goal is still the 
economic development of the partner country, whereas the goal, for instance, 
of an export promotion agency is exploring new markets for Swiss SMEs. But 
it might be an interesting means for us to work with Swiss SMEs, which would 
be happy to export and to understand how we match supply and demand be-
tween the given country and the Swiss exporter. Another example are our pro-
jects on research and innovation on the one hand and academic cooperation on 
the other. If we clearly differentiate that our means are others’ objectives and 
others’ means are our objectives, we can find a potential win-win situation. So, 
how do we bring these countries to that level and how do we walk the last mile 
together in order to make this a fruitful form of cooperation and mutually rein-
force what we do in order to bring about change? On the other hand, a danger 
in that undertaking may be to fall back into patterns of tied aid or into industrial 
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policy questions where it is not so clear whether what you do is ODA or in the 
purely economic short-term interests of your own country. That is why I high-
lighted the differentiation between objectives and means and understanding 
how win-win works if you do it right. And that is currently where our mapping 
is at, so we cannot provide you with an answer yet.  
Finally, we are exploring potential linkages between our technical assis-
tance and the Swiss Investment Fund for Emerging Markets, working on an 
understanding of what would be a good way to go beyond grants. In addition, 
it is also very important to strengthen the links within SECO. For example, with 
the unit in charge of setting up free-trade agreements, we try to focus more on 
sustainability issues. Those are win-win situations where we can promote eco-
nomic interests, free trade and make sure that international labour, and social 
and environmental standards are being implemented – as this is in the core in-
terest of our partner countries. Through our projects, we then try to help stake-
holders implement them on the ground. Going even further, the Department for 
Foreign Affairs is currently setting up a process to discuss regional strategies 
or strategies for priority countries. They invited several departments and units 
on a strategic level to see what their interests and added values are, setting up a 
government’s approach in its entirety. This is very valuable because you see 
where the complementarities are and how each and every unit can contribute.  
In the end, it also calls for the question of – and this is by no means an 
official Swiss position – if the ODA concept is still relevant. And if there are 
no other, better ways to measure donors’ contributions to global challenges, 
especially also because the SDG 2030 framework is much broader than what 
the ODA concept would allow as a measure.  
 
We have already started to touch on the strategic and political implications of 
ODA graduation for providers of development cooperation. Annalisa, could 
you share your perspective on how donors can continue to live up to the long-
term, value-based relationships that have often emerged over many years of 
development cooperation. Obviously with ODA graduation, this is going to be 
disrupted in some way. How can some form of continuance be secured in a post-
ODA setting, including the possibility of strategic partnering with graduated 
countries on global public goods?  
Annalisa Prizzon: This is a very interesting question because we are somehow 
stuck in the old aid paradigm. There are many opportunities for policy dialogue, 
also within other government departments than the development units, but the 
funding attached to it creates incentives, the urgency and the opportunity to do 
that. Some of the modalities have already been mentioned, for instance regional 
cooperation approaches and, to a certain extent, triangular cooperation.  
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Regional cooperation does not necessarily directly benefit the graduated 
country. But with regional cooperation projects you are working with neigh-
bouring countries, cross-border projects that can indirectly benefit the country 
that has already graduated. That was a good way, for instance, in Chile to keep 
the policy dialogue with development partners open. Regional cooperation is 
also a learning opportunity for countries that graduated to become development 
partners themselves if they wish to do so, and in many cases, this is part of their 
own strategy.  
Triangular cooperation was also mentioned earlier on. This was a modality, 
for instance, that Mexico development cooperation tapped into more frequently 
when the volume of ODA started falling. It was also one of the options in the 
case of Chile. There are challenges for the implementation of triangular coop-
eration programmes though. The first are very high the transaction costs. An-
other point is about the (lack of) visibility of some development partners in-
volved. In the case of the Republic of Korea, which graduated from the list of 
ODA eligible countries 20 years ago,76 triangular cooperation became less im-
portant over the years because of the lack of visibility they had in this arrange-
ment for development cooperation. 
In addition, one of the key players in a post-ODA setting focusing on global 
public goods are the multilateral development banks. This is the case for many 
reasons. MDBs often had country offices and they stay on despite being small, 
so they have country presence. Paradoxically in the case of Chile, incidentally 
when the country was about to graduate from ODA, the World Bank and the 
Chilean Ministry of Finance set up an office as a research-oriented hub, which 
also meant the World Bank had a local presence. Multilateral development 
banks have different criteria for graduation. Of course, the terms and conditions 
of financing are not such that their flows can be counted as ODA, but that is 
still official finance and, in many cases, terms and conditions far better than 
what countries can get in international capital markets. The partnership of bi-
lateral donors with multilateral development banks in a post-ODA setting is of 
paramount importance. 
Given that multilateralism has come under attack in some way, including the 
fact that many multilateral development banks have in some way been ques-
tioned in recent years: to what extent do you think are they ready and fit for 
purpose given the expectation that you just outlined? Are they currently in a 
position to live up to what you said? 
Annalisa Prizzon: In a short answer: yes, because they offer a combination of 
financing and, to a certain extent, also assistance to upper-middle-income coun-
tries. I am oversimplifying, but this can also help to subsidise the concessional 
 
76  Calleja/Prizzon 2019e. 
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window, that is, the assistance to the poorest countries. So, from a financial 
perspective, MDBs are fit for purpose, and from a technical perspective, their 
staff have a set of skills, capabilities and, in many cases, world-class knowledge 
across a large number of countries. They are often stronger than bilateral donors 
when it comes to technical assistance. MDBs have a relatively strong convening 
power, especially the World Bank. We also need to think about a fourth dimen-
sion. Earlier on I mentioned that graduating countries were not particularly con-
cerned about financial resources. Their main concern was about the technical 
assistance that comes with financial assistance. For example, some countries 
could also tap into technical assistance from MDBs through reimbursable as-
sistance services, meaning that country governments can purchase directly a 
certain kind of advisory services. Even if there are these challenges to the mul-
tilateral system, I believe that recipient countries still highly value the assis-
tance and the terms of conditions they can get from MDBs, and also the policy 
dialogue they offer. 
Ivan Pavletic / Markus Schrader: I can confirm that, for us, partnerships with 
multilateral development banks are very important and something that we will 
continue to strengthen over the coming years. Switzerland is represented in the 
executive boards of Multilateral Development Banks, such as the World Bank, 
and the regional development banks. We understand and support their agenda 
to bring about change and support economic development in their member 
countries, sometimes in a multilateral set-up, sometimes with additional bilat-
eral support. 
Anna, what does this look like from a bilateral perspective? I am sure that it is 
also important for Sweden to contribute and be part of the answer to address 
global challenges. How do you work on these issues, for instance with a country 
that has just graduated or is about to graduate, and what does this mean for 
your organisation? 
Anna Rahm: I would like to echo that we work on a lot of the global public 
goods on several levels: global, regional and bilateral, and we try to often con-
vene and work through multilaterals and joint networks of actors. When we 
work with climate funds, for example, the type of projects requires a large num-
ber of actors to be involved.  
If I talk about it from a different angle, two of the general cornerstones of 
Swedish development cooperation are that we develop very strong ownership 
and that we work on capacity. Capacity is, of course, a broad concept, but our 
focus is particularly on strengthening the ownership of the most relevant issues, 
rather than trying to solve them ourselves with short-term fixes. For instance, 
we work a lot on strengthening the capacity of governments to be able to handle 
increased funds that can support aspects that include global public goods. How-
ever, we rarely work on these aspects only from a bilateral perspective. It is 
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rather part of our regional portfolios and, almost without exception, with mul-
tilateral partners. 
Corinna, you already talked about the work GIZ has been involved in with re-
spect to global public goods, climate change, etc. for many years. Given that 
experience, what are the implications for GIZ’s way of working and do you see 
a change in how we address these issues compared to 10 or 20 years ago? 
Corinna Küsel: Yes, I think there has been a change. First of all, the Ministry 
of the Environment only started to strongly focus on international climate funds 
ten or twelve years ago and, in addition, has increasingly given assignments to 
GIZ and other implementors. They also have a different perspective on how 
they expect us to work and, on the outcomes, they expect us to generate. At 
BMZ, there was always a much stronger relationship between climate-related 
objectives and development-related objectives. And when we work for other 
agencies, there is also quite a different frame of objectives and goals and a 
strong expectation that we adjust to it. If you look back 10, 15 years, this has 
changed quite a bit. 
 
One final question: if you look at the development cooperation system as we 
know it, what is the main opportunity and also the main risk or challenge that 
you see when it comes to the dimension of ODA graduation?  
Corinna Küsel: From a corporate perspective, what would it mean for an or-
ganisation like GIZ if more and more countries graduated? For now, we have 
concluded that there are very few or limited perspectives for GIZ in countries 
that have graduated from ODA. Our experience is that in all countries in which 
we work, even if they are already on their path towards high income, BMZ 
usually continues to play a very significant role. As mentioned before, even 
where BMZ has officially phased out its bilateral cooperation, development 
work has continued through different funds, for example with regional or global 
projects. Therefore, we still see a significant share of BMZ funding in these 
countries. From a corporate view, it has been this combination of funds, some 
from BMZ, some from other clients, that has enabled GIZ to continue our co-
operation in the respective countries. One of GIZ’s key assets is our presence 
in these countries; we have a very strong implementation base. Our local office 
structures enable us to build new partnerships, to identify new donors and to 
cooperate with other agencies. A lot of the co-funding which we receive, for 
instance from Sida, the European Union or other bilateral or multilateral donors, 
is based on our presence in these countries. However, if BMZ was to pull out 
completely from these countries – due to them graduating from ODA, for in-
stance – without investing in regional or global funds anymore, it could have 
serious implications for our mode of operation on the ground.  
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In summary, at least for now, our analysis would be that there is a substantial 
risk. That may change if we talk about the graduation of big players like China 
or Brazil or Mexico, as in this case, Governments might consider new modali-
ties and funds for cooperation, where GIZ might have a role in implementation. 
However, for now, I think ODA graduation is an area where we as an imple-
mentor see very limited prospects of us continuing cooperation in the respective 
countries. 
Markus Schrader: I will take one step back and look at what motivated us to 
work in the middle-income countries, and it is very similar to the anchor coun-
try concept which BMZ developed at that time77. As long as middle-income 
countries are still eligible for ODA, we have a case to support these countries, 
which hopefully leads to economic stimulus for an entire region, with spillover 
effects into neighbouring countries and into regional stability. We strengthen 
relationships in contexts where, and here I see opportunities and probably some 
threats, regional economic federations are increasingly appearing. ASEAN 
would be one, the African Continental Free Trade Area would be another one, 
also MERCOSUR. So, we have different fora that already go beyond aid with 
an economic interest to see to it that we do not lose our importance and that we 
bring cooperation to another level. At the same time, we are currently discuss-
ing trilateral cooperation, in which we have not had so much experience so far: 
how do we leverage what we have achieved in these countries and their expe-
rience for activities in third countries? The approach which we have chosen so 
far is to strengthen institutions in the countries we are working with that are still 
ODA eligible. Just to name one example from South Africa: the National Treas-
ury and the Revenue Service were overwhelmed by other African countries 
asking ‘how do you go about public financial management and about broaden-
ing the revenue management, in the sense that their officers couldn’t do their 
proper work anymore because they were so involved with providing technical 
assistance to neighbouring countries. So, they created spin-offs as international 
organisations which we supported as development partners to make the know-
how from South Africa available to other countries in the region. Through that, 
we still have them onboard as a partner. Another way of doing so, also with 
German co-financing, are the regional technical assistance centres of the IMF, 
which obviously not only ODA-eligible countries are part of. There are differ-
ent forms of exchange and potential for peer learning, so we do not necessarily 
have to lose our impact and we do not necessarily have to hamper our relations 
with these countries if we are not able to spend ODA means any more in that 
country.  
 
77  The concept was introduced in 2004; for BMZ definition see: 
https://www.bmz.de/en/service/glossary/A/anchor_countries.html (15.04.2020) 
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In my view, the biggest threat and the biggest opportunity is the establish-
ment of the SDGs and my question is: will we still have an ODA discussion, as 
we are having today, in 2025? It is not as clear-cut any more where to start and 
stop with ODA, but I presume that discussions will rather go into a format 
known from the World Bank – like who is IDA-eligible78 and who is not any-
more, who receives loans, who has to repay how much – and that we will have 
a kind of ‘solvency scale’. 
Anna Rahm: This is a big question. We have talked about this on various occa-
sions, and it comes up a lot when we talk about development effectiveness or 
aid effectiveness. That agenda used to be very strong. And now, if I start from 
the risk point of view, I see that there is increased fragmentation and that comes 
with the good thing of more actors being involved. We have new actors coming 
in that are not traditional donors and new streams of funding for development 
goals, so it poses a challenge that these new actors and new types of actors do 
not work in a similar way to traditional donors. And even the traditional donors 
have fragmented more. There were pros and cons in the traditional setting, but 
on the pro side we had the same rules of the game, and we tried at least to 
harmonise, to focus very much on ownership, to have a balanced view on re-
sults-based management and so on. So, in this respect it poses a risk that we 
now have a much more fragmented system.  
Ivan Pavletic: I also think there is a risk in graduating countries not taking over 
the whole package we have built over the last 30-40 years with all the insights 
and lessons learned in the industry of international cooperation. It is important 
for the graduates to assume their responsibilities in the international commu-
nity. We still have some issues there. If we are honest, the whole Busan-Accra-
Paris Agenda is dead, and we have not replaced it with a framework that has a 
shared legitimacy among traditional with emerging donors. This is a challenge 
we need to address. And with this comes the question of coordination. We do 
not want or have to do what other donors are doing and, certainly, some com-
petition is good for the industry, to challenge ourselves and learn about best 
practices. Yet, I think there needs to be some balance between competition and 
coordination. And from my perspective, we have not found this balance yet. 
We need, also within fora like DAC and others, to find such mechanisms be-
cause, while those questions have been discussed in the last few years, I do not 
think we have come to a good solution as of now. 
 
78  The International Development Association (IDA) is the part of the World Bank 
that provides credits on concessional terms, i.e. with a zero or very low interest 
charge. Repayments are stretched over 30 to 38 years. Eligibility for IDA support 
depends primarily on a country’s relative poverty, defined as GNI per capita below 
an established threshold and updated annually (1,175 US-dollar in fiscal year 
2020). For more information, see: http://ida.worldbank.org/about (15.04.2020). 
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748908388, am 26.10.2021, 10:19:07
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
Dialogue 3 
88 
Anna Rahm: We do have the SDGs that are leading us in the right direction, 
and it is very good to have the Addis Agenda on financing for development. 
And linking back to the opportunity, as bilateral actors, we have about 60 years 
of experience, of knowing what works and what leaves you with long-term ef-
fects and long-term results. So, because we do not necessarily have our own 
agenda, we could play a role of trying to assist actors to make the most of the 
funds and to leverage other funds. We also see a strong interest from private 
actors in collaborating with us on various issues because we have a lot of expe-
rience and knowledge. The leverage role of development or ODA could be uti-
lised better. We could choose to have this broad agenda of working with eve-
rybody in all sectors and just try to facilitate, or we could decide to focus on 
our comparative advantage and just focus on the poorest and most vulnerable 
and try to fund the issues that no one else funds. It seems like many bilaterals, 
just like us, have not really decided which leg to stand on here, so we are doing 
a little bit of both. That could be our role as well, to really make sure that not 
leaving anyone behind is our part of the playing field. 
 
You perfectly described the strategic challenge that many donors face and both 
themes are part of the 2030 Agenda, to leave no one behind but to also address 
global public goods through global partnerships. Annalisa, you have the final 
word and I think it is perfect to let the researcher speak from a broader per-
spective: Is there anything essential we have left out?  
Annalisa Prizzon: I would like to reiterate the point that Anna just made. Re-
thinking or redefining what we mean by development or international coopera-
tion would be of paramount importance. As Anna put it very clearly, there is a 
tension between aid in the old paradigm, that is, the poorest, the neediest coun-
tries in a grant financing format, vis-á-vis broader agenda for policy dialogues 
and pursuit of donors’ national interest in wealthier recipient aid countries.  
We should also go back to what we mean by ODA graduation because it is 
a binding constraint for many donors. The fact that assistance cannot be counted 
as ODA any more in certain countries is a clear disincentive for DFID, BMZ 
and French development cooperation. We do not have to elaborate why income 
per capita is a very limited measure to assess development, but this is still the 
criterion that the DAC uses to trigger and assess graduation from the list of 
ODA eligible countries. And we have seen, even in this project, how weak this 
measure can be. Countries can face shocks and see their income per capita fall-
ing, and this happened with some of the small island developing countries. In 
the case of Chile, the fact that graduation was defined on the basis of income 
per capita masked the large inequalities within the country. There may have 
been certain areas of Chile that could still have benefitted from development 
cooperation. I am aware there might not be a window to influence and change 
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the criteria for ODA graduation. But based on the evidence of the limitations of 
the income per capita measure as a proxy for development as well as the vul-
nerability of many countries to shocks, I think there may be scope to rethink the 
criteria for the graduation from the list of ODA eligible countries. 
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Dialogue 4: ODA and the international (development) 
cooperation system – global goals and strategic partner-
ships 
ODA graduation processes change the relations between former donor and re-
cipient countries, scrape on old structures of development assistance and trans-
form existing forms of cooperation into a new mode beyond a donor-recipient 
logic, beyond the development policy sector and beyond ODA. Thereby, they 
may contribute more generally to shaping the future of the international coop-
eration system in the SDG era.  
In order to explore what this future may look like, it is necessary to first 
analyse the current landscape of international (development) cooperation, iden-
tifying persisting patterns and recent trends, and situating the role of ODA and 
ODA graduation in this landscape. Thereupon, we can begin to rethink this sys-
tem: What are today’s main challenges, and do we have the right tools to ad-
dress them? What is the best role for ODA in line with the 2030 Agenda and its 
principle of universality? What forms of cooperation are needed to realise the 
SDGs in and through graduating countries? Finally, we discuss the outlook for 
the decade to come and what could be a suitable and realistic vision to achieve 
our global goals. 
The discussion was held between Joseph D’Cruz, Senior Advisor for Strat-
egy and Planning at UNDP, Stephan Klingebiel, Director of the UNDP Seoul 
Policy Centre, Yuefen Li, Senior Advisor on South-South Cooperation and De-
velopment Finance at the South Centre and Philani Mthembu, Executive Direc-
tor at the Institute for Global Dialogue. It was facilitated by Luiz Ramalho, for-
mer senior manager at GIZ and independent development consultant, and Juli-
ane Kolsdorf, editor of this publication79.  
 
Stephan, based on your research and practical experience in bilateral and mul-
tilateral cooperation, could you provide an overview of the current situation: 
the current landscape of national development cooperation, the structures that 
we have; the strengths, pressures and drivers of change? What does ODA grad-
uation mean in this context? What are the consequences? Are we going to have 
a different ODA universe in the future?  
 
 
79  For better distinction from the discussants, the inputs and questions by the facili-
tators are displayed in italic without naming the respective person. 
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Stephan Klingebiel: Let me share with you four comments from a personal per-
spective.80 First, I think what we are seeing right now has, to a large extent, to 
do with fundamental changes outside the aid system; so many things we are 
currently experiencing are consequences of changes in the broader context of 
development cooperation. I will give you a few examples. First, we are living 
in, what Amitav Acharya calls, a multiplex world.81 You might know his pub-
lications about it, a quite fascinating debate about the rise of countries and the 
increasing complexity of issues and challenges. This is, of course, not just re-
lated to development cooperation but refers to a much broader scope. As a sec-
ond point, we have a number of megatrends which frame our debate. Just look 
at the issue of migration and refugees, how important this debate is and has 
been for the last couple of years from a European but also North American 
perspective. Frontier technologies, digitalisation and other megatrends are 
equally important. Every one of those megatrends is complex, but we all under-
stand this has a very strong impact on development. My last point when it 
comes to changes outside the aid system is that we have an increasing need for 
cooperation, for collaboration, but it does not go hand in hand with a readiness 
among main actors or countries to cooperate. But what we are seeing is shrink-
ing multilateralism. So, against the background of populism and nationalism in 
a number of northern but also southern countries, you have nowadays less read-
iness for collective action. It is really a much more complicated situation than 
a few years ago.  
My second comment is that we are also experiencing a number of changes 
inside the aid system. Many of those changes are related to the global context, 
just to mention a few of them: South-South Cooperation as a competing ap-
proach to traditional ODA, which has to do with the rise of a number of south-
ern countries. This is changing the setting in partner countries and contributing 
to reflections on norms and standards for development cooperation. Just think 
about the whole debate about TOSSD, Total Official Support for Sustainable 
Development. In my view, this is, to a large extent, related to new alternatives 
in South-South cooperation, reflecting the rise of some middle-income coun-
tries. I want to highlight another aspect which is often overlooked in that con-
text: traditionally, the allocation of development cooperation or ODA comes 
from a country-based system; we allocate resources for countries A, B and C. 
This is still to some extent reality, but over the last couple of years, what we 
have increasingly seen is a thematic allocation of resources. So, instead of at-
tributing an amount to one region or country, the allocation is going to address 
 
80  This section is based on analytical work that Stephan Klingebiel did at the German 
Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) until 
mid-June 2019. 
81  Acharya 2017. 
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climate change. Or migration: look at the European Trust Fund for Africa. 
There is a huge amount of money going to African countries for migration, but 
that allocation does not focus on countries but on thematic priorities. There are 
many bilateral but also multilateral institutions where this kind of shift has 
taken place over the last couple of years. Germany is only one example. Finally, 
there is the mutual interest approach, applied by a number of donor countries 
as a consequence of what I discussed at the beginning. For instance, when I was 
writing a paper together with a colleague last year82, it was important for us to 
see that we have an increasing disconnect between the narrative, the why of 
development cooperation, the modalities, the how, and the operational activi-
ties, the what.  
My third comment, more specifically on graduation: I am really convinced 
that this topic is highly relevant, and for some reason donors have shied away 
from really working on it for the last few years. It was always there, but not to 
the extent needed. I think this topic is important from a system perspective, as 
it is related to the entire system of development cooperation and, of course, 
there are a number of more specific dimensions related to it as well. Let me 
again just touch upon a couple of them. First of all, when you are having infor-
mal discussions with experts from practice, within the system but also from 
academia, you quite often find the reflection that the aid system is a “dying 
system”83. We have a shrinking market because of this middle-income transit: 
Some of the most important receiving countries are no longer in need of con-
cessional resources, and this is reflected ultimately in their graduation. There-
fore, over the next couple of years, the system will ‘run out of business’. In 
addition, what has been present for some years in the development debate but 
not clearly responded to is the whole question of how to collaborate with coun-
tries close to graduation: upper-middle income countries mostly, just looking at 
China, for example. A number of development partners, or donors, do not have 
a clear strategy on how to deal with this kind of situation where graduation is 
taking place, and in fact donors are quite unsure how to behave. Moreover, how 
should the handover be organised? When we were doing our study 2018/1984, 
we talked to a number of donors about how they organised the phasing-out pro-
cess with regard to Uruguay and Chile, for example. You could assume that 
donors might be interested in handing over what they are doing to other actors, 
but in reality, you find out that things are really being phased out, even if part-
ners are convinced that they could continue. In addition, if assumed that coop-
eration is needed in countries that are no longer ODA eligible, in reality, actors 
 
82  Gonsior/Klingebiel 2019. 
83  Ibid. 
84  Ibid. 
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from other policy areas are not taking over those activities. A number of devel-
oping countries are also very interested in the experiences of countries which 
have recently undergone this kind of graduation experience, like Korea, but also 
in those of countries that have not yet graduated, like China. And even a country 
like Rwanda, which is still a least developed country, is starting to share its own 
experiences with other developing countries because it is much more convinc-
ing to share recent experiences.85 And finally in this respect, we should not only 
think about graduation from the ODA system, but also consider a number of 
other important graduation challenges. Just think about the least developed 
country list and great studies done, for example, by Debapriya Bhattacharya on 
the case of Bangladesh86 and the incentive system about graduation from the 
list of least developed countries, and also from a low-income to a middle-in-
come country, etc. The IDA graduation debate is also quite relevant in this re-
gard because this takes place even before countries exit the recipient list of the 
OECD DAC.  
This brings me to my last point. Graduation should be regarded, and I think 
you are doing exactly this, as part of a broader debate on the rationale of the 
developing cooperation system. My perspective would be very much in line 
with new research on transnational rather than international cooperation in sup-
port of Agenda 2030.87 This would be a different narrative from the existing, 
rather traditional ODA narrative – but it would be important, and if we had such 
a perspective, the graduation debate would take place in a quite different con-
text.  
 
Stephan was talking about putting the graduation discussion in a broader con-
text. Philani, based on your research on international relations, on powershifts 
in international communities and also on country coalitions like BRICS, what 
is your perspective on this discussion?  
Philani Mthembu: I see there are some more conceptual elements and also more 
practical elements to this discussion.  
In my view, there is – at least amongst countries in the South – the percep-
tion that countries in the north are trying to find ways to take less responsibility 
when it comes to their historical commitments in the area of development co-
operation. Certainly, we have the idea of universality in the 2030 Agenda and 
there is an understanding that the development challenges are not only focused 
towards developing countries anymore. You may look at a country like the 
United States and some refer to it as a “rich poor country”. But at the same time, 
 
85  See Klingebiel 2019. 
86  Bhattacharya 2019. 
87  See, for example, Klingebiel et al. 2016. 
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it is important to not lose sight of the varied responsibilities. In that sense, we 
should admit that developed countries in the OECD DAC basically take on less 
responsibility just because there is this idea of universality. So, the idea of com-
mon but different responsibilities is still very applicable.  
This is interesting because we do have that perception, but at the same time, 
when you look at the historical principles around South-South cooperation, they 
always advocated that developing countries should not be perpetually depend-
ent on official development assistance for their own development goals. Within 
the Global South itself, right from the time that countries were gaining inde-
pendence, they did not want to be dependent on developed countries. You look 
at their principles of self-reliance and they speak exactly to that. Now, the coun-
tries needed to find ways to live out this self-reliance. That has been there for 
many years already and it does not come from the OECD, but it is the develop-
ing countries themselves that are saying those things.  
However, while you want to move away from a donor-recipient relation-
ship, the question for the countries that are graduating is: what follows gradua-
tion? Nowadays, there is more diversity of development finance that is availa-
ble for countries, so they have more choice. That is no longer just coming from 
the OECD DAC members but also from southern actors, and there are increas-
ingly new development finance mechanisms, whether it is the BRICS New De-
velopment Bank or the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. But even in that 
respect, development cooperation from the OECD DAC members is still an 
important source of cheap finance for quite a number of countries, particularly 
within Africa.  
In that sense, it is important to say: yes, there is the universal 2030 Agenda 
on Sustainable Development; yes, there are countries that are graduating, but it 
is important that there are programmes or at least programmatic or systematic 
thinking about what follows graduation. It could happen that suddenly those 
countries do not have access to certain financing that they had access to before, 
or that the terms of the finances change in a way that might not lead to the 
further development of those particular countries. That is why this project is 
important: long before actual graduation, it is important that those discussions 
amongst the development partners take place to understand what the expecta-
tions, for instance, from a country like Botswana are, and what the expectations 
from its partners are. South Africa was involved in an interesting discussion in 
the early nineties in terms of its relationship with the European Union. The dis-
cussion was about where South Africa fits in within the Lomé Agreement and 
then, later, within the Cotonou Agreement. In the end, South Africa was given 
a special status within the agreement. It was a member, but it was seen as more 
developed than other African countries. And depending on who you speak to in 
South Africa, which departments of government, some were not very happy 
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with that. They still believed that South Africa’s challenges in fact persist, that 
the country still faces massive poverty and inequality, that you still have vast 
areas with poor infrastructure and that you still needed that sustained support 
from the EU. I always found that interesting in terms of how South African 
policymakers saw themselves, whereas sometimes people outside South Africa 
viewed the country as having a different status or development level compared 
to its counterparts on the continent. Those external views were not always 
aligned with how those in government actually saw the challenges within South 
Africa. 
Also, in that sense, it is really important to have prolonged conversations 
and planning on the implications of graduation. In the introduction, you men-
tioned the three consecutive years in which these countries are categorised as 
high-income countries before graduating from ODA eligibility. But we also do 
not want countries falling back after that period of graduation. We do have a 
willingness to graduate, we have always had a willingness to graduate away 
from official development assistance (ODA), but the fact that we are having the 
discussion on graduation will always spark conversations on who defines de-
velopment, and why they define it in this way and not another way. That con-
versation will always be there.  
I wanted to add two short impressions from the case studies that the Overseas 
Development Institute conducted.88 For instance, in Botswana, there was the 
overall feeling that the country was being punished for its good performance, 
in the sense that its development partners withdrew, and they felt that they had 
lost access to dialogue and exchange. And in Chile, a country that in fact grad-
uated recently, an official mentioned that basically it was not Chile that grad-
uated but only Santiago. This touches on the huge persisting challenge of ine-
quality, both social and regional.  
 
Joseph, from your knowledge of the United Nations system, especially the UN 
development system: It was already mentioned that there is a different ap-
proach underlying the 2030 Agenda on the one hand, and the ODA system on 
the other, mainly because of the universality of the SDGs. Is there a contradic-
tion between the two concepts or can they come together? What does ODA 
mean in the age of universality, how would it be useful for the 2030 Agenda and 
what should be its specific role? What do we need in order to move forward – 
and in that respect, what are the key driving factors behind the UN reform pro-
cess and how are they being addressed?  
Joseph D’Cruz: Let me focus on the context of the specific issue that you asked 
about in terms of the 2030 Agenda and what I can see from my personal 
 
88  Calleja/Prizzon 2019b; Calleja/Prizzon 2019c. 
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perspective about what the role of international development cooperation might 
be today. Let me start with some observations in terms of the shift – or perhaps 
the decline – in the role of ODA as a factor in development for many developing 
countries, especially regarding the context in developing countries over the last 
few decades. Two very simple observations: ODA in its traditional form was a 
vehicle to convey two sets of resources: finance and expertise. If you look at 
the world over the last 20 years, at least from the perspective of developing 
countries, in both these areas, access to what is required outside the ODA sys-
tem has become remarkably easier.  
Firstly, finance. Not only has access to finance become cheaper because of 
historically low interest rates, but the developments of the global financial sys-
tem have led to most countries having access to a much more diverse set of 
financing options than they had in the past. And as an underlying driver for 
developing countries’ approaches and attitudes towards ODA, this is quite crit-
ical. We are in a situation right now where pretty much any country in the world 
can access financing in the global financial system, no matter how small you 
are or in what part of the world; with one or two minor exceptions.  
Secondly, on expertise. In a similar vein, globalisation over the last 20 years 
has made access to knowledge and information, and to some extent access to 
expertise, much more available to developing countries than it has ever been, 
both at the national government level as well as subnational local levels. Within 
UNDP, we openly talk about the fact that in terms of being a traditional provider 
of technical assistance, one of our biggest competitors in the world today is 
Google, or the internet. And if the role of ODA is simply to provide technical 
assistance and expertise in the traditional mode, then it is becoming an increas-
ingly challenged or in some respects marginal industry. However, there are two 
countervailing perspectives on this which I think are important to bring to bear. 
First of all, while there is access to a tremendous amount of information, 
knowledge and expertise in the world, it has become increasingly clear that the 
real value of communication and sharing within the international development 
sector has been in the sharing of experience rather than expertise, because most 
of the true knowledge that development practitioners learn on the ground is 
highly subjective, contextualised and in some respects subtle. So, what we are 
seeing more and more with policymakers and development practitioners on the 
ground is a hunger to be able to share experience, to share insights rather than 
to ask for carefully packaged and designed pieces of expertise in a traditional 
mode.  
Now, in this context, what is the role of an international development sys-
tem? I believe first and foremost that the necessity of a system that allows the 
sharing of experience as well as expertise and knowledge, and the necessity of 
a system that allows collective action on issues that are transnational or 
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transboundary is now more acute than ever. And one of the key roles for mem-
ber states, nation states and organisations that support the international devel-
opment system is in maintaining and in strengthening the systems that provide 
this ability to share knowledge and expertise. This is in one limited sense tech-
nical or financial, in maintaining the infrastructures or the networks needed for 
expertise to be shared. But it is also very critically political in reinforcing the 
need for a multilateral system that allows the sharing of knowledge and exper-
tise amongst countries and communities. Both at a nation state level as well as 
at the subnational and individual level.  
Now, all of this leads me to the question you asked about the 2030 Agenda 
and the shifts in the international development system, particularly the UN sys-
tem. First and foremost, as you rightly pointed out, the 2030 Agenda is univer-
sal. It recognises that the aspirations and challenges of development are as rel-
evant in the most developed countries from a traditional ODA point of view as 
they are in the most undeveloped. And it also recognises that many of the chal-
lenges we need to deal with today are truly not just transnational but global in 
scope. This includes, for instance, the climate emergency, this includes the 
rapid spread of diseases, shocks and other stresses to the systems, and the im-
pacts of national disasters. The 2030 Agenda has started to trigger a shift in our 
perception of development as being a binary conversation between the devel-
oped and the developing, to being a multipolar conversation about how we 
share knowledge, lessons and resources, and also how we come together in co-
alitions, in networks, in structures to be able to address the global, regional and 
transnational issues that are a key part of development. 
Within this context, the UN reform process is pushing the United Nations 
system firstly to work together more effectively. Many of the challenges that 
our member states face today are complex and multidimensional and therefore 
do not lend themselves to the traditional specialist silos that most agencies 
within the system have traditionally occupied. Secondly, it has pushed us to 
become a lot more agile and efficient on the ground because the scope and scale 
of resources that are available for development assistance are certainly a lot 
more limited than they were. The push for efficiency, the push for collaboration 
is very much driven by these incentives.  
 
Yuefen, the South Centre was created in the nineties to promote unity within the 
Global South. My first question is: Is there a common position on these issues 
from countries of the South? Secondly, Stephan mentioned the lack of readiness 
to cooperate – we have the weakening of multilateralism, we have protection-
ism, we have a tendency to adopt nationalistic inward-oriented policies. What 
could be the role of South-South cooperation? And thirdly, connected to this 
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one: what would be the role of southern providers in these changes to the de-
velopment cooperation system? 
Yuefen Li: First of all, from my observations in the negotiations for BAPA+40 
and also the current negotiations about the outcome document for the UNCTAD 
ministerial conference in October this year: all in all, people think that ODA 
continues to be important. If you look at the list of the countries still receiving 
ODA, the first group is LDCs. Over 50 years, only five countries graduated 
from the category of LDCs and some of them are still debating about the impli-
cations of graduation. For instance, Bangladesh was already mentioned; they 
are now asking whether they could still benefit from certain trade-related inter-
national support measures after graduation from the LDC category. Because 
LDC countries, in addition to ODA, also enjoy trade support and other kinds of 
concessional lending from the multilateral financial institutions. Challenges for 
countries of different income levels to ‘going beyond aid’ are not the same and 
for poor countries it is not that easy. If you look at the studies by ODI, you can 
see that for the countries that graduated from ODA, countries with a per capita 
GNI (gross national income) of $ 12,235 for three consecutive years, there is 
no longer aid dependence for most of such countries. For them the amounts of 
ODA are generally small and with declining trend over the years, so they mainly 
rely on taxation revenue and on external borrowing. Of course, they have gone 
through the transitional period through globalisation, joining the international 
production chain, benefitting from the commodity boom or inflow of different 
kinds of financial resources.  
Countries like LDCs will continue to need ODA for their development. 
About ten or eleven per cent of African countries still have a situation in which 
ODA occupies an important part of their general fiscal budget. So, there has 
been no ‘going beyond ODA’ up to now; it will take quite some years for them 
to graduate from the ODA recipient status. For the countries which have already 
graduated from ODA, the very important thing is not to have any economic 
reversal. In this context, international cooperation in taxation and support on 
how to stop or minimise illicit financial flows and also how to avoid overbor-
rowing is very important. Also, for these countries, a supporting international 
environment with no special shocks is essential. Moreover, it will be important 
for these economies to build buffers like increasing their foreign exchange re-
serves and, if possible, to set up special-purpose sink funds in order to avoid 
any kind of special needs. And, of course, it will be important for them to avoid 
the middle-income trap.89 There is one thing that I would like to highlight: 
 
89  The term usually refers to countries that have experienced rapid growth and thus 
quickly reached middle-income status, but then failed to overcome that income 
range to further catch up to the developed countries. See Glawe/Wagner 2016. 
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among the countries graduating from ODA recipient status, it is necessary to 
pay attention and follow and monitor the development of small island develop-
ing countries owing to their special vulnerabilities. These countries have a lack 
of scale of economy and their resilience to external shocks is not that strong. 
So, it would be important for them to build a mechanism to avoid returning to 
the ODA recipient status.  
With regard to South-South cooperation and triangular cooperation, I think 
it will be important for the countries that graduated from the ODA status to 
share their experiences with the rest of the countries and also encourage them 
to engage in South-South cooperation. I do not see that South-South coopera-
tion is a competing factor towards ODA. The BAPA+40 conference as well as 
the UNGA resolutions stated very clearly that South-South cooperation is a 
complement to North-South cooperation, so it does not compete with or substi-
tute ODA. The exchanges in different fields among the developing countries 
are very encouraging. As Philani mentioned, the developing countries do not 
really want to depend on ODA. There is still the slogan that they would rather 
have trade than aid. They would like to make themselves independent and not 
rely on ODA, even though ODA is important for them. However, the current 
situation is that multilateralism is under attack and unilateralism is on the rise. 
The tariffs and non-tariff barriers have been increasing in recent years and uni-
lateralism is really an onslaught on international trade. The decline of interna-
tional trade, however, is a very negative factor for developing countries. I still 
hope the international community can address these matters as they will cer-
tainly have a negative impact on the implementation of the SDGs. On South-
South and triangular cooperation, the countries are now discussing how to 
strengthen it. For instance, the Islamic Development Bank and the South Centre 
have pushed the idea about strengthening institutional frameworks for South-
South and triangular cooperation. We also published a paper on the national 
ecosystems that promoted South-South and triangular cooperation.90 In the fu-
ture, this will be even more important, especially with more countries graduat-
ing from the ODA recipient status. 
There is one question which I am curious to ask: For instance, for interna-
tional trade, you have the trade diversion impact. But with countries graduating 
from the ODA status, I do not know whether there is data which shows that the 
rest of the countries, especially the LDC countries, are receiving more ODA. 
Supposing the ODA ‘pie’ remains the same size and with more countries exit-
ing from the pie, it would mean that the countries left behind should have a 
greater share of ODA. Is this happening or not? I read somewhere that some 
countries have even received more support after graduation. I am wondering, 
 
90  Islamic Development Bank/South Centre 2019. 
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out of curiosity, is it because of the economic, geopolitical importance of the 
countries that the funding continues to flow, or for other reasons?   
What do the others think? If more countries are graduating, are the LDCs get-
ting more assistance, more financial support, more expertise? 
Stephan Klingebiel: I am not aware that this is the case. Spontaneously, just 
from data from the last Development Cooperation Report, I think we have a 
small increase for LDCs, but I think this is not really related to others graduat-
ing. But I would not expect this kind of direct link to the graduation of other 
countries. ODA data is a very complex thing. For example, a lot of resources 
are going to UMIC countries and this is related to economic interest. Some ac-
tors are in a position to bring on resources from the capital market and so forth. 
Therefore, I would not see this as a direct, positive consequence that more re-
sources go to least developed countries if more advanced countries graduate. 
Yuefen Li: Should we be concerned by this? 
I think it is not only a question of economic interest and financial flows, but 
also a question of institutionality, governance and other issues. But on one 
point you are quite right. Just to give you an example, Germany’s development 
cooperation with Mexico has greatly increased in the last few years. Of course, 
other issues are getting more important, like cooperation in climate and envi-
ronmental matters. In the case of Mexico, a large share of German ODA comes 
from the Ministry of the Environment and others, not only from the Ministry of 
Development. There is still an increase in ODA flows to countries that are at 
upper-middle-income level and the question is what will happen when they 
graduate.  
 
Let us talk about the outlook, the future of ODA, but also the future of partner-
ships beyond ODA. Looking ahead over about a ten-year period – 2030 – and 
we do not only have the SDG agenda, but also the prospect of more than twenty 
countries graduating. What consequences are you expecting for the ODA sys-
tem and for the development cooperation system as a whole? What would be 
the setting beyond ODA or beyond what we know now as a system of develop-
ment cooperation? 
Joseph D’Cruz: Again, a purely personal perspective here and one that is rooted 
more in my sense of the future rather than in any strong evidence base. In the 
short to medium term, we are clearly seeing a situation where the premise and 
the need for international cooperation is being deeply challenged. I think this is 
evident. However, in the longer term, it will become clearer and clearer that 
there are a significant number of societal, geophysical and environmental chal-
lenges that we are facing which absolutely require better forms of international 
cooperation. And that push will force us to rethink how we define and how we 
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748908388, am 26.10.2021, 10:19:07
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
Dialogue 4 
102 
deliver international cooperation in a way that better meets the needs of these 
global challenges.  
A moment ago, you talked about the case in Mexico and you pointed to the 
fact that there is still a significant increase in ODA from Germany because of 
environmental issues; funding channelled through the environmental ministry 
rather than the development cooperation ministry. This is one strong trend we 
have seen around the world in the last ten years or so, because of the urge and 
necessity to deal with issues like climate change. I imagine that we will start to 
see greater recognition that other social and economic challenges as well as 
environmental challenges will require international cooperation on the same 
scale. For instance, the scale of climate emergency impacts, natural disasters 
and shocks is going to push us to develop a much more systematic way to mon-
itor, predict and respond to them, not as crises after they happen but as early-
stage emergencies when they occur. The reactive structure we have right now, 
disaster assistance, is not sustainable in the long term. And there will be grow-
ing international recognition that we need forms and structures to share the risk 
and the burden of these impacts in a very different way.  
So, I do see that the need and the impetus for international cooperation in 
this form will grow. But I am less certain about whether it will be framed in the 
traditional context of the ODA donor-recipient relationship or even specifically 
bilateral rather than multilateral or in network cooperations.   
Yuefen Li: For the relationship between ODA and the SDGs, I hope that donors 
would have certain priorities regarding ODA. The priorities to my mind should 
be on poverty alleviation, climate change and debt problems. Because, as Jo-
seph mentioned about climate change emergencies, poverty alleviation is still a 
big challenge – the low-hanging fruits have already been harvested, and now 
we have the hard core of poverty, which really requires ODA. Also, with the 
current situation of ample liquidity and low interest rates, developing countries 
and even a number of LDCs have access to the international capital market and 
some of these countries are borrowing a great deal more than in the past, not on 
concessional terms but on commercial terms. This is becoming a problem and 
carrying the risk of a debt crisis. We know that some countries are already in 
debt distress and some are at high risk of debt distress. So, I hope that the ‘ODA 
world’ has certain priorities when it comes to the attainment of SDGs.  
Philani Mthembu: For me, the future looks much more diverse than what we 
have been accustomed to. I think it was the time when Richard Manning was 
heading the OECD DAC and, at that time, the DAC members were responsible 
for more than 80 per cent, even close to 90 per cent, of official development 
cooperation. Since the year 2000, that picture has been consistently changing 
and that picture will continue to change.  
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I think we will have many more actors but also a much more diverse set of 
actors. We have just come from BAPA+40 and some of us are still in a state of 
‘hangover’ where you realise that – in the absence of common definitions about 
what constitutes, for instance, development cooperation from the South – you 
have a lot more actors that are actually forming their own development organi-
sations or their own modes of development cooperation. They will come up 
with different modalities to share with other countries. So, the picture of the 
development landscape becomes much more complex. Take a look at a country 
like South Africa, which for over ten years has been talking about the establish-
ment of the South African Development Partnership Agency. And as that is 
happening, other countries in the South have actually gone ahead and formed 
their own development agencies. Some are working with OECD countries for 
support and others are not. That is going to create more complexity within the 
field.  
We are also going to have more triangular cooperation, with northern and 
southern actors working together in other countries. Particularly some of the 
countries that are graduating might find that other countries in that situation are 
increasingly interested in sharing their experiences through development coop-
eration. Triangular cooperation may then present an opportunity for them to 
continually engage with their traditional partners.  
So, the future may be this changing landscape: more actors, more modalities 
and no common agreement on what constitutes development cooperation 
amongst these actors that are establishing new institutions for international co-
operation. In addition, how to include the role of the private sector in interna-
tional cooperation is going to be important. I also see that we will get more 
ownership at regional levels and at sub-regional levels. Not necessarily the 
OECD; we have been accustomed to the important role that the OECD has tra-
ditionally played. But subregions, for instance the Southern African Develop-
ment Community or the East African Community, will increasingly attain their 
own ideas of how the international development landscape should evolve. I be-
lieve they will want their voices to be heard and to be taken seriously around 
forms of international cooperation. 
In that sense, the landscape between now and 2030 will become far more 
complex than it was when we were accustomed to the OECD DAC being re-
sponsible for 80 per cent and more of international development cooperation. 
And I think such a landscape tells us that we should be cooperating more and 
coordinating more. Because if we do not, then we are constantly going to be 
into the disagreements about what other actors are doing and maybe seeing it 
as a threat to various modes of cooperation. Especially in a landscape where 
multilateralism and dialogue are drifting away, this calls for more cooperation.  
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Stephan Klingebiel: My personal assumption is that we may see a more pro-
nounced system in that we have two main categories of cooperation: one for 
bilateral donors as a strategic approach in economic and, to some extent, secu-
rity terms. This means that donor A wants to collaborate with a country because 
of economic or trade interests, and development cooperation might be one of 
the instruments applied. We are seeing this already now, and this might become 
more pronounced. The second type might be centred more around thematic ar-
eas or global public goods, with more and more funds, from bilateral but also 
multilateral institutions, devoted to a specific topic. It might be climate change; 
it might be diseases. Just look at what we are seeing right now in China, in 
Wuhan, and what we already saw with Ebola a couple of years ago. My as-
sumption would be that those thematic approaches will be much more pro-
nounced in the future. 
In this regard, graduation might not really play such an important role be-
cause, if you want to do something about climate change, this kind of collabo-
ration might be relevant even if a country has graduated. The conditions might 
depend on the income level of a country, but if I want to collaborate with a 
country based on the rationale of diseases, because of climate change or because 
of migration, this graduation approach might not be really that relevant.  
 
For your closing remarks, drawing on what has been discussed so far, what do 
you feel is still missing in the dialogue?  
Yuefen Li: I would like to emphasise that there is no conflict between ODA and 
the SDGs. These two go hand in hand. Most countries are not yet upper-middle-
income countries. To reach 12,000 dollars per capita for graduating from ODA 
is quite a remote target for many developing countries. Therefore, it will be 
really important to emphasise the continued importance of ODA in general and 
to alleviate the worry and concern from LDCs or other developing countries 
that the donor communities want to give away their responsibility or commit-
ment. It will also be important to differentiate between the degrees of transition. 
Based on the analysis from ODI, we can see that graduation from ODA for the 
upper-middle-income countries is not as painful as for countries graduating 
from the LDC status. For upper-middle-income countries, this transition seems 
to be relatively natural and relatively painless. 
Joseph D’Cruz: I also believe that the conversation would benefit from being 
framed slightly more broadly – away from ODA as the term of definition – to 
being how the trends in development cooperation would affect countries that 
are on the cusp of development changes, like LDC graduation. 
Philani Mthembu: I agree with the differentiation in terms of graduation, but it 
is important to include the various forms of cooperation as well, also amongst 
countries from the South, and to understand that it is not just about state to state 
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748908388, am 26.10.2021, 10:19:07
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
ODA and the international (development) cooperation system 
 
105 
but about multiple tracks of diplomacy, essentially, by bringing more players 
into the implementation of development projects. However, we need to start 
shifting the narrative away from the idea that there are certain countries that 
have the knowledge and the know-how; shift away from this donor-recipient 
view to understanding that in the current age a country like Rwanda has lessons 
for a country like South Africa or Ethiopia. One interesting example in that 
regard: South Africa is working on how to run state-owned enterprises, and 
increasingly people are saying ‘look at what Ethiopian Airlines has been doing’ 
– and not saying, ‘look what Lufthansa has attained or British Airways’. The 
examples and the opportunities to share experiences have broadened beyond 
the OECD DAC, and I think it is about supporting both particular processes, so 
that the developing countries amongst each other also have the opportunities to 
learn from their own activities.  
Stephan Klingebiel: To add another small aspect, one trend – at least for some 
main bilateral donors with specialised development actors, like BMZ in Ger-
many or DFID in the UK – is that those specialised government actors are play-
ing an increasingly less important role because ODA resources are being split 
up amongst a group of different ministries, different departments, etc. For me, 
this is an indication that the whole rationale – how governments, countries and 
parliaments are organising themselves and how they want to use ODA, what 
they expect to grow out of it – is changing. This is a long-term trend and we 
might also see consequences of how donors look at graduation, what is their 
interest and so forth. 
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Dialogue 5: Financing for development in transition and 
beyond ODA 
Official Development Assistance is first and foremost the financial basis for 
providing development cooperation from one country to another; either directly 
in the form of financial cooperation, or as an indirect investment in the form of 
technical cooperation. Even if countries graduating from ODA have concerns 
that go beyond financial support, the topic of ODA graduation is deeply inter-
woven with various questions relating to financing for development (FfD). Pro-
cesses of graduation and transition must be embedded in international and do-
mestic economic and financial systems, including capital markets and global 
governance structures. In this regard, the Addis Ababa Action Agenda91 
(AAAA) provides a framework for financing sustainable development and 
serves as a central reference point. Its key elements include mobilising more 
and “better” domestic resources in developing countries, promoting foreign di-
rect investment for sustainable economic growth, stabilising international trade 
as a driver of development, increasing funds for development cooperation, and 
reforming global debt financing and the international financial architecture. The 
AAAA confirms the complementary and catalytic role played by ODA and calls 
for better coordination with and alignment to developing countries’ own strat-
egies.  
In that respect, both the Addis Agenda and the debate on transition and grad-
uation92 try to look beyond ODA and emphasise new sources of financing and 
modalities of support: official and private, national and international, financial 
and non-financial. In our discussion, we try to link these two dots. While the 
graduation process raises questions on adequate measurement and categories of 
development, the FfD debate discusses reforms needed to lead the world to 
more stable economic and financial systems that foster development and are 
resilient to crisis. These issues are highly interrelated – in the end, both sides 
 
91  The AAAA is the outcome of the Third International Conference on Financing for 
Development, held in Addis Ababa in July 2015, and a follow-up to the 2002 
Monterrey Consensus and the 2008 Doha Declaration. As one critical foundation 
of the implementation of the 2030 Agenda and its Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs), it provided a new global framework for financing sustainable develop-
ment by aligning all financing flows and policies with economic, social and envi-
ronmental priorities.  
92  See also the contribution on Transition Finance by Cecilia Piemonte and Olivier 
Cattaneo (OECD) in this publication. 
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want to make sure that every country has access to the funds and means needed 
to make its way to a more sustainable development path – but the connection 
between them has not been sufficiently explored so far. We ask: what are the 
current trends and challenges in financing for development that are directly re-
lated to graduation and transition processes? Which financing tools are needed 
for the implementation of SDGs to succeed and what is the role of ODA in that? 
Specifically, what needs to be done regarding the increasing debt problem? 
Which systemic issues arise in a ‘beyond ODA’ setting and how does the sys-
tem of financing international cooperation for sustainable development need to 
change? In particular, what is the role of multilateral, regional and national de-
velopment banks? 
The discussion was held between Fanwell Bokosi, Executive Director of the 
African Forum and Network on Debt and Development (AFRODAD), and 
Shari Spiegel, Chief of the Policy Analysis and Development Branch in the 
Financing for Sustainable Development Office of the UN’s Department of Eco-
nomic and Social Affairs (UN-DESA). It was facilitated by Ana Kemlein, a 
policy advisor on Financing for Development at GIZ’s Department for Sectoral 
and Global Programmes, and Juliane Kolsdorf, editor of this publication.93 
 
As regards the implementation efforts of the Addis Agenda on the ground, we 
are witnessing vibrant moments within the history of FfD. Nevertheless, the last 
Financing for Sustainable Development Report (FSDR)94 was a clear and des-
perate call for action: it seems that, on the global level, there is very limited 
progress related to critical and systemic issues of the agenda. Let us begin with 
the national level. Fanwell, what do countries need to finance their develop-
ment goals and succeed in implementing the SDGs? Which tools and what kind 
of support? How should this support and these tools be governed? And, con-
necting it with the other dot, what is the role of ODA in this? 
Fanwell Bokosi: If you look at the African Union’s Agenda 2063, the African 
blueprint for development, and then at the UN’s 2030 Agenda, you see that 
there are many similarities. While I will focus more on Agenda 2063, of course 
taking the bias that I am African, I conclude that some of these things are rele-
vant for both agendas. First of all, one of the key issues that was identified in 
Africa in terms of spurring development is infrastructure development in order 
to connect people from one place to the other. If you look at these huge pro-
grammes for infrastructure development in Africa, you will see that aid does 
 
93  For better distinction from the discussants, the inputs and questions by the facili-
tators are displayed in italic without naming the respective person. 
94  The Financing for Sustainable Development Report was produced by the Inter-
agency Task Force on Financing for Development. See United Nations 2019.  
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not form much part of that. Countries have been looking beyond aid to find 
other means of financing infrastructure.  
The second thing regarding development finance beyond aid is that, over 
the last five years, a lot of African countries have issued bonds on the interna-
tional market, therefore in foreign currencies. They have used this to develop 
their finances in order to fund development. This has implications, and some of 
these countries have got into difficulty when the bonds reach maturity: they do 
not have enough funds to pay and then they go and borrow again. And every 
time they borrow again, or they default on payments, the interest rates get 
higher. So, African countries have resorted to the bond market, which is an 
actual increase in debt, but they are also still borrowing from the international 
market. The debt levels on the continent are getting close to what they were 
before the HIPC and MDRI initiatives95.   
When you look at the debt statistics in terms of where Africans are getting 
their money for development from, first you will notice that concessional loans 
are becoming a smaller proportion of the total external debt stock of African 
countries. Most of the debt today comes from private sources and the interest 
rates are much higher. Second, the proportion of private traders or private cred-
itors is increasing. Third, many African countries are getting a large share of 
loans to finance their development from non-traditional donors, especially 
China. I mention this because the way you handle these loans, including trans-
parency and accountability, are different from, for example, the OECD DAC 
and the Paris Club, and that has become a very important issue.  
In addition, many African countries are trying to enhance their domestic 
resource mobilisation. Their tax levels have increased, even though they have 
not gone to the level that you would want for development. However, because 
of the nature of African economies in terms of the composition of the labour 
market as regards informal vs. formal and unemployed vs. employed, they have 
tended to use taxation instruments that are characterised by ‘easier to collect’ 
rather than ‘more valuable’. VAT is popular in that regard because it is easier 
to collect than taxing the companies. That means that a lot of big companies 
still have the advantage that governments are not aiming at them and, moreover, 
they are able to negotiate tax incentives in order to not pay enough taxes. I do 
 
95  The Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative and the related Multilateral 
Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) are structured programmes run by the IMF and the 
World Bank to ensure that the poorest countries in the world are not overwhelmed 
by unmanageable or unsustainable debt burdens. To date, 36 countries – 30 of 
them in Africa – have received the full amount of debt relief for which they were 
eligible through the HIPC and MDRI. 
  See: https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/debt/brief/hipc (15.04.2020). 
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not like the word ‘fair share’ because ‘fair’ is very subjective, but in these cases, 
you can ask if companies should not take more responsibility.  
Finally, it is important to notice that corruption is also an issue that we have 
to worry about when considering the financing of sustainable development in 
Africa. There still is a high degree of illicit financial flows getting out of the 
continent. So, to conclude, you see that there are several big issues that we have 
to look at in an environment in which ODA is getting reduced.   
With regard to the reduction of ODA, we should also take into account that 
we are facing an environment where a lot of European countries are now linking 
aid to capping migration. That could be a very big problem in the sense that 
some of the smaller countries that really need aid – like Lesotho for example – 
are not at the forefront of capping immigration to Europe. We see that aid is 
being diverted to countries like Morocco or Libya, where migrants are closer to 
getting into Europe. This link is important. On top, under ODA regulations do-
nors can count aid that is spent on in-country activities for refugees. That will 
inflate their ODA numbers, but fewer amounts of money will be transferred to 
support actual development for the people on the continent. So, that requires us 
to look beyond aid to see how we can actually best develop the continent.  
 
Shari, could you complete this picture with some remarks related to ODA and 
transition processes, and connect it with current developments on the future of 
development finance, also within the FfD process? 
Shari Spiegel: The underlying premise of the Addis Ababa Action Agenda is 
that financing development is not just about finance or money. It is about 
growth and the developmental process in countries, about national and interna-
tional policies and policy frameworks.  
Different strands of finance are meant to be used where they are most ap-
propriate on the country level. For instance, public finance and private finance 
have very different roles. There are sometimes discussions on comparing ODA 
with private financing. People claim that there is an enormous gap that ODA 
cannot fill, and therefore we need private financing. Coming from within the 
FfD discourse, we tend to look at it very differently: ODA was never meant to 
fill some infrastructure gaps, such as investment in energy infrastructure. That 
is not its role. Private finance is most appropriate in certain circumstances when 
there are financial returns associated with investments. It is important to better 
understand the role of different financing flows in the process.  
What does that mean in the context of transition? In this year’s FSD Report, 
we look very closely at some of the graduation issues, and we differentiate be-
tween three different contexts: one is graduation from LDC status, another is 
graduation from low income to middle income, and the third is at the top, grad-
uation from middle income to high income, which implies the loss of ODA 
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eligibility. We find that there is a question of a ‘missing middle’. That means 
that countries, as they move up from one context to another, lose access to cer-
tain sources of financing. We find that in about half the countries that move 
from low income to middle income there is a financing gap. This is not neces-
sarily because ODA is falling. ODA generally increases when countries’ per 
capita income rises above the low-income threshold, and only falls when coun-
tries reach upper-middle-income or high-income country levels. Nonetheless, 
ODA falls as a percentage of GDP as countries’ incomes grow. Even though 
tax revenues rise in per capita terms, total public finance as a percentage of 
GDP declines so that it is unable to compensate for growing financing needs.  
The implication of that is, as Fanwell said, some countries then go to the 
capital markets to cover their financial gap. The result is that the cost of financ-
ing goes up and the maturity of financing goes down. This is one of the reasons 
why there is this link to debt sustainability issues: it is based on both the size of 
the debt and the type of debt that is financing the gap. Therefore, the debt issue 
is one of the really big issues that we are discussing in the context of financing 
for development, including the question of whether we have the appropriate 
instruments to help countries in need.  
One of the risks of borrowing on capital markets is that the debt is in foreign 
currency. If you have to repay debt in a foreign currency when most of your 
revenues are in your domestic currency, a currency devaluation can lead to se-
rious debt problems. This risk can also apply to concessional loans and ODA 
when the loans are in foreign currencies. In the long run it is important to build 
local capital markets to be able to finance investment in local currencies. How-
ever, it is not so easy to balance these long-term planning processes with short-
term needs for investment.  
We also need to look at the roles of development banks. Non-concessional 
long-term affordable finance can help countries fill financing gaps. There is the 
question of what concessionality means. Even non-concessional international 
public debt is still concessional compared to market debt as it is generally sig-
nificantly cheaper than market debt and longer in duration.  
The second set of questions being discussed is about what the role of ODA 
should be in terms of leveraging private finance. ODA has always played an 
important role in catalysing private and other sources of finance, including rais-
ing taxation through capacity development and incentivizing private investment 
by creating the enabling environment for private investment. More recently, 
there has been a greater focus on how ODA can directly leverage private fi-
nance, and in what situations such blended finance would be the most appro-
priate, effective sustainable financing source, without overcompensating the 
private sector.  
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Finally, country ownership is important. There is the question of how to link 
foreign support, including for blended finance, with the priorities of the coun-
try. There is the new effort of developing ‘integrated national financing frame-
works’. The idea is that countries have a strategic plan that integrates all their 
financing flows and their financing priorities to support the implementation of 
their sustainable development goals. That could be a tool with which they can 
articulate their priorities better to their donors so that ODA can be better aligned 
with country priorities.  
 
Let us dive further into some of your points. Fanwell, you underlined the differ-
ent kinds of financial flows that are crucial on the national level for sustainable 
development, and ODA did not seem to be very important in that regard. What 
is it that makes ODA still effective? If it has any role, what is it? 
Fanwell Bokosi: From my experience on the continent, speaking to a number 
of activists and government representatives, ODA is still important. Maybe that 
is why every time you go to a meeting of African finance ministers, they still 
insist on ODA and the 0.7 per cent of GNI as a commitment. This is the reali-
sation that despite negative experiences in most African countries, ODA has 
played a number of positive roles, especially in the provision of public goods 
that do not have an outright or immediate market return. I will give an example: 
If you want to build a university and you do not have enough money, it is very 
difficult to entice the private sector to invest in such an undertaking in some 
African countries. So, ODA can be effective if it is put into areas that are cata-
lytic, where it can serve as an investment. If you invest in education and health, 
thereby in the human capital of the country, and then if that human capital in-
creases, if the health of the people increases, it sparks private activities. As Shari 
said, we need to understand what type of development requires what type of 
funding. This is why a lot of people are talking about GDP and about catalysing 
the private sector. We need to understand which types of projects can entice the 
private sector to invest, where they have a return even though they provide a 
public good. This is extremely important so that you do not end up with a sce-
nario where the private sector comes in, makes all the profit and then leaves, 
while the people bear the risk. So, to conclude, there are different types of ac-
tivities that need different types of financing.  
In addition, ODA, as has been said, can play an important role in setting the 
fundamentals right. It is like you are setting the foundations to spring from for 
development. So, if most of the ODA is not used to actually solve problems, 
like if ODA is used for humanitarian projects which do not solve a problem, 
that does not spark other things. It might not be the best way to use it. I am not 
saying humanitarian aid is not important. I am saying that if we have to move 
away from aid, then ODA should be used in those public sector areas where the 
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private sector cannot or does not go but which are still very important for the 
productive capacities of those countries to go forward.  
 
Could you go more deeply into the specific needs of countries moving from 
middle income to high income, the challenges they are facing and also the role 
that ODA can play in that context? Also, to both of you: what could be the role 
for multilateral development banks in that specific setting, given for instance 
that their graduation criteria are different from that of ODA? Moreover, if we 
are moving beyond aid: how does the system of international cooperation and 
financing for development need to change in that respect? What do we need to 
do better regarding ODA? 
Fanwell Bokosi: Indeed, looking at the African countries that are not classified, 
such as LDCs like Botswana and South Africa, or even Ghana and Zambia, that 
are moving towards the lower-middle-income category, their problems are 
slightly different. For example, in Botswana, you are not talking about the bare 
minimum level of income for people, but rather about the gaps in opportunity. 
First, the problems are more about income and inequalities rather than about 
absolute poverty, and it is also about the effect of these inequalities. The second 
thing is just the sheer numbers because you talk about the average. The average 
income for graduation is 12,000 US dollars. But when you look at the inequality 
issue, you might think about the people that are pulling that average up to 
12,000 US dollars, and these are only the top ten per cent, whereas the absolute 
numbers of people in poverty are much higher, and their income is actually far, 
far below that threshold.  
As these problems are slightly different, ODA in those countries will have 
to be crafted in a way that supports that particular context, which may be com-
pletely different from LDCs and other countries. So, it is important to look both 
at the absolute numbers in society and at the gaps between those that have and 
those that do not have, because, as Shari said, the pursuit of economic growth 
has come with increasing gaps in income and opportunities. 
Shari Spiegel: First of all, I agree that inequality is an important issue. As 
we know, the largest number of poor people live in middle-income countries. 
In addition, every country has unique challenges, which means that policy re-
sponses will vary across countries. When resources are limited, understanding 
where the greatest bottlenecks are can help countries prioritise where financing 
would be most useful – what investments give the most bang for your buck, and 
have the largest impact.  
Second, capacity development is very important. For example, in cases 
where the biggest challenge is in raising domestic resource mobilisation, capac-
ity development in tax issues can be very important. The same applies to ca-
pacity-building in debt management. One of the issues that we have been 
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surprised by is that, a large portion of the recent increase in borrowing has been 
in floating rate debt. Yet, with interest rates so low, it does not make sense for 
countries to be borrowing at floating rates that are likely to rise in the future. 
We are still in need of debt management capacity development.  
A third issue that we have not yet discussed is how technology and digital-
isation is changing the developmental model, what this means for countries, 
and if countries, both developed and developing, are ready for that transition. 
And again, it is really important to incorporate technology into planning and 
thinking forward, and capacity development.  
And finally, we need to look into institution-building. The question should 
be: Where are the institutions weakest and what institutions need to be strength-
ened so that countries can be better prepared when they graduate, for example, 
to be able to build local financial and capital markets? The type of support may 
change before a country’s transition so that the country’s own institutions and 
its own internal structures are able to better support development after gradua-
tion. Part of that means, again, that there needs to be better and smarter planning 
in order to think about these complicated issues – especially given the uncer-
tainty that comes with digitalisation changing the world, where nobody really 
knows what the impact is going to be.  
As regards the role of multilateral development banks, MDBs, such as the 
World Bank and the regional development banks as well as some of the national 
development banks, including banks like KfW and others that operate across 
borders: MDBs can play an important role in direct investment, in catalysing 
private investment and in long-term lending to countries. The question of how 
to best leverage private investment and where it is most relevant is particularly 
complex in LDCs, though it can also be challenging in middle-income countries 
and in countries in transition. There are a lot of lessons to learn from past expe-
riences, and we all need to be thinking about how to do that properly; and how 
to do that in ways which are both efficient and cost-effective and do not disturb 
private markets. 
We could go into that in more depth, but before that, I would like to come 
to how the international system and cooperation needs to change and is already 
changing. We need to think more about vulnerabilities. Right now, graduation 
from ODA is based on income levels, but vulnerabilities are equally important 
and can push countries backwards. The question is: how does one bring vulner-
abilities into the decision-making process, for instance vulnerability to climate 
but also to other external shocks? ODA is not the main or the only tool with 
which to address these problems; the international system, and particularly the 
IMF, aim to support countries that suffer from external shocks. Nevertheless, it 
is important to take vulnerabilities into account when it comes to understanding 
ODA graduation. 
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You both criticised the measurement of the ODA category, both with respect to 
vulnerability issues and to absolute numbers versus average calculations. 
There are different measurements of development and of access to development 
finance. Where do you see the shortfalls and where do you see the need for 
changes in that respect? 
Fanwell Bokosi: I think this is quite important. Coming from the African con-
tinent, we always said that these issues also affect European countries, but they 
did not want to listen. So, while Europe was developing and growing and eve-
rybody was talking about economic growth, no one thought that inequality 
could become an issue that would actually threaten the system. But if you look 
at the protests in Europe, the protests in the US and the far-right movements, it 
is all about frustration with the current economic system, which rewards only a 
few and leaves the majority behind, even though the average values are much 
higher. And I think that leads to a question about having to rethink the global 
model of development that we have. The advantage we have is that we are not 
talking about communism or central planning; we are talking about how to 
make sure that growth is not pursued for the interest of growth itself. And I 
think that is extremely important for countries that find themselves stepping up 
the ladder. I always give the example of a country like Zambia. If you went to 
Zambia a couple of years ago, everybody was celebrating the fact that Zambia 
had become a lower-middle income country, and everything was okay. Two 
years of drought followed this moment, then electricity problems and blackouts 
(because they did not have enough resources), then two years of inadequate 
rain, an energy crisis, and so on – and some of Zambia’s gains were completely 
wiped out. This is one type of vulnerability, and of course there is climatic vul-
nerability. But it is not only that. Look at the example of Angola: a couple of 
years ago, we would never have talked about Angola being in financial crisis, 
but then oil prices went down. And because of a country’s dependency on a few 
commodity prices and fluctuations in the commodity markets, you find it being 
vulnerable to these shifts. So, we need to look at the system and see how we 
pursue growth in a way that does not take growth as an end in itself but as a 
means to lifting up the majority of the people, as a means to human develop-
ment. I think that is where we need to start tweaking the system. And when I 
hear the IMF and the World Bank talk about inequality these days, this is where 
I punch the air and say: Now we are talking! Because in the past, they kept 
saying that “trickling down happens very easily; do not worry, economic 
growth is going to increase and somehow the system is going to compensate 
the people at the bottom, and everybody is going to be better off.” We are now 
realising that this did not exactly happen. I do not have a solution to how to 
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tweak that, but I think we really need to think about new concepts when looking 
at the global economic system. 
Shari Spiegel: I completely agree with that. I think that there are two elements 
that will come up: one is inequalities and the other are shocks. We are more 
focused on shocks because of the visibility of climate-related shocks. But there 
have actually always been shocks, and there have always been vulnerabilities 
that countries have faced. They are not only climate-related, but climate-related 
shocks bring our attention more to the questions of how to strengthen countries’ 
systems, including their financial systems, and the importance of addressing 
vulnerabilities.  
Talking about inequality, I think that neo-classical economists always be-
lieved this would not be a critical issue – you just redistribute; you maximise 
and then redistribute. In my view, there is now a much deeper understanding 
that, first, there is not always the political will to redistribute, and second, there 
are economic implications from inequality that go beyond simple redistribution. 
Today, these issues are being understood much better. While there has been 
enormous progress in analysis, inequality is still growing faster than the solu-
tions.  
Prior to the FfD conference in 2015 in Addis, the United Nations Intergov-
ernmental Committee of Experts on Financing for Sustainable Development 
launched a report that was meant support the 2015 financing for development 
process. This report addressed the importance of including not just income, but 
also vulnerabilities and social needs in reflections on income graduation and 
the needs of countries. The idea was that by the time countries graduate in dif-
ferent processes, one area would have to compensate for the others. For in-
stance, countries that are more vulnerable will have to be stronger in the other 
two areas to compensate for their vulnerabilities. For me, that is certainly some-
thing that must be thought of more broadly.  
Today, the phenomenon of shocks is most noticed in relation to the small 
island developing countries and climate issues. Nevertheless, confronting the 
issue of vulnerability needs to go more deeply than that. We have already seen 
countries that graduate from one category into another and then backslide again. 
And we need to ask: What are possible solutions to this, particularly in terms 
of how to prepare better for shocks, and what types of instruments would be 
helpful in this respect? For instance, we looked at debt instruments. Some have 
been issued with hurricane clauses. More debt instruments should include 
clauses that allow for countries to delay debt payments during periods of 
shocks. In other words, risks are shared between the creditor and the debtor, as 
opposed to the debtor taking on all those risks. And especially when it is public 
debt, in the end, the creditors take these risks anyway due to the high risk of 
default during shocks. These types of structures would help make the process 
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smoother when such events happen. We could also think more about incorpo-
rating other state contingencies into public debt. We know that there have been 
discussions about GDP-linked bonds in the private sector that have not taken 
off but if the public sector takes the lead, this could be a way to make these 
types of instruments more utilised. Insurance mechanisms can also help manage 
risks and be part of the solution, though it is important to understand their lim-
itations. For insurance to work properly, you need diversification across coun-
tries, sectors and regions. The public sector can help enhance these sorts of 
mechanisms. There is a lot of space for thinking and ideas to help countries 
when shocks happen, as well as the implications of shocks on graduation.  
  
We talked about ‘what’ needs to be done and you already started to talk about 
the ‘how’, sharing some solutions, for example regarding the debt challenge. 
Before we go more deeply into the development cooperation system, I would 
like to go back to the roots of the debt problem, dive a bit more into it and ask: 
What could be a better role for development cooperation in this debt challenge? 
Fanwell Bokosi: One of the things that we struggle with on the African conti-
nent is that we do not have an international debt resolution mechanism. A debt 
crisis is basically left between the creditor and the debtor. If the creditors are in 
a group like the Paris Club, then they can agree on solutions, because although 
the Paris Club is not a formal body, it does work together, and it actually helps. 
The problem is, as I said at the beginning, that more and more the Paris Club’s 
importance – in terms of the volume and proportion of the aid that it has given 
to African countries – is getting smaller. As a result, it was much easier to deal 
with the MDRI and the HIPC processes, because most of that debt was owed to 
multilateral institutions and bilateral creditors, and either way, it was basically 
bilateral. It was also easier because this was public money; most of those bilat-
eral donors lent money from their own taxpayers to African and Asian coun-
tries. That is why the Jubilee Movement96 was so successful, because the gov-
ernments were able to forgive that debt based on their budgets. Compare that to 
the current scenario where most of the debt is private bonds: if a country issues 
a bond on the international market, the buyers are individuals who are buying 
into syndicates out of their savings. You are not going to go to the individuals 
and say: forgive the debts of the African countries because this could be their 
pensions, this could be their investment. As it stands now, we do not seem to 
have an international mechanism that can resolve that. And that might lead to a 
problem: if one creditor holds out, then the others cannot move; they cannot do 
 
96  The Jubilee Movement (or Jubilee 2000) was an international coalition movement 
in over 40 countries that called for major debt relief for poor countries by the year 
2000. 
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anything else. So, I really think that we need some form of international mech-
anism to resolve debt. 
The other thing is debt transparency. The problem with resolving this in the 
current international system is that we do not know who owes whom. Take the 
example of Germany and Zimbabwe. Germany was the largest bilateral creditor 
to Zimbabwe until China overtook it. Now, the German ambassador says: I do 
not know what Zimbabwe owes China. My problem is if I go to my government 
in Berlin and ask them to forgive the German debt of Zimbabwe, what if they 
ask me “are we just transferring resources so that Zimbabwe will be in a better 
position to repay Chinese debt?” In other words, even if I am willing to commit, 
I am just giving Zimbabwe fiscal space to repay another creditor. And if there 
is no transparency and if the Chinese are not talking to the Germans, then it is 
going to be difficult to resolve a future debt crisis.  
Shari Spiegel: When we think about debt, there are three different areas. 
The first is that, even before they get to a debt crisis, highly indebted countries 
do not have the finances to be able to invest in the SDGs, despite the enormous 
financing gap in sustainable development. What can donor governments do to 
help those countries? One option could be debt swaps, and again, both the cred-
itor and the debtor need to want to do this. In a debt swap, the borrowing coun-
tries shift from repaying the creditor to investing the money in the SDGs. Often 
people think about debt swaps in a crisis situation, but we should consider them 
more generally for countries that are heavily indebted. ECLAC has made a pro-
posal for the Latin American region to do this through the Green Climate Fund. 
But whatever the mechanism, the first question would be: Are there cases where 
creditors agree to help heavily indebted countries swap some of their debt pay-
ment into SDG investments? There have been successful examples of debt 
swaps, sometimes with philanthropy buying commercial debt at discounted val-
ues and swapping it for investments.  
A second area is to strengthen responsible borrowing and lending by both 
borrowers and creditors. This subject also relates to the Addis Agenda, which 
clearly states that debt is the responsibility of both the creditors and the borrow-
ers. When creditors lend money, they make a decision. Interestingly, in private 
markets, creditors get paid an extra premium, a credit spread, for taking on 
higher credit risks. In the end, creditors are supposed to do credit screenings, so 
that if they lend to high-risk countries, they demand a higher return to compen-
sate for the additional risk. If the country is unable to repay its debt and defaults 
on payments, creditors have to work with the debtor to restructure the debt. 
There have been many discussions about the principles of responsible borrow-
ing and lending. Principles already exist, for example agreed by the G20, and 
others formulated by UNCTAD, but some of them have become controversial 
over time. The Addis Agenda calls on countries to devise a new set of principles 
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for responsible borrowing and lending, to be agreed on a global basis, building 
on existing measures. Those principles would include issues of transparency, 
on both sides. However, it remains a question of whether the international com-
munity wants to pursue this at this point, or not.  
The final area is debt resolution. As Fanwell said, we do not have a global 
system for sovereign debt resolution. In corporate debt, every country has its 
own bankruptcy regime, with clear legal rules that address the question of sen-
iority – who is paid first when a company defaults. In sovereign debt, we do not 
have anything like that. It often happens that whoever has payments due first 
gets paid and whoever comes after that does not get paid. If someone has col-
lateralised the debt, then they are going to be paid back and the other ones will 
not. Sovereign debt resolutions have recently become much more complicated 
as the creditor landscape has changed, and it is not clear if the methods used in 
the past (with various degrees of success) are going to work go forward. I am 
convinced that there is more willingness to approach these issues now from 
both creditors and from debtors, because there is a bigger realisation of how 
difficult resolutions are becoming.  
 
If we look at the financial systems in a beyond-ODA context, the question about 
responsibility is crucial and needs to be debated a lot more. Who is in charge 
and who needs to take responsibility? This leads to the question of how the 
development cooperation system needs to change, and we have already touched 
on this matter. There is not much time left until 2030, we have a debt crisis on 
the horizon, and we are still working on long-term investment. We have differ-
ent tools, but everything seems to still be in an initial phase where we are not 
really seeing an impact or success. So, what do we need to do urgently and how 
can we do it? Again, what is the role of ODA in this? What is the role of multi-
lateral and national development banks, and if they should work together as a 
system, how may their governance have to change?  
Shari Spiegel: There are several elements of the question. One issue on debt is 
how to differentiate how the funds being borrowing are used. When the invest-
ment associated with borrowing generates financial returns or leads to eco-
nomic growth, the investment can help repay the debt. Yet, the impact of this 
type of borrowing is not always monitored, in part because governments don’t 
have ‘balance sheets’ that account for both liabilities (i.e. the debt) and the as-
sets (i.e. the investments). It is very challenging to incorporate this into the Debt 
Sustainability Analysis of the international financing institutions. That is where 
the development bank system can come into play. When regional and multilat-
eral development banks lend for specific projects – as opposed to general sov-
ereign lending – it is clear where the money is going.  
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The second pillar is the national bank system: if a country has a strong na-
tional development bank that is financially sustainable, it can borrow against its 
own balance sheet. Such a development bank may not be as profitable as a 
commercial bank, nor should it be because it has a developmental mandate, but 
it should have sufficient returns to be financially sustainable. There are exam-
ples of very successful national development banks, such as KfW, though there 
are also examples failures. So, it’s important for national banking systems to be 
well governed. For instance, there is a group in Africa that has come up with a 
set of principles, rules and guidelines on what good governance in national de-
velopment banks should look like. I think that a lot more work could be done 
in that area, including questions on developing risk reporting for national de-
velopment banks that takes into account their unique mandates. The Interna-
tional Development Finance Club (IDFC), the group of national development 
banks, brings some of the largest NDBs together, and can lead on some of these 
issues. In sum, we have to ask: How does the system enable countries to have 
more productive investments that can help generate growth and revenues to re-
pay debt, and which do not hurt sustainability, but instead help that sustainabil-
ity? Because right now, our system does not do this very well.  
The second issue, in terms of development cooperation itself, is about 
loans, both concessional and non-concessional, and what their terms should 
be. Can there be changes today in the structure of loans, in government to 
government lending and in development cooperation lending? What would 
they look like? As we discussed, there are examples of state contingent debts. 
In the past, these loans have been structured in such a way that the borrowing 
country had to pay a bit more up in interest payments to get a guarantee for a 
future crisis. As a result, some borrowing countries are not interested in these 
types of loans, even though they might an efficient way to manage risks and 
help resolve crises. There needs to be more discussion between partners to see 
if there can be agreement on sharing this risk and how it can be done. As dis-
cussed, debt swaps are another mechanism to share risks. In the end, it comes 
down to one question: Are partners willing to work together to help countries 
that are heavily indebted today and need to invest in the SDGs, by finding 
some mechanism for them to be able to invest more? 
In that respect, we also need to look into the modernisation of ODA. How 
debt relief is calculated in ODA has changed, and there may be a risk that this 
disincentivises debt relief in the future.  
Fanwell Bokosi: One of the issues that already came up is: Why were we not 
worried about debt management? We did not worry about debt management 
because of the fundability of the debt. In other words, if these debts are coming 
from multilateral institutions or regional development banks, they are ‘pro-
jectised’. You have a project, you get it approved, and there is some element of 
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monitoring from the project provider. That is not the same with a bond. With a 
bond you raise the prospectus. But the prospectus is not binding. Once the 
money comes, you can use it for any reason that you want. And sometimes, for 
example in the case of Zambia, they wanted to raise a certain amount of money, 
so they issued a bond and it was over-subscribed. Suddenly, they had extra 
money that was not actually budgeted for, and you cannot really know how it 
was used. So, one way to deal with this issue is to start thinking about how 
ODA can empower citizens to hold their governments accountable in some of 
these highly technical areas. A lot of civil society organisations get involved in 
debt issues, but maybe ODA can help to improve that accountability, even in 
cases where the government gets money that is not ‘projectised’, like in bond 
markets. There is certainly a lot of corruption, a lot of actual theft of that money, 
because it is difficult to track. I would like to add a point about infrastructure. 
A lot of money is being given for infrastructure, but the question is: what type 
of infrastructure? I always give the example of Chinese aid. In a couple of Af-
rican countries, we now have probably three more new football stadiums, each 
of which is empty all the time – well, the football teams are there, but most 
spectators cannot afford to go to the stadiums. Was that the right type of infra-
structure to borrow money for? Who makes those decisions? So again, it is 
about accountability.  
 
We have been talking a lot about financing for national development. Coming 
to the close of this interview, let us look a bit into the factor of global public 
goods. Many of the countries that are predicted to reach high-income status are 
important contributors in this respect. What do we need in terms of financing 
to ensure proper provision and protection of global public goods in a post- or 
beyond-ODA setting?  
Fanwell Bokosi: This is why, for me, international development cooperation is 
extremely important, because no one country can actually deal with global pub-
lic goods on its own. The issues of climate, the issues of other risks: you really 
need to have a mechanism that deals with all of those. The FfD forum is the 
place where you can discuss this; it is a place where you can start leading on 
these things and this is why we support the annual reviews (FSD reports, see 
above) produced by the FfD forum. As civil society organisations, we have al-
ways said that while we know that the technical expertise in some of these areas 
is at the OECD, it does not have the mandate and the legitimacy that the UN 
has. We know that the IMF has technical knowledge on some of these issues, 
but our aim is that the United Nations should continue to coordinate because, 
irrespective of the flaws of the UN system, it is the only place where people 
have equal power on most of the issues: one country, one vote. The other mech-
anisms of global development cooperation are not even close to that. We know 
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that people talk about the ineffectiveness of the UN, and my argument is it is 
only ineffective because the big guys do not want to play by the rules. Because 
if everybody else agrees on the rules and only you as a country say no, then you 
undermine the system, you make it ineffective in order to blame it for not ful-
filling its role.  
Thus, I think that in terms of international cooperation, we need to support 
a rule-based system under the United Nations. I see movement in that direction 
towards a multipolar, a global governance system, and maybe that will help to 
begin to move the parts of the puzzle. Global goods can never be financed, can 
never be provided if we do not have proper international development cooper-
ation, which, from my point of view, must be coordinated under some form of 
the UN system. They might not have the technical expertise, but they have spe-
cialised agencies; UNCTAD could be part of that coordinating role to move 
things forward.  
Shari Spiegel: Even if this may be a pitch for ourselves: I completely agree that 
the UN has an important role and that the FfD forum is an important place to 
discuss these issues. Let me just add that, from my point of view, we have ac-
tually developed a lot of expertise in the UN on financing issues. In addition to 
that, the Inter-Agency Task Force on Financing for Development, led by the 
UN’s Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN-DESA), brings together 
more than 60 UN and non-UN agencies, with a leading role for the IMF, the 
World Bank, WTO, UNCTAD and UNDP. In the FSDR, we bring together all 
this thinking and all the expertise from across the system on financing issues, 
including the OECD Secretariat, the Financial Stability Board and other finan-
cial standard-setting bodies. So, I do think that we have been building expertise, 
including learning lessons from across the international institutions over the 
past five years, on issues of financing for development. 
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748908388, am 26.10.2021, 10:19:07
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
 
123 
Spotlight v: Transition finance – financing the journey 
towards sustainable development 
Olivier Cattaneo & Cecilia Piemonte, OECD 
To support the implementation of the Addis Ababa Action Agenda (AAAA), in 
its communiqué issued at its 2017 High Level Meeting, the Development As-
sistance Committee (DAC) set an objective “to better understand the broad cat-
alytic effect of official support and other resources by understanding the inter-
linkages among official development assistance (ODA), partner countries’ do-
mestic resources, private investment, remittances, philanthropy, trade finance 
and export credits, and other sources of finance”, and to “continue to collabo-
rate with other experts within the OECD and beyond in order to have a global 
overview and outlook on financing for development”97.  
The work on transition finance responds to this call, exploring the availabil-
ity and interactions of the different sources of financing for sustainable devel-
opment (public and private, external and domestic) as countries develop and 
reach higher levels of income. Indeed, the intention of the OECD’s work on 
transition finance is to help DAC members manage transition in partner coun-
tries better and, as ODA is progressively phased out, enhance the resilience of 
their efforts by avoiding financing gaps or socio-economic setbacks. As part of 
the work stream, seven pilot studies98 on countries illustrative of different tran-
sition phases, challenges and geographies have been produced99. These form 




97  OECD Development Assistance Committee 2017: para. 15. 
98  Cabo Verde, Chile, Lebanon, Solomon Islands, Uganda, Vietnam, Zambia. 
99  In addition, a working paper that outlines the analytical basis of this framework, 
various fact sheets and an online dashboard have been developed. All products 
will be published within the Transition Finance Compendium (OECD, forthcom-
ing). 
100  The methodological approach for the case studies followed an ‘ABC framework’ 
for transition finance diagnostics, which involves: Assessing the transition context 
in the country; Benchmarking the substitution effects between public, private, do-
mestic and international resources; and Counselling on how development partners 
can help phase out ODA and secure the progressive growth of other sources of 
finance. 
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Access to finance for sustainable development in transition 
 
As showcased in Figure 2, as countries transition (with the rise in their GNI per 
capita) they lose access to certain types of financing, but gain access to a 
broader variety of actors, tools and instruments. 
 
Figure 2: DAC, non-DAC OECD members and multilateral agencies’ outflows, 
2013-2017 net disbursements, 2017 prices 
Source: Authors’ calculations101 
 
This illustrates two main trends: 
(i) There is a relative substitution of external with domestic resources (the latter 
becoming more and more important in relation to the former). From the onset, 
domestic resources are the largest source of finance for the economy – with a 4 
to 1 ratio of tax revenues/external flows. This ratio keeps increasing, however, 
with tax revenues representing more than 12 times the value of external flows 
as the country reaches high-income status. Domestic resource mobilisation is 
therefore a key component of sustainable national financing strategies, and 
should remain a primary objective of ODA; 
(ii) There is a relative substitution of external public with external private re-
sources. Highly dependent on public external support (mainly ODA) in early 
 
101 Calculations based on OECD (2018d ‘Creditor Reporting System’ database) for 
ODA, OOF flows, and private flows, World Bank (2018 ‘migration and remit-
tances data’), UNUWIDER (2018, ‘tax revenues’ database) and IMF (2017, ‘Bal-
ance of Payments’ database) for FDI, portfolio investments, and long-term and 
short-term debt. 
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stages of transition (lower levels of GNI per capita), countries progressively 
move towards private financing of their economy. Public financing itself 
evolves, with a progressive substitution of ODA with OOF; then private flows 
(foreign direct investments and remittances) take the leading financial role. 
 
Graduation from ODA eligibility 
 
One of the pilot studies in the work stream explored the specific ODA gradua-
tion milestone by looking at the case of Chile102. The experience of Chile is 
particularly interesting from a transition finance perspective as most of the re-
cent ODA graduates are either SIDS, oil-exporting countries or countries in the 
EU neighbourhood. After decades of continuous economic growth, Chile 
reached HIC status in 2011, a year after it joined the OECD, and continued to 
be eligible for ODA until 2017103. 
First, the study showed that ODA flows to Chile had remained relatively 
low from the early 1970s onwards and until its ODA graduation in 2017: the 
last projects were not concessional and targeted renewable energy. Second, the 
study found that technical cooperation, even if low (25 million USD on average 
per year in 2010-2017), was considered important to the country. Nonetheless, 
most projects were discontinued and not replaced by domestic equivalents in 
the absence of allocation in the national budget. Finally, the study observed 
considerable disparities between economic and social growth and inequalities, 
which prompted the recent massive street protests throughout Chile, and ques-
tioned the prioritisation of DAC interventions prior to Chile’s graduation. 
In sum, insufficient efforts were made to strengthen the resilience of 
ODA104, in particular with regard to domestic resource mobilisation (e.g. to ad-
dress inequalities), the continuity of technical assistance programmes through 
budgeting or other forms of financing (e.g. through regional programmes), or 
the sustainability of private financing. More efforts could also be dedicated to 
tapping the strong potential of Chile in triangular cooperation and as a provider 
of development cooperation.   
Indeed, the results of the seven case studies led to the overall conclusion105 
that each transition milestone needs to be equally prepared. There is no single 
milestone, whether legal or income-based, that is more important than others. 
 
102  Cattaneo et al. 2020. 
103  The DAC graduation rules stipulate that a country is removed from its list of ODA 
recipients when it exceeds the high-income threshold (as measured by GNI per 
capita) for three consecutive years at the time of the committee’s review, which 
itself takes place every three years. 
104  The concept “resilience of ODA” refers to the best alternative use of ODA re-
sources in order to perennialise its effects. 
105  OECD forthcoming. 
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Moreover, efforts to strengthen the resilience of ODA should be increased all 
along the development continuum. 
 
What could the DAC do to manage graduation from ODA eligibility better? 
 
Specific mechanisms and tools could be developed to support ODA graduation: 
these could include better defined and targeted technical assistance, as well as 
transition loans or grants. While the DAC could maintain the GNI per capita 
criterion for ODA graduation106, other warning indicators could be highlighted 
to apprehend the countries’ situation better with regard to specific vulnerabili-
ties, such as climate or inequalities, and guide ODA efforts close to graduation. 
Additionally, the DAC could usefully create a mechanism for preparing gradu-
ation better as well as promoting continuous dialogue and peer-learning after 
graduation from ODA. Such a ‘Graduates’ Club’ would allow for monitoring 
of socio-economic progress after graduation, tracking non-ODA flows, discuss-
ing experiences and advising recent or future graduates, developing new rela-
tions with DAC donors beyond ODA, assisting access to other types of finance 
and technical assistance, and enhancing a country’s capacity to become a donor. 
Finally, the DAC should develop new channels for sharing expertise and tech-
nology as well as for peer-to-peer learning. These could include: (i) better use 
of multilateral (including global funds) and regional financing and support 
mechanisms (including deep trade agreements) to sustain inclusive growth; (ii) 
the identification of new institutional partners for preserving budgetary alloca-
tions in favour of jointly identified priorities (e.g. climate change); and (iii) the 
reform of former channels of cooperation to harness new tasks, such as trian-
gular cooperation.107 
 
106  So far, this criterion has not been called into question by the DAC because of its 
simplicity of use and utility with respect to universality, comparability and other 
practical reasons, e.g. availability of data in developing countries. 
107  All key products of the OECD work stream on transition finance, including the 
detailed results and summaries of the seven country studies and an online tool for 
conducting additional transition finance analyses, are available online at: 
www.oecd.org/dac/transition-finance-toolkit. Forthcoming products will also be 
published here.  
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Dialogue 6: Modes, ideas and innovations for coopera-
tion beyond ODA 
To create a new system of international cooperation which is stable, efficient 
and consistent with the shifts in world politics, it is necessary to establish new 
visions and perspectives, as well as new modalities and instruments of cooper-
ation to fill the emerging new structures with life. We would like to explore 
ideas, tools and innovations which could contribute to achieving sustainable 
development in a setting beyond or post-ODA. How do conventional ap-
proaches have to change and be adapted, and which alternative modes of coop-
eration can be developed? What are the roles of different actors, such as the 
private sector, regional development banks and civil society? What might be 
innovative instruments for sharing knowledge on and solutions to development 
challenges and how can we join forces to secure and provide important public 
goods?  
The discussion was held between Citlali Ayala Martínez, Research Profes-
sor at Instituto Mora, Semih Boyaci, Co-Founder of Impact Hub Istanbul, Riad 
Ragueb Ahmed, Manager ‘Reverse Linkages’ at the Islamic Development Bank 
(IsDB), and Ulrich Wehnert, Head of Section Governance and Human Rights, 
Division for Global Affairs at GIZ. It was facilitated by both editors of this 
publication: Ulrich Müller, Senior Advisor to GIZ’s projects on knowledge 
sharing, networks, southern development cooperation agencies and trilateral 
cooperation, and Juliane Kolsdorf, Senior Policy Advisor at GIZ’s Corporate 
Development unit.108 
 
Citlali, having worked for several years as a researcher at Instituto Mora and 
being a member of global and regional think tank networks, you have been in-
vestigating new forms of cooperation, the role of Mexico as a southern pro-
vider, triangular cooperation, networks and funds, as well as knowledge shar-
ing. What are your most outstanding findings in that research? 
Citlali Ayala: At the Network of Southern Think Tanks (NeST)109, we are cur-
rently working on strengthening our regional chapter in Latin America in order 
 
108  For better distinction from the discussants, the inputs and questions by the facili-
tators are displayed in italic without naming the respective person. 
109  NeST was established on the sidelines of the first high-level meeting of the Global 
Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC) in Mexico in April 
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to further research what is happening with South-South and triangular cooper-
ation, and what think tanks can contribute to this discussion. We are aware of 
the current situation, moving away from ODA and no longer being full recipi-
ents, and the challenges of becoming a southern provider. As a southern think 
tank, Instituto Mora has participated in specific studies like the ‘Decalogue’ for 
improving South-South and triangular cooperation in the Meso-American re-
gion110 through a workshop on inter-agency coordination. There are other op-
portunities besides traditional development cooperation, for example working 
on intra-institutional coordination and improving the mobilisation of technical 
and financial resources. There, we could see that the private sector is playing 
an important role and is becoming a stronger partner, for instance through pub-
lic-private partnerships for development, with initiatives like the Mexico-Ger-
many Alliance for Sustainability or the Mexican Alliance for Haiti. The above 
initiatives include projects where convergence between technical cooperation, 
financial cooperation and capacity building has been encouraged, as well as 
processes of gradual partner ownership. Research has also shown that, at least 
in the Meso-American region and in Central America, development coopera-
tion can be beneficial not only for development but also for regional integration. 
Finally, given the sensitive matter of migration, we can see today that govern-
ance and security issues rank highly on the current agenda for development 
cooperation.  
 
Riad, the Reverse Linkages Programme111 is quite outstanding for multilateral 
banks. As far as I know, it is the only one that focuses on triangular coopera-
tion, on knowledge sharing. From this practice and your observations, what is 
your vision for the future?  
Riad Ragueb Ahmed: When you see what is going on now, such as the trade 
tensions between US and China, the spread of coronavirus, and other global 
trends, the vision for the future is blurred. However, based on my experience 
working with 57 countries from the Global South at different levels of 
 
2014, and as a follow-up to the Conference of Southern Providers held in Delhi in 
April 2013. Its purpose is to provide a global platform for southern think tanks to 
collaboratively generate, systematise, consolidate and share knowledge on South-
South cooperation approaches in international development. For more 
information, see: http://southernthinktanks.org/index.html (15.04.2020). 
110  Decálogo de Cooperación Sur-Sur y Triangular en Mesoamérica, see: 
https://www.mx.undp.org/content/dam/mexico/docs/Publicaciones/Publicaciones
GobernabilidadDemocratica/Decalogo_Digital_2019.pdf (15.04.2020). 
111  Reverse Linkage is a technical cooperation mechanism introduced by the IsDB to 
facilitate South-South and Triangular Cooperation and knowledge exchange 
amongst IsDB member countries. 
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development, I would like to highlight three points that need to be kept in mind 
when we think ‘beyond ODA’. 
First, the dual role of each country. I believe that all countries in the South 
can be recipients and providers of knowledge and solutions. I prefer to use the 
term of ‘solution’ rather than ‘knowledge’ because it is more inclusive and com-
prehensive than knowledge. And here I will be provocative – the North should 
also accept having this dual role, particularly in being a recipient and not only 
a provider of solutions. The North needs to have a paradigm shift and accept 
receiving solutions coming from the South or to partner with the South in 
providing to others collaboratively. So, all countries in the world should em-
brace this dual role. Of course, the degree and magnitude of a country’s role as 
a recipient and provider may vary. Some countries may be more active as re-
cipients, others more providers. But this paradigm shift in the mindset of all 
countries and governments to take on that dual role is important. We should not 
assume that developmental solutions or knowledge are only a privilege of a 
group of countries. They can be available in all countries at various levels in 
different degrees.  
Point number two: Nowadays, the divide between the North and South 
needs to be transcended. Many emerging countries from the South will be 
among the largest economies of the world within the next few years. We have 
to elevate and strengthen the North-South / South-South cooperation by en-
hancing triangular cooperation, where each partner brings something to the ta-
ble. It is a partnership among equals. All the partners – the financier, the recip-
ient and the knowledge provider – should be considered as equals, and the ap-
proach of imposing conditionalities because one side has the resources and the 
other side has the need should be abandoned.  
And my last point which I consider as a crucial element while talking about 
ODA and beyond, is the necessity of having adequate institutional arrange-
ments. To play an effective role in development cooperation and fully benefit 
from it, each country needs to take the lead at the national level and put in place 
relevant institutional arrangements or a national ecosystem. We did a study that 
was published in September 2019 in the margin of the UN General Assem-
bly112. This study identified a set of pillars that can be considered by the coun-
tries for their institutional arrangements related to development cooperation. 
We are currently advocating for and encouraging each country to enhance its 
national capacity to manage South-South and triangular cooperation and ODA. 
 
 
112  Islamic Development Bank/South Centre 2019. 
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Ulrich, you have vast experience on global projects and global networks, which 
is an important and interesting point of view when we look at the issue of going 
beyond ODA. What are your ideas and comments on our topic? 
Ulrich Wehnert: If we really move beyond ODA, we should leave development 
behind us, this connotation of development, this concept of development. For 
me, moving beyond ODA entails us beginning a new game: new actors, new 
principles and a new attitude. I very much agree with Riad when he said that 
we should all be providers and recipients. That is right and even our minister 
for development says Germany is a developing country to underline the univer-
sal approach of the 2030 Agenda. 
Still then, thinking in terms of providers and recipients is an old concept of 
development, and moving beyond ODA, in my view, would mean that each 
country is a provider. There are no recipients. We all provide to something, and 
it is not development, it is sustainability. That would be my hope, at least. I do 
not know what this new system could look like, but if we really would like to 
meet on an equal footing, we need an exchange that goes beyond just dialogue 
to knowledge sharing, to co-creation. I think you can only co-create if all actors 
involved provide something. If you have a provider-recipient relationship, you 
are not on an equal footing. These are my 20 years of experience, and I am 
really frustrated about this. You can also try to work around this and find new 
methods and approaches to overcome the provider-recipient dogma; but, in the 
end, in a new world beyond ODA, I do hope that we are all providers, providing 
ideas and co-creating approaches to global sustainability. 
 
Semih, you probably represent the most exceptional organisation in our discus-
sion. With the Impact Hubs, a new type of organisation is arising. If we take up 
what Ulrich has said, that we need to initiate a new game, do you have models 
for that game? What should we take care of? What should we keep in mind 
when discussing going beyond ODA? 
Semih Boyaci: First of all, I will briefly explain what we do as Impact Hubs113. 
We are a global network of social innovators and social entrepreneurs, which 
is now active in 102 locations around the world. Each Impact Hub is a co-work-
ing space for social innovators and social entrepreneurs, impacting on individ-
uals and on organisations. But it is much more than a space. All these people 
coming together as a global community are creating positive impact on society 
via their projects or start-ups. And we, as Impact Hub teams, organise and sup-
port programmes to empower these people to have a further impact. In addition 
 
113  For further details, see Semih’s contribution on the Impact Hub network in this 
publication. 
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to having spaces around the world and organising events, we develop a lot of 
content that empowers social leaders.  
On your question, I would like to start with the SDG Agenda. In order to 
achieve the goals that we have for 2030, making existing models better is not 
enough at all. It is required, but we also need new models; and social entrepre-
neurs do exactly that: they create new models that can use existing resources in 
a more sustainable way. For example, consider that we have one-third of all the 
food wasted globally, and yet we have so much hunger in the world. Social 
entrepreneurs create models that use food waste to create more nourishment. 
What they do is particularly inspirational, and it is already showing that each 
country is a provider. Today, Turkey is considered a developing country and it 
has not graduated yet. But this social venture was developed here. It takes the 
food waste from producers and retailers to food banks, so that they help a lot of 
people in need. Now, they are establishing the same system in Germany and 
Italy.  
This shows that South-North cooperation is already happening at the grass-
roots level. But it needs to be transferred to existing systems so that more re-
sources can flow into innovation and new models. The problem is that resources 
are not moving as fast here because it is considered risky. But even if only one 
out of ten social entrepreneurs is successful, this creates a huge impact because 
they find that critical gap in the system and develop a model based on this. We 
should also have capacity for supporting new impact-driven models, as we do 
for developing existing models. And these should go hand in hand. There are 
many inspiring examples of social ventures that are creating significant impact 
globally, especially from developing countries. As Impact Hub, we support 
these people and accelerate their ventures, so that they exponentially increase 
their impact. A good example of this is ‘Accelerate2030’, a global Impact Ac-
celeration Programme where we select impact ventures that contribute to the 
SDGs and help them scale globally, particularly in developing countries. I had 
personally been enrolled in the Turkey chapter of this programme three years 
ago and one start-up in that programme cohort (Whole Surplus) was selected as 
the best social venture in Europe by the European Investment Bank last year. 
There is great potential and there is no difference between North and South at 
the grassroots level, in my opinion. 
 
Based on your inputs, I would like to propose four topics and one question for 
our dialogue. First, the dual role of countries and the partnership among 
equals; second, the linkage and relationships between development and other 
policy areas like security or migration; third, the flow of resources; and fourth, 
the role of the private sector. Finally, if we leave traditional development co-
operation behind us and begin a new game, what would that be?  
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Let us start with the terminology. We heard that all countries should have a 
dual role. We need partnership among equals, go beyond this divide between 
North and South and everyone should be a provider. At the same time, we live 
in a world where everybody is programmed to broadcast her or his views but 
only few are really listening. So, I wonder if it is good to have only providers. 
Isn’t there also a need to have those who are ready to receive, in a sense of 
listening and learning, and to understand ‘recipient’ as an active role? Not in 
an attitude of demand and gratitude, like “Please do that for me and I will not 
take up the responsibility”. Should we not rethink what it means to be a recip-
ient? What do you think? 
Riad Ragueb Ahmed: Sometimes, the energy and effort that we lose in termi-
nology take us far from the action on the ground. We have to keep in mind that 
five years have already passed since the adoption of the SDGs. And we are still 
debating about how we can finance the SDGs. In the meantime, climate change 
and other issues are not awaiting.  
For me, the most important focus is the previously highlighted dual role 
with the fundamental principle of partnership among equals. This also implies 
that we respect the demand, needs and context of each country. We listen to 
each other while doing business in development. All of us, as equal partners, 
North and South, should look for solutions. The nature of the solutions and how 
they fit the context of each country will vary depending on each situation, but 
we should join our efforts. We should reconsider on how to deal with that, how 
to work together hand in hand. It may be idealistic but accepting this dual role 
for all countries in the world would, for me, be a first step. I also like Ulrich’s 
point on sustainability a lot. Yes, we must join our efforts for sustainable solu-
tions.  
Citlali Ayala: From a ‘beyond ODA’ point of view, I would like to add that 
ODA is official, and if you talk about the dual role of countries, countries are 
considered to be governments. But currently, we are discussing development in 
our countries with a participatory approach, with a multi-stakeholder approach 
and with multiple actors, plurality and inclusiveness. Possibly at this point it is 
possible to glimpse that official development aid will at some point become 
obsolete as we have known it for decades. Recent debates on development aid 
and the discussion of alternative terms such as the TOSSD show that it is not 
possible to conceive of official development aid without the new providers from 
the South, the private sector and remittances. Economic dynamics and sustain-
able development, in their broad understanding, require broader and more in-
clusive concepts that translate into equally inclusive financial instruments and 
cooperation policies. Current ODA discussions cannot exclude other actors an-
ymore, like social or private actors. It is true that this is changing, but maybe 
too slowly. 
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In the last few years, I have been thinking that instead of becoming complete 
donors, middle-income countries should advocate this duality, because we as 
middle-income countries can enhance and improve the capacity to receive de-
velopment cooperation, which is not aid, and provide better development coop-
eration. So, as dual countries, we can sophisticate and improve the capacity to 
manage development cooperation. In specific initiatives, like the programme 
that the German government has on institutional strengthening with the Mexi-
can development agency AMEXCID and the different projects within that ini-
tiative, I have the perception that the equality among partners is in political 
dialogue, sharing methodologies and sharing different approaches. So, as a 
Mexican, I think that we are listened to and we can build an equal development 
solution in different aspects for Germans, for example.  
In terms of what Mexico is doing with Central America on issues like mi-
gration and others, this equal dialogue can be deepened further. Duality among 
North and South and South and South requires a horizontal dialogue. I repeat 
constantly to my students that this recipient-donor approach is obsolete and this 
North and South approach is used less. ‘Development partners’ can be a 
stronger term, and it has already been used by some countries, instead of talking 
of recipients. ‘Recipient’ has a passive connotation.  
Riad Ragueb Ahmed: Just to build on that: when we talk about the dual role, 
particularly at the receiving end, we have to make sure that the relevant institu-
tional arrangements to absorb the solution, and to adapt it to the local context 
exist. The right legal framework, supporting policies and regulations as well as 
adequate capacity should be put in place to allow each country to play this role 
effectively. Without these arrangements resources and funds will be wasted. It 
is of paramount importance to strengthen the human and institutional capacities 
in each country to play these dual roles. 
Citlali Ayala: Maybe we can support the term ‘beneficiary’ instead of ‘recipi-
ent’. That could be something to think about. 
Related to the partnerships among equals: in the studies conducted by the Over-
seas Development Institute during the first stage of our project, regional or 
global programmes were quoted as a good way to continue partnerships, also 
in a post-ODA setting. How is the division of roles in these programmes? Is it 
any different from bilateral programmes? I was just wondering: if there are 
more players, are they also more equal? 
Ulrich Wehnert: Definitely. In my experience, if you are meeting on a global 
issue, if you meet with countries from the global South and North, coming to-
gether in, let us say, Bangkok, you are on an equal footing. You invited the 
experts from the global community, and it does not matter if they come from 
Germany, Togo or Indonesia. You invited the experts with their expertise and 
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that should be the standard. And that could be an approach for going beyond 
ODA.  
ODA means Official Development Assistance. Germany has to live up to 
its promises and commitments and spend two or three billion each year to the 
South. This makes it very difficult to achieve true partnership ambition. If you 
give money as a donor, there will be a receiver. That is ODA; that is the system. 
All of us do not like it, but the logic of the system, in the end, finds its way into 
our mindsets. But the global cooperation dimension is: you meet, you come to 
a dialogue, you share knowledge, and you very often come to co-creation mod-
els. And I do hope that beyond ODA, we will have a partnership among equals. 
My hypothesis is that in a world beyond ODA, you will have countries that are 
mature, that have resources, and there will not be the question of who has the 
money. All countries will have the money and the resources to meet. And that, 
in my understanding, is the precondition for meeting on an equal footing. Eve-
ryone puts money on the table, not the same amount, but everyone contributes 
something. That is the difference to ODA. 
Semih, how does that sound to you? Is it an old discussion which you are simply 
beyond?  
Semih Boyaci: I do not have a background in the internal structures of develop-
ment organisations, but I will comment based on general observations about 
South-North relationships. In every kind of environment, with all kinds of 
stakeholders I see locally and globally, one of the main things we lack is that 
we do not do much to bring different stakeholders together. We do not focus 
much on extracting the shared wisdom in those groups and investigating facil-
itation models. This is, in general, the problem I see when I go to big confer-
ences and workshops. There are nice connections one-to-one, but overall, there 
is a lack of participatory models that bring together different agendas in co-
creation settings.  
With regard to your question, in the last few years we have started to see 
more funding being allocated to entrepreneurial activities that support North-
South collaboration. And on this front, I think it is quite hopeful that develop-
ment organisations will start to allocate funding to programmes like Acceler-
ate2030. For instance, that programme has been developed by Impact Hub Ge-
neva, together with UNDP. The funding reinforced new ideas and models, from 
particularly the emerging countries that have the potential to create an impact 
in both the South and North in all countries. UNDP saw the potential, with the 
Impact Hub global team, that innovations that can contribute to a more sustain-
able world could come particularly from emerging and developing countries. 
Considering the impact created by the ventures that joined that programme, this 
is a really good case to show the potential of countries that are normally per-
ceived as recipients. These countries have the ability to create these models. 
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That is where there is most potential, and hopefully we will have more initia-
tives like that in the future. 
 
Let us move on to our next topic, the relation between policy areas. Ulrich, 
based on your experience with global projects: when we are discussing global 
networks, they often have a specific topic. Are other actors taking this seriously 
– the Ministry of Economic Affairs, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of 
Defence – when development actors are working on these issues? Or is there 
still a strong divide between the policy areas and do we remain in a niche? 
What is the change going on with regard to this kind of policy coherence, which 
may be needed to achieve the SDGs? 
Ulrich Wehnert:  My observation is that over the last five, maybe ten years our 
rhetoric has changed, and we do talk about linking those fields: development, 
peace and security, climate and foreign policy. All of this is stressed in daily 
speeches. However, in reality, many of us, be it state actors, be it implementing 
agencies, be it civil society, be it think tanks, are looking into their own silos. 
In the end, it is a fight about resources in various organisations concerning cer-
tain subjects. In this way, to my understanding, we have not yet achieved the 
2030 Agenda, which has tasked us with finding a way to cross sectors and to 
link fields. We are still searching for ways to implement the complexity of the 
2030 Agenda. To be positive, we are thinking about this much more than we 
did in the past. But again, we have not found a good approach yet. 
Riad, how are you dealing with that in the Islamic Development Bank? For 
instance, you have so many member countries where security issues are a big 
topic. How far do you get into these policy areas with your work, with some-
thing like ‘reverse linkages’? 
Riad Ragueb Ahmed: I fully agree with what Ulrich said. In our case, we are 
‘mainstreaming’ these cross-sectoral or thematic issues such as climate change, 
women empowerment, youth empowerment and building resilience in our op-
erations. It is not an easy exercise because it is multidimensional. As a devel-
opment bank, we have put in place policies on many of these issues, such as a 
climate change, woman empowerment, etc to properly guide every single inter-
vention. When it comes to fragile states, it is even more complex because most 
of the time you do not even have fully-functioning governments in place. We 
are conscious of it. We are doing our best but there is no one single ‘miracle’ 
solution. The important point here is that there is now an awareness on a global 
level that those issues have to be mainstreamed and considered in every single 
action. 
Citlali, do you have examples that could be inspiring in this process of change 
that we are heading for, but that apparently, we have not reached yet? 
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Citlali Ayala: I will mention the Plan for Integral Development in Central 
America, which is supported by the United Nations Economic Commission for 
Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). It is executed mostly by AMEX-
CID with national and international funds, it aims to reduce poverty and foster 
development, and also tries to diminish migration from Central America, i.e. 
undocumented immigrants from Central America going to the United States 
through Mexico. Personally, I find this Plan has really changed AMEXCID’s 
recent way of working and it is its current priority. The news show officers from 
AMEXCID going to the southern border every week to implement specific ac-
tions of the programs that include the Integral Plan, register beneficiaries, offer 
jobs and send money through diplomatic channels. At the same time, the Mex-
ican government is trying to replicate a brand-new national initiative called 
‘youth building the future’ in the region. This initiative tries to create jobs in 
Central American countries and to provide the population in poverty with better 
conditions, so that they stop leaving their countries. 
A possible constraint I see is that the original programme, the original initi-
ative in Mexico, has had only one year of implementation. It has not been tested 
nor proved to be successful yet. In Mexico, the original programme follows an 
assistance approach; the government gave money directly to young people and 
they worked in a small enterprise on temporary jobs. I do not want to criticise 
the programme because it is brand new, but I was really concerned that it was 
replicated in Central America that soon. In addition, the programme will de-
velop other initiatives in Central America with 30 million USD for each coun-
try, i.e. for Guatemala, for Honduras and for El Salvador. This means that it has 
been designed for the long term, but I still wonder if it will also be sustainable 
in the long term and where the money is going to come from. Alicia Barcena, 
the (Mexican) Executive Secretary of ECLAC, is very engaged and has already 
called for a donors’ meeting in Mexico City. It is a different form of creating a 
regional fund for Central America.  
Perhaps, Semih, in this initiative on ‘youth building the future’, Mexico should 
work with the Impact Hub? 
Semih Boyaci: Yes, why not! I have a separate addition to this. As you know, 
migration is also a big issue in Turkey because of the war in Syria. There has 
been huge funding from the EU delegation, around 3 billion EUR, to develop-
mental organisations working in Turkey. GIZ is one, but the World Bank, 
UNDP and other UN organisations, KfW and others are also disseminating this 
funding to the projects and partners they have here. There are around four mil-
lion refugees in Turkey. It has been more than five years since this funding was 
distributed and at first it was more focused on aid but now, after a long time, it 
is moving more in the direction of livelihoods.  
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And this is also an example of how things still work in silos and why there 
is a lack of innovation in the use of this funding. When this funding is being 
distributed, big organisations are almost the only ones eligible because there is 
a financial and organisational capacity issue. That is one of the problems that I 
see, because it means that mediocre projects get the big funding, and some of 
the projects implemented do not create results. They perhaps tick the checklists 
in the audit, but they do not create a real impact in the field. There are so many 
people implementing all these programmes, it has become a bit like an industry. 
For me, this is one of the major problems that I see in Turkey. New organisa-
tions that want to do new things cannot get access to these funds. We as Impact 
Hub can get them because we worked and invested a lot on this, and now we 
have more capacity. But a lot of organisations that are trying to do things in a 
really innovative way do not have access to such funds, even though they do 
good work and can present their portfolios. Sometimes the requirements are too 
high. That blocks the degree of innovation in using these funds.  
Another point is that when these funds for livelihood projects first started, 
they did not involve the host communities much. This shows that co-design was 
not very successful; it created negative reactions in the host communities. To-
day, donor organisations are more careful about balancing the beneficiaries.  
 
Let us shift to the topic of resources. On the issue of diversity, what I am ob-
serving is, and Semih made a comment in this direction already, for reasons of 
efficiency, we always try to organise big funds in a very standardised way. Does 
that correspond to the diversity that we find? Or how can we channel resources 
– which are obviously there and often not utilised in the best way – to the or-
ganisations that have the best solutions? 
Riad Ragueb Ahmed: First, reiterating my earlier point on terminology: while 
financial resources are important, resources can be more wide ranging and go 
beyond financial matters. Intellectual property or technologies or 
knowledge/indigenous knowledge or in-kind contribution, etc are also re-
sources that we often do not capture. Therefore, the term resources should be 
considered comprehensively. Second, when we talk about resources, we also 
have to keep in mind what can be mobilized from the private sector, from civil 
society, and from the public sector. We should not only think about government 
resources.  
On your question, certainly flexibility is required. However, all institutions 
have policies and rules that govern their actions and sometimes do not allow 
for a lot of flexibility. We may come up with new mechanisms that will allow 
us to be more flexible in our way of managing resources. 
Ulrich Wehnert:  Actually, I am not so much concerned about resources, be it 
financial or in-kind, human resources, if we are moving into a mode beyond 
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ODA. ODA, again, is a very strict, narrow system of channelling financial re-
sources from the North to the South. That was the idea back in the 60s, after 
World War II. We should not make the mistake again of coming up with a sec-
ond rigid system. In ‘beyond ODA’, we will have various channels: private, 
public and from various actors. I might be wrong, but I would like to hold the 
uncertainty and see if such a system can somehow be created. 
The alternative to this could be to set up a global fund for global sustaina-
bility. Something where the UN and many other countries bring in huge 
amounts of financial resources, from which international cooperation for global 
sustainability could be financed. That would probably be a huge thing but could 
be worth reflecting on. 
Riad Ragueb Ahmed: At BAPA+40 discussions, some concerns were raised re-
garding the North reducing its support and moving away from its responsibility 
of implementing the 2030 Agenda. When we talk about beyond-ODA, we must 
clarify that it does not translate into less funding, less resources going from the 
North to other countries, which can be interpreted as a sign of diminishing sol-
idarity. 
Ulrich Wehnert: It is my understanding that ODA will still be there for many 
years, but that maybe a second system, beyond-ODA, will somehow comple-
ment the current system as we know it. That would be my guess. 
Citlali Ayala: I would like to add that financial resources still are an issue for 
many southern providers, and it will remain that way for many years, as long 
as we do not have a specific budget for development cooperation. On the other 
hand, we can recall the evolution and the discussion of the Total Official Sup-
port for Sustainable Development, where the private sector and remittances and 
different financial sources are included, and various other countries can partic-
ipate beyond the DAC. 
I would also support Riad’s idea that knowledge, local knowledge or ances-
tral knowledge, human resources, technical resources and material resources, 
are all part of this umbrella of resources. It is not only about financial resources; 
instead when it comes to South-South and triangular cooperation, the strong 
part, at least in the Latin American approach, is knowledge and technical re-
sources. We will scale up on this topic when we have a national budget for 
development cooperation, which we currently do not have. That remains our 
constraint. But on the other hand, different kinds of alliances, funds and net-
works can exchange different kinds of resources to propose development solu-
tions. Some of these funds and networks still lack financial resources, but it is 
not a limitation to continuing with building development solutions. 
Semih, in the Impact Hub, how much do you depend on ODA money? Do you 
already have this second pillar of funding that Ulrich was talking about? 
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Semih Boyaci: It is actually a very low percentage in our case. We mobilise a 
lot of private sector resources for the Sustainable Development Goals, and this 
works a bit more like typical consulting: you make a good match between the 
areas of priorities and social needs, as well as what you can provide. For exam-
ple, a private sector company funded the Accelerator2030 programme in Tur-
key, the local chapter of the programme I mentioned as an example before. 
Mobilising these resources is easier, but obviously they are much less in amount 
compared to the funding from development organisations. The process is 
quicker, but the amount is much lower. In addition to that, we also work with 
big foundations and generate resources from there. Overall, I would say ODA 
funding is not more than 10 per cent in our case. 
We work like a typical social enterprise, in our own model. We want to 
make it less financially dependent because it is a very risky model. But we also 
try to establish links with this funding, in our way, to organisations in our own 
network. For example, the office I am in right now is rented by GIZ, within 
Impact Hub. GIZ has a team here and it was not easy for them to rent an office 
in a shared space. But they wanted to get out of the bubble and meet more in-
novative organisations here. In that respect, I'm very happy to have GIZ here. 
My second comment is related to that. I think the issue of resources, on the 
one hand, is about the management of the resources and allocation of the re-
sources, but, on the other hand, about interacting and explaining potential part-
ners how this resource management works on the side of development organi-
sations, because other people have no idea about how these systems work. 
There is no other form of exposure than finding out if such collaborations can 
occur. I was also very unaware of, for example, GIZ before Impact Hub and 
GIZ signed their global memorandum on working together on topics related to 
Sustainable Development Goals. That memorandum has now spread to all Im-
pact Hubs worldwide. It is a very good move to disseminate social innovation 
and collaboration in all these countries. So, yes, exposure and establishing these 
links with other ecosystems, particularly northern ecosystems, is important. 
 
To continue, Semih, what is your experience and maybe recommendation re-
garding the involvement of the private sector? How much does the language 
have to change? How are you doing it?  
Semih Boyaci: There are a couple of things that have moved the private sector 
in this direction. I think by far the biggest one is the changing behaviour of 
customers and consumers. Obviously, depending on the country, sensitivities 
are different, but all these sensitivities are related to the SDGs. There is a great 
deal of pressure everywhere in moving in this direction and allocating resources 
for sustainable development. This is also an argument that we use in developing 
projects and it is always a good way to catch them, because they see this as a 
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748908388, am 26.10.2021, 10:19:07
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
Dialogue 6 
140 
market in the end. They may not do all this for good purposes; the profit motive 
is still always number one. But, in addition to becoming more sensitive, the fear 
of losing customers is becoming a trigger for them. Another trigger is that they 
are quite concerned about retaining the Y and Z generations. People are looking 
for social impact in their work environments. Young people are looking for 
meaning in their social environments, and private companies struggle to retain 
people like they did before. That means that they have to invest – not like green-
washing, but in a sincere way – and this also mobilises a lot of resources. 
From my point of view these are the two main motivators. We also explain 
to them that the world is shifting, and since they are living this reality, they 
understand it. Then they ask about how to proceed. Our approach in general is 
that we study the organisations, their products, their services and their priority 
areas in terms of the SDGs. We always try to make a link between the social 
impact and their core business. For instance, circular economy has to work for 
them because it does create social good, but it is also important for their re-
source management and cost-effectiveness, today and five years from now. 
In sum, it is also a competitiveness issue. It is not just philanthropic. And 
they are becoming more and more aware of this. For them to become more 
circular, more sustainable, they must collaborate with organisations that create 
social innovation technologies, new green production methodologies, new 
ways to reduce carbon footprints, new forms of transportation. I mean, they 
have to do all these things. And if they do not create their systems in such a way 
that they correspond to these new demands, they will be much less competitive 
in the market ten years from now. That is basically the picture that we share 
with them. 
Ulrich Wehnert: I would also see much more space for the private sector in the 
beyond-ODA world simply because it will also be a very digitalised world. 
People will get connected on a global dimension. The Impact Hub is a good 
example of where private actors move in, connecting people all over the world. 
This already shows that there is scope for the private sector to be more involved. 
Riad Ragueb Ahmed: It goes without saying that the private sector is a very 
important stakeholder when it comes to development cooperation. Its involve-
ment is crucial. It owns most of the technologies, licences, intellectual proper-
ties needed for development solutions. The private sector is also more results-
oriented and will develop relatively quickly solutions, while governmental in-
stitutions may need more time due to heavier procedures and processes. The 
involvement with the private sector brings efficiency, results, flexibility and 
agility, which donors sometimes lack.  
However, when it comes to the private sector, we have to distinguish be-
tween two elements: their corporate social responsibility (CSR) and their nor-
mal business. CSR could be easy to engage in development cooperation and we 
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can quickly collaborate with the private sector, making sure that CSR is con-
tributing to the 2030 Agenda. As for the business-as-usual, it is more complex 
to engage them in South-South and Triangular Cooperation. In this regard, we 
should particularly ensure that we are supporting the beneficiary country. The 
private sector aims to make profit which is normal. They have the power to 
influence, to sometimes impose their own solutions or their own view, espe-
cially in a small or fragile country. We, as development partners, should make 
sure that we assist the countries that receive funding under South-South and 
Triangular Cooperation from the private sector in a way that it is beneficial for 
them: beneficial for them in terms of employment creation, economic benefit 
partially maintained in the country, etc. It is quite challenging, but I think this 
must be ensured. We must encourage the private sector more and more to con-
tribute and support the implementation of the 2030 Agenda by providing the 
right channels, incentives and mechanism for them to do so. 
Citlali Ayala: I would like to add that the national legal frameworks are im-
portant when we talk about the participation of the private sector and mobilising 
private contributions. In the case of Mexico, we have some legal constraints 
when managing financial funds. For example, the Mexico-Chile Fund for De-
velopment Corporation, this bilateral fund, is administrated by the Chilean gov-
ernment, not by Mexico, because here we have some legal constraints regarding 
the administration of that money. But that has not been an obstacle to replicat-
ing this kind of funding. For example, we have a similar fund with Uruguay and 
Spain, and the bilateral fund agreed with Germany. So, it is kind of a funny 
situation because we do not have a federal budget for development cooperation, 
but we have bilateral funds with southern partners and with northern partners 
that are successful as soon as they are managed outside our country. It is like a 
paradox. On the other hand, we have all those successful experiences, like the 
Mexican Alliance for Haiti, in which the private sector, universities and 
AMEXCID participated. Maybe due to the context, coordination was the most 
difficult part.  
I agree with Ulrich that the beyond-ODA world will be a more digitalised 
world. And in that regard, we need to think in terms of a future ‘ODA’ that 
supports more innovation, science and technology and inter-agency coordina-
tion. Security and climate change are obviously priorities in the agenda of co-
operation, but digitalisation and development are a future priority and a future 
strategy for our countries. 
 
For your final statement: if we leave development behind us and begin a new 
game, what would that be? What I hear is: the future is emerging. There are 
many good examples. We are on the way, but we are not yet there. This is what 
I have understood from you.  
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Semih Boyaci: To achieve the 2030 Agenda, one of the most important things 
is for all sides to act more like an ecosystem, moving together in one direction. 
We talked about the disadvantages of thinking in silos. Shifting from “ego-sys-
tem” to ecosystem would be, for each actor, a key determinant of this transition. 
As a person active in the social innovation and social entrepreneurship ecosys-
tems, another suggestion would be that the ecosystems of the development sec-
tor especially, the private sector and also the public sector more widely, should 
come closer with social innovation ecosystems. The examples and success sto-
ries we see show the potential of this and this should be scaled up.   
Ulrich Wehnert: Going beyond ODA would mean finally realising true partner-
ships and heading towards, preparing the way to achieve global sustainability. 
Riad Ragueb Ahmed: Time is not in our favour. If we look at climate change 
and what is going on around the world, we must be very concerned. As devel-
opment partners, we have to come together with every means we have got. It is 
important to complement ODA and play a dual role, all of us, in mutually re-
sponsible and equitable partnerships. 
Citlali Ayala: The future fields, in my view, are in innovation, science and tech-
nology, applied to education, health and economic development. It is also im-
portant to ‘cross over’ development cooperation and to mainstream it in public 
policies and to social actors. ODA will remain being ODA. But as soon as it is 
inclusive and participatory and open, and if we have new forms of participation 
regarding diversity and legal and budgetary conditions, we can strengthen ca-
pacities and find new ways to work better – according to each case but trying 
to build a common ground and a common vision of everyone working as equal 
partners. Sustainable development has three spheres, and we can look for some 
progress in that respect in order to achieve the 2030 Agenda.  
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Spotlight vi: The role of global networks in settings be-
yond ODA – the example of the Global Alliances for So-
cial Protection 
Nora Sieverding, GIZ 
Eradicating poverty in all its forms and dimensions remains one of humankind’s 
greatest challenges. According to the latest Multidimensional Poverty Index 
(MPI), 1.3 billion people across 101 countries are considered multidimension-
ally poor, two-thirds of whom live in middle-income countries. Based on this, 
one of the most pressing issues for both lower and upper-middle-income coun-
tries seems to be combating inequality.114 At the same time, climate change 
poses a serious risk to poverty reduction and threatens to undo the progress 
made during the past few decades. 
Against this background, social protection systems play a crucial role, since 
they aim to protect the population against social, economic and natural risks. In 
addition, effective social protection systems promote the active participation of 
all population groups in economic growth processes, contribute to the reduction 
of inequalities and thus support sustainable and inclusive social development. 
Numerous countries have therefore incorporated the establishment and expan-
sion of integrated social protection systems into their national development 
strategies and plans. Middle-income countries such as Brazil, China, India, In-
donesia, Mexico and South Africa but also Chile, Peru and Argentina are play-
ing a leading role in expanding national policies and social protection systems. 
Most of these are expected to pass the threshold for high-income countries 
within the next decade and thereby graduate from the list of countries eligible 
for ODA. They have clearly stated their interest in further cooperating interna-
tionally on the topic in order to overcome specific technical challenges and 
knowledge gaps – even though bilateral development cooperation with these 
countries is either declining or has, in some cases, already stopped. 
 
114  OPHI/UNDP 2019. South Africa, for instance, is ranked by the World Bank as an 
UMIC and still has one of the highest inequality rates in the world, with a con-
sumption expenditure Gini coefficient of 0.63 in 2015 
(https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/southafrica/overview). Chile, even 
ranked as a HIC, is the most unequal OECD country according to its Gini coeffi-
cient of 0.47 in 2017 and appeared in 2013 among the 10 most unequal countries 
in world, next to Brazil, Mexico and South Africa (See World Bank, 2016). 
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In 2013, the global GIZ project “Global Alliances for Social Protection” 
was created as a response to these demands. It is funded by the German Ministry 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) with resources specifi-
cally designed to pioneer new forms of international cooperation. The pro-
gramme aims at fostering opportunities and structures for dialogue and tech-
nical exchange on social protection amongst interested partner countries (as 
listed above), regional organisations115 as well as international partners116 and 
Germany117.  
The focus of the programme on middle-income and even upper-middle and 
high-income countries as main partners is a deliberate choice: the countries in-
volved in the programme have gained valuable experience in the field of social 
protection and are eager to share them through dialogue with others. Their ex-
periences are made accessible and usable, so that other countries – even those 
that are not amongst the direct partner countries in the programme – can benefit 
from good practices and lessons learned, and feed them appropriately into their 
own country’s context.  
The programme itself works through regional hubs (Indonesia, Mexico, 
Chile, South Africa and Germany) and acts as a facilitator using appropriate 
and innovative learning formats, including special events, peer-to-peer learn-
ing, workshops and large-scale learning forums to promote networking and 
knowledge sharing. Its decentralised structure allows the programme to react 
directly and flexibly to the interests and learning needs of the partner countries 
and it therefore works on a wide range of topics, including productive inclusion, 
universal health coverage, financing and payment models for primary 
healthcare, single window service approaches, adaptive social protection, social 
protection and early childhood development, and beneficiary identification and 
registration, among others. 
By bringing together partner countries at different levels of development 
(LMICs, UMICs and HICs), the programme fosters South-South learning on 
the key issues of social protection and creates new formats for international 
cooperation that go beyond the classical modalities of bilateral development 
cooperation. As a global programme without any funds to implement measures 
 
115  Such as the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Car-
ibbean (ECLAC) and the African Union (AU). 
116  In its current phase, the programme collaborates with the World Bank Group's 
Global Practice on Social Protection and Jobs and the International Policy Centre 
for Inclusive Growth (IPC-IG). 
117  Though the programme focuses mainly on the exchange between the partner coun-
tries and regional and international development partners, the German Federal 
Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs has always been strongly involved in learn-
ing formats organised in Germany and has been a valuable knowledge provider in 
the context of these technical exchanges. 
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on a national level, strict partner orientation is key to its success: It allows the 
partner countries to identify specific knowledge gaps and needs for technical 
assistance with regard to clearly defined technical questions, which might then 
be attended to with follow-up programmes – funded with ODA or non-ODA 
means, e.g. from other partners or through national resources.  
The Global Alliances for Social Protection may serve as one example of 
how countries can maintain access to knowledge and international dialogue on 
specific development challenges in the stage of transition or even after gradua-
tion from ODA – which, generally, is one of the biggest concerns of the coun-
tries affected118. By moving cooperation from a bilateral to a regional or multi-
lateral level, global networks and alliances can offer suitable knowledge sharing 
formats in order to fill the gaps that arise when development partners withdraw 




118  Calleja/Prizzon 2019a 
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Spotlight vii: Building entrepreneurial communities and 
enabling innovation for sustainable development world-
wide – the Impact Hub network 
Semih Boyaci, Impact Hub Istanbul 
To move towards the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) by 2030, 
it is important to improve current business models and make them more sus-
tainable. However, the complexity of today’s social and environmental prob-
lems calls for the development and scaling of new and unconventional business 
models. As Impact Hub, we are one of the world’s largest networks focused on 
building entrepreneurial communities for impact at scale – and home to the in-
novators and dreamers who are creating tangible solutions to the world’s most 
pressing issues in more than 100 communities worldwide. We use the global 
SDGs as a lens through which to view our impact in the world. While we use 
ODA-based funding to catalyse certain projects, our work goes beyond it, both 
in terms of funding and the actors involved. Empowering social entrepreneurs 
and change-makers and helping them scale their innovative models are at the 
centre of our activities.   
At Impact Hub Istanbul, we implement programmes in partnership with the 
private sector, international development organisations and public institutions. 
These include large corporations as well as umbrella organisations and net-
works such as Global Compact; governmental bodies such as regional develop-
ment agencies, municipalities in Turkey as well as consulates of other countries 
in Turkey; and organisations such as UNDP, World Bank and GIZ. With the 
latter, our projects in general focus on improving the livelihoods of vulnerable 
groups via entrepreneurship, or on empowering social entrepreneurs that con-
tribute to the SDGs.  
Fundraising from our partners works in very different ways as each of them 
has different priorities, needs and targets. With the private sector, the key com-
ponent is the degree to which the proposed projects match the SDGs with the 
actors’ overall business strategy and objectives. One of the biggest challenges 
for all our projects is that the funding cycles last, in general, for one year, rarely 
longer. This makes it hard to make long-term plans and also risks the sustaina-
bility of the projects when the priorities of funders change. Another challenge 
is that development organisations especially tend to work with partners with 
whom they have a long track record of cooperation. This restricts the room for 
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experimentation with new actors. Both the development and private sectors 
should take more risks in working with younger organisations and social enter-
prises that bring in a unique approach and develop innovative models that are 
needed in the transition to a more sustainable and just society. 
 
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748908388, am 26.10.2021, 10:19:07
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
 
149 
Dialogue 7: The role of South-South and triangular co-
operation in contexts beyond ODA 
Cooperation beyond ODA overcomes traditional role concepts in development 
politics. The conventional ascriptions of the North providing and the South re-
ceiving assistance are being contested and increasingly replaced by new mo-
dalities that enable countries to engage with each other on a more equal footing. 
The Second UN High-level Conference on South-South Cooperation (BAPA 
+40), held in March 2019 in Buenos Aires, empowered the Global South and 
consolidated South-South cooperation as a key element of the 2030 Agenda. At 
the same time, triangular cooperation between northern and southern countries 
is gaining momentum and starting to trigger ministries and implementing agen-
cies to rethink the role of former donors in a setting beyond ODA. 
With our discussants we debate the current prospects and challenges for 
South-South and triangular cooperation and set them in relation to ODA grad-
uation. Are these modes suitable alternatives for graduating countries, espe-
cially regarding their demand for technical cooperation and knowledge ex-
change? How can South-South and triangular cooperation be further promoted, 
more recognised and improved?  
The discussion was held between Orria Goni Delzangles, Team Leader for 
South-South Cooperation and Finance for Development at the UNDP Africa 
Finance Sector Hub, Nadine Piefer-Söyler, Policy Analyst for triangular coop-
eration and cooperation with Latin American and Caribbean countries at the 
OECD’s Development Cooperation Directorate, Martín Rivero Illa:, Coordina-
tor of South-South Cooperation at the Ibero-American General Secretariat, 
SEGIB119, and Rita Walraf, desk officer for emerging countries and triangular 
cooperation at the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment, BMZ. It was facilitated by Christof Kersting, director of the Regional 
Fund for Triangular Cooperation in Latin America and the Caribbean at GIZ, 
and Juliane Kolsdorf, editor of this publication.120  
 
 
119  SEGIB is an international support organisation for the Ibero-American commu-
nity, covering the 19 Spanish- and Portuguese-speaking countries in Latin Amer-
ica and those of the Iberian Peninsula, Spain, Portugal and Andorra. 
120  For better distinction from the discussants, the inputs and questions by the facili-
tators are displayed in italic without naming the respective person. 
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Martín, you bring in not only your experience from SEGIB, but also from your 
previous job as head of the Uruguayan development cooperation agency. What 
is your opinion about the current prospects and the challenges for South-South 
and triangular cooperation?  
Martín Rivero: First, I would like to differentiate between South-South and tri-
angular cooperation. They are related but they are not the same and this is a 
point that we consider quite important. There is a lot of noise nowadays about 
the potential of triangular cooperation. A lot of things are happening, but it is 
not clear if it is a type of cooperation that will grow constantly in the near future. 
It seems that it will happen, but it is not yet very clear.  
The figures related to triangular cooperation in our region are quite stable 
in absolute terms, around 120, 130 projects every year. But it is changing in its 
characteristics; it is changing regarding the countries that are involved. To 
begin with, mainly the countries that were being phased out of traditional ODA 
from the beginning of this century were participating in triangular cooperation. 
Chile is a clear example of that. These countries started to develop strategies 
regarding triangular cooperation in order to maintain their presence in the busi-
ness of cooperation in the region, and they were quite active about that. Other 
countries, like Argentina or Mexico and later Uruguay, also started to grow in 
these terms. They pursued the strategy of being active in the context of devel-
opment cooperation, but not only for that reason; there is a mix of strategies in 
each country. Another change regarding triangular cooperation are the areas of 
engagement. To begin with, those areas were mostly generated by the North, 
by the traditional donor partner in the relationship, but then this started to 
change. Health, agriculture or the environment are areas that are more active 
nowadays in projects of triangular cooperation. The third change is that, in ad-
dition to a long history of actors, particularly Germany and Japan, being active 
in the region, other countries have started increasing their projects of triangular 
cooperation, like Spain or the United States in Central America in the last seven 
or eight years, or countries like Luxembourg in the last two to four years. The 
last change is that while the number of projects has remained relatively stable, 
the projects are growing in size. At first, there were many small projects or 
activities, and now there has been a growing number of bigger projects or pro-
grammes.  
So, the process of triangular cooperation is changing inside, for many dif-
ferent reasons. These reasons have to do with the international context, with 
national strategies and also with a learning process among the countries from 
the North or the traditional donors, or the global cooperation institutions that 
are starting to see the capacities and the potential of triangular cooperation. 
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Orria, could you confirm this process of change from an African viewpoint? 
What are your views on the prospects and challenges of trilateral and South-
South cooperation? 
Orria Goni: In broader terms, that is the trend. But, before looking into the 
SDGs and South-South Cooperation, we need to look into the Addis Ababa 
Action Agenda; more precisely the implications of the 3rd Financing for Devel-
opment Agenda which looks at the practical means of how to achieve the SDGs. 
We need to see how these means of implementation have impacted on the way 
countries are starting to look into their own domestic resource mobilisation 
agenda, tapping into the public and private financing, internally and externally, 
with its different layers and chapters.  
This is also influencing how African countries are looking into their foreign 
affairs agendas to boost South-South and triangular partnerships that support 
their national development priorities. In this regard, there has been increased 
ownership in the south-south partnership building, including a self-empowering 
approach, where African countries have realized that they are not only receiving 
technical support, but that they can be active South-South sharing countries, as 
they have a wide range of development solutions ready to share. Graduating 
MIC countries like Botswana or Cabo Verde realise that they have a lot to sell 
and to export as good practices and are setting up their own development agen-
cies to do so. But also, least developed countries like Rwanda, which envision 
graduating from ODA by 2030 or 2050, are currently boosting and setting up 
their national architecture for SSC. This is the ‘decade of action’, and I believe 
this is the African decade, where African countries are empowering themselves 
and getting ready to have a leading role in the global development agenda.  
In UNDP’s renewed strategy we want to focus on prioritizing “African 
money for African development”. As such, we are providing support to coun-
tries in assessing what countries are doing well, what good practices they have 
and what can be shared through SSC with our peers. This Pan-African approach 
on SSC aims at transforming the development cooperation in Africa and wid-
ening the vision of what SSC is. It means suggesting that SSC is beyond the 
cooperation support provided by key African partners, such as China, India and 
Brazil. In this regard, it is positive to note that such partnership agreements are 
being formalized at the continental level through the Africa Union (AU) – as 
the case of the FOCAC121 with China, for example – with the intention to foster 
broader alignment with continental priorities, including the AU’s Agenda 2063.  
In the case of Africa, engagements between countries have been very much 
limited to South-South cooperation. I have still not seen a triangular coopera-
tion agenda; in fact, I am looking forward to partnering with all of you to see 
 
121  Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. 
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that happen. This should be a coherent continental set-up, with the AU’s 
Agenda 2063 and the SDGs, including the AU Development Agency, AUDA- 
NEPAD, having the greatest influence. A potential triangular cooperation part-
ner is Japan, where the Tokyo International Conference of African Develop-
ment (TICAD) could serve as a good means of reinforcing TrC in Africa.  
Nadine, within the OECD, you work more on a macro level. What do you think 
are the prospects and challenges for South-South and triangular cooperation? 
Nadine Piefer-Söyler: At the OECD, we see an increased interest in the topic 
of triangular cooperation and, of course, BAPA+40 was very instrumental in 
that. I would say it was really a milestone event, also from the perspective of 
the Development Assistance Committee (DAC). In the beginning, when we at 
the OECD Secretariat started putting the topic of preparing for BAPA+40 and 
triangular cooperation on the agenda for official DAC meetings, it was not very 
prominent. Then BAPA+40 happened and there was good participation, also 
from the DAC, in the meeting and afterwards. The DAC members are more 
aware of the importance of triangular cooperation, of the discussions that are 
happening, and they are looking for ways of using the modality more. 
Discussing triangular cooperation in the context of ODA graduation as a 
milestone of transition is very good, but only one way of using the modality 
and only in a certain context. We are trying to really mainstream triangular co-
operation into the normal toolkit or set of instruments of all development part-
ners, so that when you start thinking about a cooperation project, you automat-
ically think about the option of doing it trilaterally or at least including a trian-
gular component.  
We also set ourselves the mission of pulling triangular cooperation out of 
its perceived niche of just being an instrument for Latin America and the Car-
ibbean (LAC) or for middle-income countries. There are a couple of myths go-
ing around, and this is one of them. Everyone agrees that triangular cooperation 
is one of the cooperation modalities in LAC, but it is not yet mainstreamed in 
Africa or Asia. Several countries have agencies or other institutional structures 
in place to engage in South-South and triangular co-operation and they have a 
large network of partners in their regions and beyond.  
I think, from a longer-term view, we can see different regional prospects on 
triangular cooperation. There are different stages of how well the instrument is 
developed and included in normal cooperation methodologies. For example, we 
see training approaches in partnership with institutions from Asia, the MENA 
region and Africa. To give an example, Japan is working with organisations 
that have specific expertise in a certain area, such as rice production. Through 
previous bilateral cooperation these organisations or institutions are strength-
ened and they can become pivotal partners to train participants from other coun-
tries in Africa and Asia. We also see that approach in Latin America and the 
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Caribbean, but there, like Martin was saying, most triangular initiatives have 
developed more into a partnership-oriented approach over the years.  
And that is where we see huge potential. We need to work more in partner-
ships to achieve the 2030 Agenda and to move beyond the binary donor-recip-
ient model – I really see triangular cooperation as a good way to forge those 
partnerships.  
The challenge here is that we need a mindset shift for that to happen. And it 
is not only the mindset that is important, but also the internal institutional reg-
ulations, the way we engage in cooperation. Whenever we talk about triangular 
cooperation, we often hear that the transaction costs are so high, that it is more 
complicated to engage in triangular initiatives. But that comes with us being 
geared towards the default option of working bilaterally or in regional cooper-
ation. The latter usually means to work with a regional organisation that then 
coordinates among countries in that region. As the call for more multi-stake-
holder partnerships with different actors beyond governments gets louder, I see 
this as the big opportunity for triangular cooperation and other innovative part-
nership-oriented modalities to shape the future of development cooperation. We 
will need to change the way we work to be able to better engage in these types 
of horizontal partnerships and also accept that everyone learns and provides 
resources at the same time – thus, enshrining mutual learning as a key element 
of development partnerships. 
Rita, what do you think about the current prospects and challenges, reflecting 
your involvement with South-South and triangular cooperation from the side of 
German development policy? Maybe you can also share some insights from the 
recent evaluation of triangular cooperation conducted by the German Institute 
for Development Evaluation, DEval? 
Rita Walraf: First of all, I would like to focus on the challenges that we face 
within German development cooperation in terms of triangular cooperation. 
Although Germany figures among the most active bilateral DAC donors in that 
area, to many of my colleagues, triangular cooperation seems to be a tiny mo-
dality and is often not supposed to be really useful for broad, big and effective 
development cooperation. I think this is due to several reasons that have already 
been mentioned by Nadine and others. First, people always put the issue of high 
transaction costs onto the agenda. They say it is too complicated to start such a 
modality; it requires too much investment in terms of coordination, talking and 
dealing with at least three partners at the same time. Then, many tell me that it 
is just a modality that works in Latin America and the Caribbean but nowhere 
else. The underlying reason has also been one of the findings of the 
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aforementioned DEval evaluation122: There is not enough knowledge about the 
instrument itself within our institutions. That is why all these myths remain 
present in people’s minds.  
I think one of the biggest bottlenecks is the fact that we do not invest suffi-
ciently. We do not have enough resources for the modality in terms of funds 
because, as Nadine has just mentioned, most of the time, the German funds 
invested in triangular cooperation also come from the bilateral development 
cooperation. This means that people have to decide whether to put funds into 
bilateral projects which they know very well or try to invest them in triangular 
programmes.  
The other bottleneck has to do with staff. If you do not have the experts, 
especially working in the field, who really know the modality and how to han-
dle it, things are, in fact, difficult to realise. The time factor is also quite im-
portant. Most of our triangular projects have got a very short duration, maybe 
one year only, and if you think about all the time needed to initiate a project, 
this does not add up in the end and makes it very difficult. Most of the time, the 
project volume is very tiny, too. So, talking about efficiency or high transaction 
costs: with a small project volume, efficiency cannot be very good because the 
budget does not allow you to work for three years or more, which would be 
needed to have a bigger impact.  
With regard to our perspectives, I would agree with what we have just heard: 
BAPA+40 is a big milestone for us. The DEval evaluation also gives us advice 
and recommendations on how to push forward the agenda on the modality. Of 
course, within the OECD and other international organisations, there are many 
interesting publications and the definition of triangular cooperation has been 
updated. I also think, as Orria has said, that we should look at the broader pic-
ture. If you only see South-South and triangular cooperation as an isolated issue 
and you do not consider the broader perspective of financing for development, 
of the graduation discussion, of the transition finance discussion, you cannot 
mainstream the modality. The strategic documents we have nowadays can re-
ally allow us to continue and consolidate the instrument in a broader picture. 
 
Let us continue with a ‘beyond-ODA’ perspective. Are South-South and trian-
gular cooperation suitable instruments for countries on their way towards or 
past graduation, even suitable alternatives to technical cooperation and 
knowledge-exchange with countries from the North? This is also interesting 
from another perspective, as things are changing in bilateral cooperation. Ger-
many, for example, is currently discussing reducing the number of its partner 
 
122  Soon to be published in English and Spanish, see https://deval.org/en/evaluation-
of-the-dc-modality-triangular-cooperation.html (15.04.2020). 
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countries in development cooperation. Similar things are happening in other 
countries like Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States. The number 
of direct bilateral partners is shrinking, and, at the same time, there is a process 
of graduating from ODA for a range of countries.  
Nadine Piefer-Söyler: I would say yes and no. Yes, it is suitable for thinking 
about ODA graduation. And no, it is not an alternative. The one word I would 
really take out of this question is “alternative” because I think it is not either/or; 
all modalities are complementary. However, triangular cooperation is more 
than just about maintaining relations with countries that are graduating.  
I will come back to your question again but allow me to make some com-
ments on graduation from the OECD perspective, referring to what you said in 
the introduction that in 2014, 29 countries were projected to graduate.123 In 
2014 and in the following consecutive years, the OECD came up with projec-
tions of countries that are likely to graduate until the year 2030. In these pro-
jections, 29 countries were considered, but that is by no means an indication 
that those 29 countries will in fact graduate. The DAC revises the list every 
three years (last in 2017 with the new revision taking place in 2020). Countries 
that have exceeded the high-income threshold, meaning that their GNI per cap-
ita remains at high-income level (above USD 12,375), for three consecutive 
years at the time of the review are removed. The countries that have graduated 
since that 2014-projection, and until March 2020, are Chile, Uruguay, the Sey-
chelles and Cook Islands. Cook Islands was decided on during a special review 
that took place in July 2019, because of doubts about the reliability of the data 
delivered through the national statistical system.  Antigua and Barbuda did not 
graduate, not because they were not on the high-income path for three years, 
but because Hurricane Irma almost completely destroyed the island of Barbuda. 
The heavy impact of Hurricane Irma on the Caribbean and the case of Antigua 
and Barbuda triggered another discussion in the DAC on re-insertion of coun-
tries to the DAC List. With that, the discussion on ODA graduation became 
broader and more global, moving beyond the Latin American and Caribbean 
region. 
Coming back to South-South and triangular cooperation as an instrument in 
that stage of transition: as a reaction to the graduation process, we have seen 
that countries, especially in Latin America and the Caribbean, are already en-
gaging more in triangular cooperation. At the same time, some DAC members 
are using triangular cooperation as a way of continuing to work with countries 
that have been taken off the list of countries eligible for ODA. Giving an exam-
ple of a DAC member that is a champion on triangular cooperation, the EU, of 
 
123  Nadine refers to the oral introduction to the group dialogue in which the projection 
by the OECD was mentioned. See introduction of this book.  
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course, comes in as a big player. It has set up a facility for Development in 
Transition as well as the EU-LAC Facility for Triangular Cooperation (ADE-
LANTE). The first phase of ADELANTE has just been concluded; the second 
phase is being planned and is agreed by the European Commission.  
There are opportunities for DAC members to use triangular cooperation as 
a modality to partner with key development providers like China, India, Brazil, 
South Africa, and DAC members are doing that. However, it is not about re-
placing ODA relations, but rather about building new ways to partner among 
providers of development cooperation. That is beneficial, because now triangu-
lar cooperation is being pulled out of the niche that Rita also described, and it 
is becoming more prominent and visible.  
My concern would be to talk about triangular cooperation as an alternative 
or seeing it as something that is only for graduating countries. Of course, it is a 
good option and these countries are well-placed as partners: they have struc-
tures in place, and they have often already worked in triangular cooperation. If 
you look at Chile and Uruguay, both are countries with a very long tradition 
and a lot of experience, so, of course, it seems like the perfect match. But I 
would also say, let us not discuss it in that area only but go beyond that. 
Martín Rivero: I will begin with a couple of points still related to the previous 
question on challenges. First, just for the recording, most of the Ibero-American 
countries do not accept that category of ‘graduation’. We have been discussing 
this a lot with the EU, OECD and with the traditional donors and we still think 
that is not the best way to proceed in terms of cooperation. Graduation – and 
then what? This is a reality, obviously, but I just want to make the political point 
that as SEGIB we do not accept that category. Particularly, and I think that we 
have seen that very strongly, when you graduate a country, you lose political 
dialogue with that country. And there are at least three important global issues 
that, in order to move forward, this dialogue prove to be extremely important. 
One has to do with migration: you need to have a good geostrategic dialogue 
with certain countries for migration issues, and that generally has nothing to do 
with the income level of that country. Another is the environment, particularly 
related to prevention and respond to natural disasters: any regional cooperation 
policy about the environment should include countries that are at higher level 
of income than the graduation level. And the same applies to health as a regional 
or global public good, given the transnational spread of epidemic diseases in 
our globalised world, like currently the new coronavirus, policies related to 
health are obviously global.  
Second, within South-South and triangular cooperation, there are still im-
portant challenges regarding on how to work with civil society as well as there 
is still not so much capacity, dialogue, knowledge and funds related to develop 
South-South cooperation among local governments, particularly big cities, 
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which are an extremely important actor in the SDG agenda. So, this is still a 
weak area of South-South cooperation and that affects triangular cooperation 
as well. 
The third challenge, and related to that, is the capacity of South-South co-
operation to work with vulnerable populations. If you analyse the content of 
South-South cooperation, at least in the Latin American region, the proportion 
of projects focused on the black population, the indigenous population, the 
handicapped population, any type of population with high vulnerability levels, 
is an extremely low proportion. Less than one or two per cent of all SSC pro-
jects carried out in the region during the last decade (a huge amount of around 
8.000 initiatives) are focused on these populations. So, these are challenges fac-
ing South-South cooperation, and if these elements are weak in South-South 
cooperation, they will be weak in triangular cooperation too. Evidence started 
to show an important proportion of the success stories in triangular cooperation 
are built on previous successful South-South cooperation projects. 
Finally, about that, an important difference between triangular cooperation 
and South-South cooperation is that in South-South cooperation you are sup-
posed to have a common definition between the actors involved (southern coun-
tries) about the type of cooperation you are going to engage in, the principles 
that rule the relationship and how you will report and collect data or figures. 
This has some weak areas, like everything, but it exists and is legitimate for all 
the southern partners. If we want to work harder and more strongly, with an 
increasing number of projects on triangular cooperation, both sides, the ‘tradi-
tional North’ and the ‘traditional South’, will have to build together a common 
definition of triangular cooperation. And that has not yet been completely ac-
cepted by all the parties. What is triangular cooperation for you, Germany, for 
you, Japan, and for me, Guatemala, Brazil or Colombia? How will we measure 
it? What are the principles that rule it? And this applies to both sides. Some-
times the South says: yes, let us engage in triangular cooperation, but with my 
rules. But if you really want to engage in horizontal triangular cooperation, hor-
izontal means horizontal, equal; you are not more than me and I am not more 
than you, so I have to accept your necessities and we have to find our common 
rules. This still needs to be improved, to be built between the North and the 
South: the rules and principles and the way of measuring the triangular cooper-
ation that we have.  
How suitable is this type of cooperation in terms of technical cooperation 
and knowledge-exchange? I think that the SDG agenda is an excellent frame-
work for all of that; Nadine and the rest have been talking about an improve-
ment in the process since the BAPA+40 conference. As of now, we have said 
“this is our agenda, the SDGs, these are our procedures”, and we have a lot of 
elements to generate our future agenda on South-South and triangular 
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cooperation. There is still a lot of room for improvement in certain areas, but 
based on the evidence we have, we are very confident that triangular and South-
South cooperation is quite suitable, useful and capable of finding powerful re-
sults in this 2030 Agenda. I think the answer to your question would be: yes, 
considering these weaknesses that we have to improve and these new political 
agreements that we have to achieve, it is a suitable instrument in a ‘beyond-
ODA’ landscape. 
This is quite interesting because you mentioned the relation between our topic, 
South-South or triangular cooperation, with Goal 17 on global partnerships 
within the SDGs. And this has both not to do and to do with graduation pro-
cesses – it is the new way we are doing our work together. From our side, in 
the North, it is quite difficult: in my [Christof Kersting] previous job, I was in 
charge of a global programme on social protection. And the problem was we 
were excluded when we talked about South-South cooperation on social pro-
tection, because the North was not part of it, even though a lot of countries were 
interested in the German model. We therefore continued as a global alliance 
and that gave us the opportunity to include the German Ministry of Labour and 
Social Affairs as part of the dialogue. 
Are there any additions to what has been said about the role of South-South 
and triangular cooperation for graduating countries? Let us also move on to 
discuss how these instruments can be further promoted, more recognised and 
improved. Orria, you already mentioned it is important for the African context 
to have more of these modalities within this internationally agreed new devel-
opment agenda, and Rita is also trying to push the discussion forward within 
BMZ, to also promote what has been established and evaluated in Latin Amer-
ican countries for African and Asian contexts.  
Orria Goni: I very much agree with Nadine – it is not an alternative, but an 
additional and complementary modality and we really need to think that way. 
In this precise same way of thinking, the financing for development agenda had 
seven pillars that we were looking into. This SSC/TrC agenda is about means 
of implementation, which brings us back to the SDG 17 – to strengthen the 
means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable 
development. SSC and TrC are both complementary means to implement na-
tional development priorities that are aligned with the SDGs. We need to put 
this comprehensive perspective into the game.  
Regarding the question about how SSC can be further promoted, my re-
sponse here is linked to the current challenges we face in this agenda. In the 
case of the African continent – being either a middle-income country, a gradu-
ating country or a least-developed country – , and their means of implementa-
tion to achieve their own national development priorities: we have seen (and 
this is also a legacy of the development effectiveness agenda), that the starting 
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point is both strong national ownership and leadership. This means strong own-
ership that promotes alignment with a country’s national development priori-
ties. And this is what we are currently helping with in UNDP, with Botswana 
and now Cabo Verde: to make sure that countries have longer-term goals when 
they design South-South cooperation agendas, through their own national SSC 
strategies. For example, Cabo Verde is now in the process of developing a na-
tional South-South strategy that is aligned with its national development strat-
egy, and it is not just something ad hoc with no clear contribution to the SDG-
oriented priorities. Secondly, at UNDP we believe that in order to further pro-
mote SSC and TrC, we need to reinforce that coordination and coherence on 
the SSC and TrC-related work and initiatives, by setting up coordination mech-
anisms – in the format of an SSC Unit, for example. This is, in the same way 
that countries are establishing an SDG coordination platform for monitoring 
and evaluation, connecting also how bilateral partners and other financing flows 
are contributing to national development priorities. A third element, connected 
to this national coordinating structure for SSC, is the idea of a system that can 
track those partnerships and that can tell us where this partnership is taking us 
in terms of the planned national targets, and that it is not an isolated project-
driven or programme-driven only. This is a process where we have been provid-
ing support to countries like Uganda and Ethiopia, mapping out the SSC activ-
ities from the different ministers to ensure there is a tracking system of where 
they are leading the country to. From our understanding in UNDP, these aspects 
– the idea of a national strategy, the establishment of a SSC unit that coordinates 
the work and the idea of a system that tracks what happens in terms of south-
south cooperation – are some key elements, very much aligned to what 
BAPA+40 indicated regarding institutional capacity and the whole set-up to 
make South-South cooperation happen at national level. All this lies in the in-
tention to become an active South-South partner, but I can also become an ac-
tive South-South host country, to ensure that there is alignment and that it does 
not come here and there, and I do not even know when it will happen or where 
it will happen. 
One important additional element to consider for further promoting SSC, 
very much related to what Martin was saying, is the need to have inclusive 
multi-stakeholder partnerships that are developed in South-South national ar-
chitecture settings. We know that trade unions are doing exchanges with other 
trade unions or universities with other universities, and we know that South-
South exchanges are happening at a decentralised level. So, we need to make 
sure that they are all part of the national and regional dialogue, so that we can 
ensure proper coherence and coordination with the aim of boosting the results 
of SSC and TrC efforts. In my view, in the case of Africa and the AU’s agenda, 
it is important to strengthen the regional systems and mechanisms that can 
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contribute to creating coherence among different national, regional, inter-re-
gional and global agendas.  In Africa, the clear entry point should be through 
the AUDA-NEPAD.  
So, let me just summarise by saying: in order to further promote SSC and 
TrC, particularly in Africa, there needs to be institutional capacity-building, at 
the planning level, at the monitoring level, but also system-wise. This means 
creating platforms and creating systems for national and regional dialogue 
around SSC for tracking and monitoring those partnerships.  
The last point will be: if we want these horizontal partnerships to happen, if 
we want this knowledge transfer to happen, we need to create the space for 
them, and we need to start getting on board. It is not enough with one report 
prepared by the North on good practices, or a good development solution that 
these countries are preparing or are eager to share. Our colleagues from the 
Islamic Development Bank (IsDB) are doing an amazing job mapping all these 
resource centres so that countries can know what they have to share to other 
countries. I think there is a huge need for knowledge management, for the cod-
ification and the systematisation of those good practices. And we need to do 
that, because otherwise, we are not promoting those countries and we are not 
promoting those solutions. We do have the South-South Galaxy that the UN 
Office of South-South Cooperation has launched124. We need to feed into that, 
and we need to make use of that, so that people have access to that information, 
so that we can channel and encourage those technical exchanges.   
Rita Walraf: Let me share some more ideas on how to promote the modality. I 
would also start by creating an enabling environment, like the recent publica-
tions by the OECD125 and by the IsDB and the South Centre126 have been con-
firming. I think this is key in terms of what you have just mentioned: capacity-
building, not only for southern partners, for their incoming and outgoing aid, 
but also talking about the DAC members themselves. We need these elements 
in terms of awareness but also institutionally speaking to create such an ena-
bling environment. Secondly, information campaigns may also be main-
streamed within partner and donor institutions, and we need to continue to share 
the evidence and good practices that have been produced, like the South-South 
Galaxy tool. For example, I have already mentioned the evaluation of the Ger-
man DEval Institute on the instrument with 16 case studies, and we are working 
on a plan to disseminate the findings and recommendations. We are collecting 
good practice examples to share with the international community. And yes, we 
also need more resources, although this is not a popular demand.  
 
124  See spotlight viii on the UN South-South Galaxy in this publication. 
125  OECD 2019f. 
126  Islamic Development Bank/South Centre 2019. 
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Let us come to the last part of our discussion and go a bit more deeply into the 
role of new donors and their agendas. Moreover, in terms of final conclusions, 
let us come back to the key question of the future of international development 
cooperation – do you dare to offer an outlook and some recommendations on 
South-South and triangular cooperation in the short and medium terms?   
Nadine Piefer-Söyler: Generally, we work with many providers of development 
cooperation beyond the DAC membership and we have forms and mechanisms 
of support. For example, together with the Islamic Development Bank, we fo-
cus on strengthening institutions or institutional capacities, making capacity as-
sessments of countries that are interested in and also benefitting from the expe-
rience of DAC members. One point that I think is often neglected in global 
discussions is that the DAC itself is extremely heterogeneous. Many newer 
DAC members and participants have gone through very similar processes or 
faced the same challenges as some of the emerging partners in development 
cooperation.  
The DAC went through a reform process in 2017: its vision is ‘to influence 
and to be influenced’. And I think we need this openness on both sides to link 
the two communities. The internal discussion that we often hear on the DAC 
side is, of course, still: how do we uphold our standards? This is a very legiti-
mate discussion, and that is what the DAC was created for and these standards 
and experiences can be insightful for partners beyond its membership. At the 
same time, experiences of providers of South-South cooperation could be in-
spiring for DAC members as well.  
Nevertheless, we need to bear in mind discussions in the South-South co-
operation community which, also of course justified through historical experi-
ence, would not necessarily want to include the North in discussions on South-
South cooperation. To start breaking up the North-South and South-South di-
vides, we would need to talk about international cooperation or international 
partnerships for development. But for that to happen, I think we need both sides 
to enter more into dialogue with each other. In any field of this kind of cooper-
ation, there are a lot of myths, misperceptions and misunderstandings, so we 
need more dialogue to really understand where we all come from, and what our 
priorities for going forward and our commonalities are. 
Orria Goni: We need to think of setting up new partnerships. We know that 
there are new providers, there are new donors, there are countries that want to 
become new donors, that want to become active South-South partners through 
different means, either by contributing to the UN but also by being an active 
OECD partner and, at the same time, by being active in other platforms as well. 
The future of development cooperation is here and is very different, completely 
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different to the MDG days or even the Logical Framework Approach days127, 
and we need to think of new financing instruments to make that happen. And 
when we talk about transaction costs, we need to think that we are going to deal 
with transaction costs anyway because that is what it takes when you form a 
partnership.  
But what we need to underline is: let us make things bigger, lets scale up 
and let us bring more partners on board for greater impact. This will promote 
the principle of SSC to create horizontal partnerships, making it a win-win sit-
uation for everyone. But we should also be thinking of bringing in private ac-
tors. In this regard, we need to think of being ready and supporting our member 
countries to be ready to set up – and manage – an SDG oriented bond; we also 
need to think of how to establish guarantees, how to partner with multilateral 
development banks and how to create all the bankable projects that everybody 
is talking about. The OECD is preparing a lot of countries and is working in 
this direction, so blended finance is the way forward, but we see that technical 
cooperation needs to fit there, too. Knowledge transfer needs to fit there. It is 
not only about financing instruments but also bringing in other elements. And 
it is going to be extremely demanding, of course, to set up these partnerships, 
but this is the world we are living in, which justifies the need to scale up our 
efforts. We cannot have pilots in a community anymore – these need to be na-
tionwide, attached to ministries and then we need to make things bigger. And 
the way we can make things bigger is by all of us coming together. Of course, 
it is going to be extremely complicated, but well, this is how and why we need 
to get ready.  
So, the whole issue of an enabling environment and looking into the regu-
latory frameworks of the country as well as the managerial capacities of these 
new partnerships is a huge agenda, at the country level, at the regional level and 
at the global level. The conclusion is, at least in the case of Africa: let us all 
contribute to make African money work for African development.  
Rita Walraf: I do not want to repeat the many good recommendations you have 
been giving, but just let me add some points concerning the need or not of hav-
ing common definitions and standards. We have been talking about this topic 
for ages, about the North and South and standards and principles – and, of 
course, it is important to somehow have common standards, the feeling of what 
it means to set up a project in a horizontal manner or not and also ownership. 
But in my view, it would not promote the modality; it would not be very positive 
 
127  The Logical Framework Approach was developed for USAID in 1969 as a meth-
odology for designing, monitoring and evaluating international development pro-
jects.  
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to go on with the debate and go into the nitty-gritty details because we cannot 
lose time.  
For me, our starting point is SDG 17, global partnerships for the goals, and 
I think it would be counterproductive to go on with that very theoretical debate. 
In Buenos Aires, BAPA+40 has shown that there is a way forward between the 
North and South, and triangular cooperation stands exactly for building bridges 
between the North and South. We should keep the instrument as flexible as 
possible to make any contribution from any side possible to achieve the SDGs, 
so we should focus on learning by doing together without debating too much 
on theories instead. 
Martín Rivero: Just some thoughts: First, I personally do not much like the idea 
of the ‘new donors’. Definitely they are not new; and generally, these countries 
do not like to call themselves donors, so ‘new donors’ is a category that some-
times makes ‘noise’ so perhaps is not very good one.  
Second, we are closer than ever before to achieve common ground in terms 
of thinking about these issues. I mean, as SEGIB we have accumulated the in-
formation of 22 countries for more than 10 years, if you add the accumulation 
of OECD and the recent work of UNDP in Africa we have encounters with 
more than 80-90 countries together, so that is a lot of countries on which to 
collect the evidence, the experiences and the knowledge of what has happened. 
Unfortunately, we still do not have the political consensus to decide all these 
countries together, but nowadays we are closer to having a better dialogue and 
this meeting is an example of that, so thank you, Juliane and Christof and eve-
rybody, for organising this type of discussion. So, in a certain way, I am positive 
about how we are moving forward to get together and to think bigger, as Orria 
was saying.  
Third, we are in quite a strange political context. The development cooper-
ation discussions inside the countries are not in the top priority and budgetary 
position, which is something that we must accept. Even in countries that have 
long experience of supporting development cooperation, for example in the 
country I am staying now, Spain, development cooperation is not set very high 
on the national agenda. This is a problem. And now, there is great uncertainty 
about the impact of Brexit. I really do not know what is going to happen, but 
Britain has been putting a lot of money into development cooperation, even 
when those budgets were going down in other countries. So, they will differen-
tiate their strategy compared to the European Union and perhaps this moment 
of lack of clarity is an opportunity to think out of the box. I think this negative 
political context outside the development cooperation community is also pull-
ing us closer together and I think we are closer to finding common ground that 
was much more difficult to find before. That said, I am confident that we can 
build together these new positions and that is why I congratulate you again on 
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conducting this project. It is extremely important to continue generating the 
knowledge and evidence that helps us to find a common position on these is-
sues. 
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Spotlight viii: Scaling up South-South and triangular co-
operation through digital technologies – the UN’s South-
South Galaxy as an example of knowledge sharing  
Shams Banihani, UNOSSC 
South-South and triangular cooperation have been recognised as effective 
means of achieving development and alleviating poverty in the South. In to-
day’s era, digital technologies are offering transformational opportunities for 
development cooperation and new tools for addressing persistent development 
challenges. By enhancing knowledge sharing and collaboration, and by opening 
new opportunities for business and entrepreneurial activity, digital technology 
is becoming a key driver of growth and development in the Global South and 
can further bolster South-South cooperation.  
To build on this potential, the UN Office for South-South Cooperation 
(UNOSSC) launched the “South-South Galaxy”128– a global knowledge shar-
ing and partnership brokering platform – together with its development partners 
in September 2019. It represents UNOSSC’s recognition of the exceptional po-
tential presented by new digital technologies and offers transformational coop-
eration opportunities for enhanced knowledge sharing and collaboration across 
borders, as well as a chance for businesses and social entrepreneurs to access 
overseas markets and engage in global e-value chains.  
The platform complements, rather than substitutes or duplicates existing na-
tional and regional institutional arrangements. It acts both as a one-stop shop 
for all partners to communicate and share solutions in order to address common 
challenges, and as a matchmaker by connecting solution providers and seekers. 
Southern countries and interested development partners will be able to locate 
concrete cases, share their knowledge and initiatives, collaborate with potential 
partners digitally and explore funding opportunities. Through its research arm, 
the platform is connecting governments, experts and think tanks to ensure that 
southern perspectives and insights are included in mainstream policy dialogue. 
The Galaxy platform makes South-South cooperation more of a reality by 
eliminating a significant barrier to entry through digital technology and ensur-
ing that southern partners can easily access and navigate a wide range of 
 
128  See here: https://www.southsouth-galaxy.org/ (15.04.2020). 
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knowledge and information. Thereby, it will strengthen the integration of the 
sharing of southern knowledge, expertise and technologies into regional and 
national capacities. The Galaxy is all about placing the great range of experi-
ences, practices and exchanges of South-South and triangular cooperation 
across the world in a single digital space. By building bridges and connections 
irrespective of distance and the development stages of partners, the South-South 
Galaxy has the potential to contribute to improving the quality of people’s lives 
across the Global South.  
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Conclusions and outlook 
Ulrich Müller, Carolina de la Lastra and Juliane Kolsdorf   
The transformation of international (development) cooperation is an open-
ended process with still unclear results. A multifaceted discourse among prac-
titioners, decision makers, researchers, social entrepreneurs and activists ac-
companies the transition. Graduation of countries from ODA is one element in 
this discourse and can only be fully understood if it is embedded in the broader 
picture of change. Other elements are, for instance, the emerging alternative 
cooperation modes, the changing roles of actors and the new requirements for 
cooperation ecosystems. 
This publication captures at least part of this discourse with the intention of 
encouraging further exchange of ideas without judging different views, predict-
ing future developments or necessarily preparing decisions. It was with impres-
sive openness that all the contributors in the dialogues and spotlights shared 
their thoughts and perspectives, while moving on uncertain ground. This was 
combined with often deep and critical self-reflection on the current experiences 
of countries and groups of countries. 
It is also remarkable how much the concepts articulated coincide, how the 
participants in the discussions and authors of the spotlights respond to each 
other, often without knowing what others had stated. Despite the many concerns 
and risks expressed, acknowledging that the path to the future has not been laid 
yet and that there is no guarantee that the global cooperation community will 
be able to overcome the existing challenges and deficiencies in the system, a 
great openness towards change prevails, together with a general optimism. This 
is based on a feeling of self-confidence that all have something to offer and 
something to learn – a genuine knowledge sharing attitude, also reflected in the 
2030 Agenda's principle of universality. 
The arguments developed in the dialogues and spotlights move from an 
overall view on the global system in transition and a screening of the traditional 
development cooperation system with ODA as a central feature to prospects 
beyond ODA and the challenges to and opportunities for change. These reflec-
tions result in a call for a global goals-oriented, knowledge sharing-based part-
nership of multiple open-minded actors in the future. 
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The global system in transition 
 
To understand the current changes in development cooperation and the role of 
ODA graduation within these changes, a view on the broader transitions in the 
global system is necessary. “What we are seeing right now has, to a large extent, 
to do with fundamental changes outside the aid system.”129  
“Some of the biggest challenges we are facing are transnational”130 and even 
“global in scope”131. The “degree and plurality of environmental changes we 
are facing”132 are mentioned by all participants in the dialogues, as well as 
“megatrends”133 such as “the issue of migration and refugees”134, “frontier tech-
nologies, digitalisation”135 and others that need to be addressed jointly. These 
global challenges are reflected in global goals agreed by all countries, espe-
cially the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. 
Countries from the North are experiencing that it is no longer only them 
who can claim to be frontrunners in innovation. At the same time, they have 
become aware that they are affected by global issues and that “vulnerability [...] 
is not only a feature of developing countries or of extremely poor and vulnera-
ble countries”136, as has been seen, for instance, with the Australian forest fires 
and the impact of the coronavirus crisis. Moreover, it is recognised that “there 
are significant developmental challenges even in wealthy countries”137, partic-
ularly with respect to social and economic inequalities. In consequence, “now-
adays, the divide between the North and South needs to be transcended”138. In 
addition, the idea “that economic development goes along with a development 
of institutions and political regimes towards democracy, participation and hu-
man rights”139 is questioned. “Today, we know […] that the relationship be-
tween economies, societies and nature also needs to be transformed.”140  
Emerging economies from the global South are climbing up the income lad-
der – which is reflected inter alia in the OECD’s prognosis of countries soon to 
graduate from ODA141 – and are demanding their share in global power politics. 
 
129  Klingebiel: 92 in this book. 
130  Sidiropoulos: 40 in this book. 
131  D’Cruz: 98 in this book. 
132  Scholz: 33 in this book. 
133  Klingebiel: 92 in this book. 
134  Ibid. 
135  Ibid. 
136  Scholz: 33 in this book. 
137  Sidiropoulos: 32 in this book. 
138  Ragueb Ahmed: 129 in this book. 
139  Scholz: 33 in this book. 
140  Scholz: 37 in this book. 
141  See: OECD 2014 and Introduction 
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748908388, am 26.10.2021, 10:19:07
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
Conclusions and outlook 
 
169 
They are “developing more agency”142 and “feel more empowered to come in 
with […] own positions and articulate them”143. This may offer new opportuni-
ties, including alternatives in terms of with whom countries align. However, in 
the multipolar world, the “complexity of issues and challenges”144 is increasing. 
Despite their economic progress, many challenges prevail in emerging coun-
tries. They still have a “large poor population”145 and often high levels of eco-
nomic, regional and social inequality146, resulting in opportunity gaps between 
different parts of society. There is also no guarantee that the path of growth will 
continue. Examples of stagnation in some countries have coined the idea of a 
“middle-income trap”147, which is important to avoid. 
There are also repercussions on multilateralism. A multipolar world “does 
not necessarily mean that it is going to be easily more multilateral”148. Many 
observe a crisis of multilateralism. Over the last few decades, a lot of “blindness 
and double standards”149 regarding the multilateral rule-based system has been 
in place. Nationalistic tendencies, the emergence of stakeholders with different 
values like China and Russia, and political divisions in formerly unanimous 
blocks have contributed to “the weakening of the multilateral system as we used 
to know it, its principles, its rules, its institutions, its procedures”150. This was 
aggravated by the fact that “the big guys do not want to play by the rules”151. 
Peace between rich countries was accompanied by a lot of wars in developing 
countries – the effects of that “are now falling back down onto us”152 to the 
extent that “the current situation is that multilateralism is under attack and uni-
lateralism is on the rise”153.The new plurality also means that “we need to let 
go of the belief that we are going to develop an entirely harmonised, universal 
approach to international cooperation”154.  
 
142  Sidiropoulos: 44 in this book.  
143  Ibid. 
144  Klingebiel: 92 in this book. 
145  Mao: 52 in this book. 
146  See Bokosi/Spiegel: 113 in this book; see also, for example, ODI country study on 
Chile: Calleja/Prizzon 2019c: 29. 
147  Li: 100 in this book; Pavletic/Schrader: 75 in this book. The term usually refers to 
countries that have experienced rapid growth and thus quickly reached middle-
income status, but then failed to overcome that income range to further catch up 
to the developed countries. See Glawe/Wagner 2016. 
148  Sidiropoulos: 44 in this book. 
149  Scholz: 43 in this book. 
150  Scholz: 33 in this book. 
151  Bokosi: 122 in this book. 
152  Scholz: 43 in this book. 
153  Li: 100 in this book. 
154  Sidiropoulos: 36 in this book. 
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At the same time, many agree on the importance of the multilateral system. 
Preserving and strengthening the multilateral rule-based order requires the 
countries in the North to rethink their role in the world, including the current 
distribution of power, and gain a new openness to pressure for reform and to 
change and solutions brought in from elsewhere. It is nothing less than a “par-
adigm shift in the mindset of all countries and governments”155, which includes 
to not assume that “developmental solutions or knowledge are only a privilege 
of a group of countries”156 but to “believe that all countries in the South can be 
recipients and providers of knowledge and solution”157. Emerging countries 
from the South – increasingly so after reaching high-income status – may try to 
find new approaches to work within the current change within the current mul-
tilateral system. “We as developing countries have been requesting to play a 
more meaningful part in the setting of international rules and standards for a 
while.”158 However, if their demands are not responded to, they will search for 
and find alternatives. Thereby, patterns of “contested cooperation”159 have 
emerged and a regional power such as South Africa works with “China or Rus-
sia, who it believes are able to push for change or to create alternative global 
institutions in parallel, maybe not to replace but to contest the traditional 
ones”160. 
These changes in international relations naturally have an impact on devel-
opment cooperation systems. In response to global challenges, many donors are 
increasingly shifting from a country-based allocation of ODA to a “thematic 
allocation of resources”161 and “a lot of the assistance is being securitised”162. 
Domestic problems are putting the governments of countries from the North 
under pressure for national resource allocation. “Altruistic justification”163 has 
“always been part of the multilateral system of cooperation”164. But with mul-
tilateralism being weakened, “more and more countries adopt a short-term per-
spective or see their national interests as juxtaposed to international cooperation 
because they understand it as a zero-sum game”165. In many traditional donor 
countries “development cooperation is not set very high on the national 
 
155  Ragueb Ahmed: 129 in this book. 
156  Ibid. 
157  Ibid. 
158  González: 54 in this book. 
159  Sidiropoulos: 34 in this book. 
160  Ibid. 
161  Klingebiel: 92 in this book. 
162  Sidiropoulos: 42 in this book. 
163  Scholz: 35 in this book. 
164  Ibid. 
165  Ibid.  
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agenda”166 and “it has become much more mercantilist, much more interest-
driven”167.  
At the same time, there is an increasing demand “to ‘cross over’ develop-
ment cooperation and to mainstream it in public policies and to social actors”168. 
“We do talk about linking those fields: development, peace and security, cli-
mate and foreign policy […]. However, in reality, many of us, be it state actors, 
be it implementing agencies, be it civil society, be it think tanks, are looking 
into their own silos. In the end, it is a fight about resources in various organisa-
tions concerning certain subjects.”169 On the other hand, it is an increasing re-
ality that more and more sectoral ministries are engaging in development is-
sues170. This presents new opportunities but at the same time also poses policy 
coherence challenges. Development cooperation steps out of the ‘comfort zone’ 
of a specific policy field into the competed space of national and global political 
priorities. 
“Rethinking or redefining what we mean by development or international 
cooperation would be of paramount importance”171 taking into account that 
“there is a tension between aid in the old paradigm, that is, the poorest, the 
neediest countries in a grant financing format, vis-á-vis a broader agenda for 
policy dialogues and pursuit of donors’ national interest in wealthier recipient 
aid countries”172.  
 
A screening of the traditional development cooperation system 
 
In this changing global order, development cooperation and ODA in particular 
are still considered relevant. “People think that ODA continues to be important 
[…] to alleviate the worry and concern from LDCs or other developing coun-
tries.”173 Representatives of the South remind the North about their “responsi-
bility when it comes to their historical commitments in the area of development 
cooperation”174. 
Nevertheless, the concept of ODA is under pressure for many reasons. 
While some argue that “the priorities […] should be on poverty alleviation, cli-
mate change and debt problems”175 and that ODA is required to address “the 
 
166  Rivero: 163 in this book. 
167  Sidiropoulos: 35 in this book. 
168  Ayala: 142 in this book. 
169  Wehnert: 135 in this book. 
170  Küsel: 72 in this book. 
171  Prizzon: 88 in this book. 
172  Ibid. 
173  Li: 104 in this book. 
174  Mthembu: 94 in this book. 
175  Li: 102 in this book. 
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hard core of poverty”176, others state that “development challenges are not only 
focused towards developing countries anymore”177 and ask for “conversations 
on who defines development, and why they define it in this way and not another 
way”178. “ODA in its traditional form was a vehicle to convey two sets of re-
sources: finance and expertise”179, but financing is increasingly available 
through different channels, particularly to upper middle-income countries, and 
“the real value of communication and sharing within the international develop-
ment sector has been in the sharing of experience rather than expertise”180 in a 
horizontal and collaborative approach. There is a demand from the South, and 
from the North as well, to “think ‘beyond ODA’”181, working “more in partner-
ships to achieve the 2030 Agenda and to move beyond the binary donor-recip-
ient model”182. Therefore, ODA and graduation from it “should be regarded 
[…] as part of a broader debate on the rationale of the developing cooperation 
system”183.  
However, there are obstacles to such a change. ODA “is a very strict, narrow 
system of channelling financial resources from the North to the South. That was 
the idea back in the 60s, after World War II”184. “This makes it very difficult to 
achieve true partnership ambition. If you give money as a donor, there will be 
a receiver. That is ODA; that is the system. All of us do not like it, but the logic 
of the system, in the end, finds its way into our mindsets.”185. “We are somehow 
stuck in the old aid paradigm.”186 
ODA graduation is part of this strict system with its classification in one of 
the four stages of development – from least developed countries to low-income, 
to middle-income and finally to high-income countries – altering step by step 
the kind of aid received. While graduation from the LDC status entails a heavy 
loss of trade support and other kinds of concessional lending from multilateral 
financial institutions, “graduation from ODA for the upper-middle-income 
countries is not as painful”187 since these countries no longer depend on aid in 
financial terms188. In this context, it should be kept in mind that graduation and 
 
176  Ibid. 
177  Mthembu: 94 in this book. 
178  Mthembu: 96 in this book. 
179  D’Cruz: 97 in this book. 
180  Ibid. 
181  Ragueb Ahmed: 128 in this book. 
182  Piefer-Söyler: 153 in this book. 
183  Klingebiel: 94 in this book. 
184  Wehnert: 137 in this book. 
185  Wehnert: 134 in this book. 
186  Prizzon: 82 in this book. 
187  Li: 104 in this book. 
188  Li: 99 in this book. 
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exit of donors from determined countries may have similar effects but are dif-
ferent in terms of their finality. The exit is the result of a political decision in a 
donor country that can be revised or even taken back, while graduation follows 
an automatism laid down in the rules for development cooperation that does not 
leave OECD-DAC donors room for choice. While partners can continue to co-
operate regardless of graduation, this may mean a shift in the ministries in 
charge, and it would certainly not contribute to the 0.7% ODA target anymore. 
Part of the criticism also refers to the graduation criterion itself: “the ODA 
categorisation by income per capita is a metric that maybe makes sense for 
economists, but it is increasingly being contested”189. “We need to develop a 
more comprehensive methodology for measuring development because just us-
ing GNI per capita is a too simple way to measure a country’s development 
situation”190. “The metrics for graduating [...] are extremely simplistic. They 
are also part of the old narrative because we all know that a certain level of 
income per capita does not say anything about real income distribution, and it 
does not say much about the quality of public services. The need for coopera-
tion and knowledge sharing and, to a certain extent, resource sharing to solve 
urgent and major problems do not disappear when you reach this level [...], that 
is a mismatch in criteria.”191 “The concept of ‘graduation’ is based on a misun-
derstanding of what the nature of development is. The DAC graduation is based 
on the idea that a country magically develops when it surpasses for three con-
secutive years an arbitrary threshold put forward by the World Bank in the 
eighties, through a methodology that has never been sufficiently explained, nor 
adequately updated.”192 Also, “the 0.7% target193 […] could really be a disin-
centive for modernising this [international cooperation] system”194. As, glob-
ally, the highest number of poor people live in emerging countries, “there have 
also always been debates in the international community about whether ODA 
should focus more on poor countries or poor people.”195 
Many of the countries in transition “do not accept that category of ‘gradua-
tion’”196. “There are a lot of contradictions in this concept of graduation, which 
we think is more related to a political concern than to a real technical 
 
189  Sidiropoulos: 37f in this book. 
190  Mao: 58 in this book. 
191  Scholz: 36 in this book. 
192  van Rompaey: 55 in this book. 
193  Refers to the commitment stated by most DAC donors to achieve the target of 
spending 0.7 per cent of their GNI on ODA measures. For further information, see 
https://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/the07odagnitarget-ahistory.htm (15.04.2020). 
194  Scholz: 34f in this book. 
195  Mao: 52 in this book. 
196  Rivero: 156 in this book with reference to “most of the Ibero-American countries”. 
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concern”197. When contesting ODA graduation, these countries are not so much 
concerned about funding, but about “both the connection to international 
knowledge and the access to financing”198 to address global challenges. “The 
economy needs to grow to provide more resources, and the country also needs 
to become more conscious that these areas need to have a higher priority level 
in the budgetary struggle. We need funds for the environment and climate 
change, for global public goods in general. Still, technical cooperation is also 
needed, and in that respect funds and technical cooperation often come hand in 
hand.”199 Unlike Eastern European countries that have access to EU neighbour-
hood facilities, most countries in transition to high-income status in other re-
gions “do not have alternative support mechanisms”200 to close their develop-
ment gaps.  
While in general all those involved in the dialogues think that ODA and the 
SDGs “go hand in hand”201, countries on the way to ODA graduation perceive 
the risk “that we will not achieve our goals with a lack of support”202 and reflect 
on the fact that “our graduation has led to us having a conversation at the global 
level on the issues that matter most: what do we understand as sustainable de-
velopment, what needs do countries have relating to sustainable development, 
what are the capabilities and how can we build an international cooperation 
system that is based on those needs and the capabilities of countries in terms of 
sustainable development goals that we have commonly agreed to? […] This is 
an opportunity for the ODA graduation criteria to be revised and updated in the 
light of the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda.”203 This reflection leads to 
the question, raised by many of the discussants, of “if the ODA concept is still 
relevant. And if there are no other, better ways to measure donors’ contributions 
to global challenges, especially also because the SDG 2030 framework is much 
broader than what the ODA concept would allow as a measure”.204 
Another criticism in ODA graduation relates to the potential loss of strategic 
partnerships for global goals. “The graduation process means we are kicking 
the instruments we have for funding international cooperation out of our 
hands”205, breaking bridges of cooperation, which afterwards will be difficult 
 
197  González: 50 in dialogue 2, p.4; see also the observation by Annalisa Prizzon that 
graduation from ODA is criticised for “often being a political decision” (Prizzon: 
76 in this book). 
198  van Rompaey: 57 in this book 
199  Ibid. 
200  van Rompaey: 49 in this book. 
201  Li: 104 in this book. 
202  González: 60 in this book. 
203  van Rompaey: 62 in this book. 
204  Pavletic/Schrader: 82 in this book. 
205  Scholz: 39 in this book. 
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to reconstruct, and affecting political dialogue. Thus, countries from the North 
“will lose relevance as international actors” and countries from the South will 
build new partnerships “with whomever wants to support our national ef-
forts”206. “For us, international cooperation is a […] means for mutual trust-
building and to address regional and common global challenges. This is some-
thing that the donor community should take into account if they really want to 
leave countries completely on their own and lose that area of policy dialogue 
and of strengthening multilateralism, and the common ground to work on all 
the structural and systemic changes that are needed to really enable develop-
ment at a global level.”207 
The implications of graduation for the countries affected, as well as their 
position in the international and development systems afterwards, remain un-
clear. “After graduation, when you are a high-income country, how do you po-
sition yourself?”208 “We started to ask ourselves: What are the consequences of 
being graduated from ODA? What are the wider implications? Are we going to 
be perceived as a ‘developed’ country now? Are we going to have to give 0.7 
per cent of our GDP to others?”209 In that respect, graduation opens questions 
of identity and alignment: “Uruguay is no longer a middle-income country. 
Where does it stand in all the political negotiations in the UN, for instance? 
Where do we align ourselves? Are we a developing country? Are we a devel-
oped country? Are we part of the G77? Are we part of the group of middle-
income countries? Our graduation from ODA has also led to us living slightly 
in limbo.”210 “China always said: we are the largest developing country in the 
world. So, after we have reached high-income status, how should we position 
ourselves? Also, rethinking China’s foreign assistance and its role as a southern 
partner: would it still be South-South cooperation? There are a lot of questions 
on this, already now and especially after you have graduated from the ODA 
list.”211  
Graduated and graduating countries also state there is a lack of clarity about 
the process itself. “There is not a very clear road map for graduation. We do not 
really know how to cope with that.”212 Graduation experiences in the past have 
been negative: “the process of ‘graduation’ lacked clarity and formality […and] 
if we had not had our close relations with Chile, we would not even have been 
 
206  González: 60 in this book. 
207  van Rompaey: 61 in this book. 
208  Mao: 58 in this book. 
209  van Rompaey: 48 in this book. 
210  van Rompaey: 57f. in this book. 
211  Mao: 58 in this book. 
212  González: 50 in this book. 
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properly informed until who knows when”213. This went hand in hand with the 
observation that “there was no explicit strategy on the exit from ODA on the 
part of the government, but there was also no strategy from the DAC donors to 
support Uruguay during the graduation process”214. The whole process has been 
perceived as “frustrating because it was automatised and unilateral”215. 
This is acknowledged by traditional donors, too: “three or four years ago, 
hardly any donor had a strategy on transition in place – probably the only one 
was the European Commission with the Agenda for Change in 2011”216. This 
is changing nowadays. In the process of putting an end to development aid, 
some donors are trying to foster the “ability to hand programmes over to other 
development partners or to the government without disruption”217 through long-
term planning and stakeholder communication. More and more countries are 
expected to graduate in the coming years. Forthrightly expressed, “the aid sys-
tem is a ‘dying system’. We have a shrinking market because of this middle-
income transit: Some of the most important receiving countries are no longer in 
need of concessional resources, and this is reflected ultimately in their gradua-
tion. Therefore, over the next couple of years, the system will ‘run out’ of busi-
ness”218. “ODA graduation is an area where we as an implementor see very 
limited prospects of us continuing cooperation in the respective countries.”219 
“The fact that assistance cannot be counted as ODA any more in certain coun-
tries is a clear disincentive for DFID, BMZ and French development coopera-
tion.”220 Most of the traditional donors’ development policies formally follow 
the ODA criteria to define their aid’s recipients. However, there are also pro-
gressive tendencies: “‘Beyond ODA’ is already very much a normality and part 
of our daily life […], particularly in our cooperation with Asia and Latin Amer-
ica [where] we implement various projects which go beyond a classical devel-
opment cooperation approach.”221 222 
 
213  van Rompaey: 48 in this book. 
214  Ibid. 
215  van Rompaey: 49 in this book. 
216  Prizzon: 76 in this book. 
217  Prizzon: 77 in this book. 
218  Klingebiel: 93 in this book. 
219  Küsel: 86 in this book. 
220  Prizzon: 88 in this book. 
221  Küsel: 72 in this book. Other organisations have had similar experiences: “South–
North cooperation is already happening at the grassroots level.” (Boyaci: 131 in 
this book). 
222  It should be noted here that some interlocutors distinguish between post-ODA and 
beyond ODA, defining ‘beyond ODA’ as “everything beyond classical develop-
ment cooperation” (Küsel: 72 in this book), while others use both terms synony-
mously. 
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Going beyond ODA 
 
Both donors and countries that will soon graduate or have already graduated 
have developed an emerging “diversification strategy […] to change from de-
velopment cooperation to a broader concept of international cooperation”223. 
From some donors’ perspectives, the “focus is much more on building capaci-
ties, advising on policies or processes. […] Policy dialogues […] or building 
networks between these countries also play an important role”224. “Projects to 
facilitate the dialogue between the respective partner country and the [donors’] 
relevant […] ministries and agencies”225 are mentioned, too. “At the same time, 
funding as part of our cooperation becomes far less important”.226 Others state 
that it is part of their agenda to “broaden the number of actors that work with 
development, and also to include technical cooperation”227, and that “many of 
these types or means of collaboration continue even after development cooper-
ation is phased out”228. “We still have ongoing partnerships in areas where we 
have a comparative advantage, and this is not limited to development coopera-
tion”229 but increasingly also involves other, thematically focused public min-
istries and agencies. “Specialised government actors are playing an increasingly 
less important role because ODA resources are being split up amongst a group 
of different ministries, different departments.”230 “This is very valuable because 
you see where the complementarities are and how each and every unit can con-
tribute”231, but it also poses the challenge of capacity building to public institu-
tions with little experience in the field of international cooperation. “Regional 
or global approaches and funds”232 have a special significance, though they do 
“not necessarily directly benefit the graduated country. But [by] working with 
neighbouring countries, cross-border projects […] can indirectly benefit the 
country that has already graduated. That was a good way […] to keep the policy 
dialogue with development partners open. Regional cooperation is also a learn-
ing opportunity for countries that graduated to become development partners 
themselves if they wish to do so, and in many cases, this is part of their own 
 
223  Küsel: 72 in this book. 
224  Küsel: 80 in this book. 
225  Küsel: 81 in this book. 
226  Küsel: 80 in this book. 
227  Rahm: 81 in this book. 
228  Ibid. 
229  Ibid. 
230  Klingebiel: 105 in this book. 
231  Pavletic/Schrader: 82 in this book. 
232  Küsel: 80 in this book. 
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strategy.”233 This is in line with the aim of many donors “to cooperate with 
‘global partners’ and to strengthen them in their global role”234. These strategies 
are recognised as being linked to “genuine”235 donor interests, trying to “find a 
potential win-win situation”236, especially regarding trade and international re-
lations. Donor countries emphasise that “the rationale behind our engagement 
is important”237 and that cooperation, including funding, is appropriate even 
with higher income countries since “those countries play an important role in 
their regional context both from an economic and a political perspective, but 
also regarding their contribution to global challenges”238. 
The countries that have graduated and will soon graduate are also “adjusting 
[their] strategies to make the most out of the [forthcoming] situation”239. “We 
are trying to convince our international partners that we need to work together 
in a more structured manner.”240 “After the graduation, we managed to negoti-
ate with the European Union and we are back in regional cooperation; they have 
also maintained the funds for our civil society, and we are negotiating a bilateral 
co-fund to address […] transition priorities.”241 “Basically, we are trying to see 
how we can shift from, for instance, bilateral to bi-regional development coop-
eration programmes. We are moving towards different mechanisms of cooper-
ating with donor countries. For instance, we are looking at co-financing certain 
programmes; we are looking at triangular cooperation; we are looking at hori-
zontal programmes. We are also looking at regionalising within Mexico itself, 
taking a look at regional, sub-regional or subnational programmes, trying to 
focus on those regions which are most in need within our own country.”242 This 
means a reorientation and strengthening of existing cooperation facilities. “We 
are becoming more of an implementation agency, but at the same time we are 
not losing grasp of political discussions.”243 “In many […] ministries, there 
were also institutions established to manage the incoming aid. After all that had 
been phased out, they needed to find new tasks and many of these institutions 
are now active in applying for the implementation of [their] own aid projects. 
 
233  Prizzon: 83 in this book. 
234  Küsel: 73 in this book. 
235  Pavletic/Schrader: 75 in this book. 
236  Pavletic/Schrader: 81 in this book. 
237  Pavletic/Schrader: 75 in this book. 
238  Ibid. 
239  González: 51 in this book 
240  Ibid. 
241  van Rompaey: 58 in this book 
242  González: 51 in this book. 
243  González: 55 in this book.  
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This way, they hope to support other developing countries by using the 
knowledge they gained through the incoming aid.”244 
As part of their diversification strategies, both traditional donors and former 
recipients are also broadening the scope of participating actors. Many are “en-
hancing their cooperation with the private sector as a third pillar”245. They also 
“reach out to other groups in society and broaden our way of looking at devel-
opment so that we could leave a basis for sustainable development with more 
actors than the government and some civil society organisations. For example, 
we had more collaboration with trade unions and private companies.”246 Given 
the particularly severe and early impact of graduation on non-state actors, de-
velopment partners are requested to “explore how to support civil society in 
more diverse and creative ways to enable [them] to continue to tackle global 
and local rights and development-related issues”247. 
In relation to many global public goods, donors work “on several levels: 
global, regional and bilateral, and we try to often convene and work through 
multilaterals and joint networks of actors”248. Particularly, “one of the key play-
ers in a post-ODA setting focusing on global public goods are the multilateral 
development banks”249, whose partnership with bilateral donors “in a post-
ODA setting is of paramount importance”250 “and something that we will con-
tinue to strengthen over the coming years”251.  
Financial resources are an important issue to be considered in the ‘beyond 
ODA’ strategy. The Addis Ababa Action Agenda that accompanies the imple-
mentation of the SDGs incorporates a greater variety of sources of financing. 
Key issues in this respect are, for instance, domestic resource mobilisation 
through improved tax systems252 and the attraction of private sector funding253, 
transparency and corruption254, but also innovative funding mechanisms255. 
Debt remains an issue that needs to be addressed. This includes “capacity-
 
244  Mao: 53 in this book. 
245  Küsel: 73 in this book. 
246  Prizzon: 74 in this book. 
247  Hayman: 70 in this book. 
248  Rahm: 84 in this book. 
249  Prizzon: 83 in this book. 
250  Ibid.  
251  Pavletic/Schrader: 84 in this book. 
252  “In cases where the biggest challenge is in raising domestic resource mobilisation, 
capacity development in tax issues can be very important” (Spiegel: 113 in this 
book). 
253  For the involvement of the private sector, see Boyaci: 139 in this book. 
254  Bokosi: 109 in this book. 
255  Boyaci: 136 in this book. 
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building in debt management”256 as well as the demand for “an international 
mechanism to resolve debt”257. It should also be noted here that in spite of their 
strong orientation towards knowledge sharing approaches “financial resources 
still are an issue for many southern providers”258. This also relates to the capac-
ities of the institutional settings for cooperation. However, the discussion on 
resources should not be limited to finance. Many other resources such as 
“knowledge, local knowledge or ancestral knowledge, human resources, tech-
nical resources and material resources, are all part of this umbrella of re-
sources”259. 
In fact, what countries in transition most strongly demand is closely related 
to these other resources. “Aid was never about how much money donors gave 
to the country. Aid for us has a strategic value that is beyond its economic 
worth. It is about agenda setting, it is about putting all the people together that 
can design the best policy to solve a problem. It is about providing for the over-
all public goods, it is about strengthening capacities, it is not about the money 
that it brings in but the knowledge and the facilitation role that comes with it.”260 
“For those phased out of ODA, […] aid not only meant financial support but 
much more. They valued the technical exchange, sharing of experience, learn-
ing and management skills development, which came through the aid from tra-
ditional donors.”261 So “we continue to cooperate, continue to exchange and 
continue to find ways to support each other’s development efforts. Technolog-
ical exchanges, scientific exchanges, student exchanges and so forth are bene-




256  Spiegel: 113 in this book. 
257  Bokosi: 118 in this book. 
258  Ayala: 138 in this book. 
259  Ayala: 138; in the same way, Ragueb Ahmed: 137 in this book.  
260  van Rompaey: 49 in this book. 
261  Mao: 53 in this book. 
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Challenges and opportunities 
 
The arguments collected so far make clear that practitioners, analysts, research-
ers, decision makers and other actors in the international (development) coop-
eration system are currently witnessing an ongoing and deep process of change. 
When stepping from a participatory to an observational position, as the discus-
sants in the dialogues presented in this book do, they recognise the reality and 
dimension of this change: “The future of development cooperation is here and 
it is very different, completely different to the MDG days or even the Logical 
Framework Approach days.”263 However, this does not simply mean that inter-
national (development) cooperation is passing from one state to another. The 
future will rather be “much more diverse than what we have been accustomed 
to”264. 
This diversity is an answer to “a significant number of societal, geophysical 
and environmental challenges that we are facing which absolutely require better 
forms of international cooperation”265. Its framework is the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development, whose global principles and goals express various 
aspects that make up the new system. Firstly, there will be “many more actors 
but also a much more diverse set of actors”266 that are “setting up new partner-
ships”267 “with a participatory approach, with a multi-stakeholder approach and 
with multiple actors, plurality and inclusiveness”268. Secondly, a change of 
roles and relationships is taking place. The “recipient-donor approach is obso-
lete and […the] North and South approach is used less”269. Meanwhile, “all 
countries in the world should embrace […a] dual role”270 in which they are 
“recipients and providers of knowledge and solutions”271 at the same time. 
Thirdly, this requires new modes and forms of cooperation. Some of these have 
already emerged within the development cooperation system and have entered 
 
263  Goni: 161 in this book. 
264  Mthembu: 102 in this book. 
265  D’Cruz: 101 in this book. 
266  Mthembu: 103 in this book. 
267  Goni: 161 in this book. 
268  Ayala: 132 in this book. 
269  Ayala: 133 in this book. 
270  Ragueb Ahmed: 129 in this book. 
271  Ragueb Ahmed: 129. In the same way, Mthembu: 104: “[…] shifting the narrative 
away from the idea that there are certain countries that have the knowledge and 
the know-how; shift away from this donor–recipient view”, Piefer-Söyler: 161: 
“At the same time, experiences of providers of South-South cooperation could be 
inspiring for DAC members as well”, and Wehnert: 130: “[…] in a new world 
beyond ODA, I do hope that we are all providers, providing ideas and co-creating 
approaches to global sustainability”. 
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the 2030 Agenda272, for instance the aforementioned multi-stakeholder-partner-
ships or triangular cooperation that “stands exactly for building bridges be-
tween the North and South”273. Other new modes, moreover, have arisen in in-
novation settings, where “social entrepreneurs […] create new models”274. In-
ternational (development) cooperation actors need the openness and capacity to 
recognise these approaches and the ability to incorporate them without spoiling 
their creative potential. 
The increasing diversity provides a lot of opportunities. However, in order 
to fully unfold these opportunities, a number of requirements need to be met, 
which can also be seen as challenges to change.  
A first requirement lies in the availability of resources for new partnerships, 
considering the desire to mainstream new modes of cooperation and “the 
broader perspective of financing for development, of the graduation discussion, 
of the transition finance discussion”275. Approaches to change need “to be trans-
ferred to existing systems so that more resources can flow into innovation and 
new models. The problem is that resources are not moving as fast here because 
it is considered risky.”276 In addition, with respect to triangular cooperation, 
“people always put the issue of high transaction costs on the agenda. They say 
it is too complicated to start such a modality; it requires too much investment 
in terms of coordination, talking and dealing with at least three partners at the 
same time”277. However, “when we talk about transaction costs, we need to 
think that we are going to deal with transaction costs anyway, because that is 
what it takes when you form a partnership”278. Beyond that, a more radical shift 
in the provision of resources and the reasons why they are provided is taking 
place. In a setting beyond ODA, the assessment of cooperation measures will 
focus less on a beneficiary country, including an exit strategy once local needs 
have been met, and more on both sides wanting to be part of a partnership, 
including the willingness to contribute one’s own resources in participation. 
This is a challenge not only for countries from the South but also for countries 
in the North, where the use of resources has generally been justified according 
to the help provided to others but not to cover one’s own costs. Such partner-
ships are sustainable when the partners remain involved for a long time and not 
when the structures created survive without their participation. 
 
272  See especially goal 17 (means of implementation) 
273  Walraf: 163 in this book. For more detail on triangular cooperation, see dialogue 
7, which especially focuses on South-South and triangular cooperation. 
274  Boyaci: 131 in this book. 
275  Walraf: 154 in this book. 
276  Boyaci: 131 in this book. 
277  Walraf: 153 in this book. 
278  Goni: 162 in this book. 
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A second requirement is the establishment of a new language and a new 
narrative of development that reflects the changes. Both communities in the 
systems of North-South cooperation and South-South cooperation need “more 
dialogue to really understand where we all come from, and what our priorities 
going forward and our commonalities are”279 in order to get to “broader and 
more inclusive concepts that translate into equally inclusive financial instru-
ments and cooperation policies”280. It requires “a mindset shift for that to hap-
pen. And it is not only the mindset that is important, but also the internal insti-
tutional regulations, the way we engage in cooperation.”281 
This leads to a third requirement, the revision of structures and processes or 
ecosystems in South-South and triangular cooperation282. The issue is “to make 
sure that the relevant institutional arrangements to absorb the solution and to 
adapt it to the local context exist. The right legal framework, supporting policies 
and regulations as well as adequate capacity should be put in place to allow 
each country to play this role effectively. Without these arrangements, re-
sources and funds will be wasted. It is of paramount importance to strengthen 
the human and institutional capacities in each country to play these dual 
roles.”283 
 
Towards a new partnership based on global goals and knowledge sharing 
 
The reflections on transition in the global system, the past and present practice 
of development cooperation, and the challenges to and opportunities for change 
culminate in a vision shared by all the contributors to this publication – with 
some differences in detail. There is a consensus that the development system 
needs to go beyond ODA for countries approaching graduation or having grad-
uated and a majority opinion about the characteristics this should have. 
This vision has four elements. Content-wise it is oriented towards global 
goals, predominantly the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. This ori-
entation is based on the conviction that the challenges of the 21st century can 
hardly be resolved by any country alone, no matter how big and strong it is. In 
spite of the frequent criticism of the multilateral system, this represents a cate-
gorically multilateral vision. The primary practice through which the 
 
279  Piefer-Söyler: 161 in this book. 
280  Ayala: 132 in this book. 
281  Piefer-Söyler: 153 in this book. The idea of the shift in the mindset is also men-
tioned by Riad Ragueb Ahmed: 129 in this book. 
282  See Islamic Development Bank/ South Center 2019 Developing National Ecosys-
tems for South-South and Triangular Cooperation to Achieve the Agenda 2030 for 
Sustainable Development 
283  Ragueb Ahmed: 133 in this book. 
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implementation of the global goals is expected to be fostered is knowledge shar-
ing. While the protection and provision of global public goods particularly will 
need continued access to funds, knowledge sharing is the way partners, who all 
have something to contribute and something to learn, find the necessary inno-
vative solutions. In this context, ODA still has its place in supporting those in 
need, especially low-income countries. Beyond ODA knowledge sharing also 
requires resources for each country to finance the participation of its own ex-
perts. This includes scientific cooperation, but also requires the involvement of 
policymakers and practitioners. A knowledge sharing-oriented partnership re-
quires284 an attitude of openness: in order to listen to the (unexpected) contri-
butions of one’s partner, to bring in one’s own ideas (with the risk – or chance! 
– of them being denied or copied) and to accept not necessarily knowing the 
best solution oneself – to learn from the other285. This openness is asked espe-
cially from countries from the North.  
This vision is not uncontested. Things will not develop in this direction on 
their own. As regards global goals, the need for collaboration contrasts with the 
emergence of a new sense of protection of the own group, of the citizens of the 
own country against all others. This trend has at least partly been nurtured by 
the fact that globalisation failed to bring about the promised bright future for 
all people. Therefore, countries from the North may feel tempted to withdraw 
their cooperation when their own challenges become more pressing. As far as 
knowledge sharing is concerned, it proves to be a demanding practice. Not eve-
rything framed as such really deserves the name due to hidden power relations. 
A partnership itself is fragile and needs to be re-established continuously, an 
effort that under conditions of limited resources may be considered too strenu-
ous. Although inspiring and fascinating, openness may also create a fear of los-
ing what has been considered an established right, of being overrun and over-
ruled. 
However, the shared vision of a partnership among equals that is geared 
towards global goals and based on the sharing of solutions and knowledge is 
not out of reach. Even today, many examples demonstrate how it works in prac-
tice.286 Whilst the formal rules for official development assistance are clearly 
set and accepted by most traditional donors, the dynamic cooperation system 
and the need to confront global challenges have helped it to outgrow its own 
boundaries. The dialogues in this book show that donor, graduating and gradu-
ated countries are taking ground-breaking pathways towards a new de facto sit-
uation that invite the cooperation status quo to be amlified and diversified. The 
 
284  Müller 2017. 
285  Krewer/Uhlmann 2015. 
286  See, for example, cases on triangular cooperation in GPI (2019) and the UN South-
South Galaxy (spotlight viii in this book). 
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stakeholders have already set their foot in the new reality of international (de-
velopment) cooperation. The global ecosystem for this cooperation system is 
growing. It builds upon the principles of development effectiveness287 and of 
South-South cooperation288, the experience gained in means of implementation 
– as expressed in SDG 17 – and the new modes of working together. A new 
global cooperation ecosystem can transcend the graduation of countries from 
ODA to the graduation of the international development cooperation system 
from its existing limitations, leading it beyond ODA. 
 
287  Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation, see 4th High-Level Fo-
rum on Aid Effectiveness 2011. 
288  ‘Bandung Conference’, see Asian-African Conference 1955.  
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He obtained a degree in social work in Germany and a graduate diploma in 
population and development at the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague, the 
Netherlands. 
 
Stephan Klingebiel took up his post as a director of the UNDP Seoul Policy 
Centre in June 2019. He was previously the Chair of the Research Programme 
“International and Transnational Cooperation” of the German Development In-
stitute (Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik / DIE). Before he joined DIE 
in 1993, he was a researcher at the University of Duisburg (Institute for Devel-
opment and Peace). He was a founding Director (2007-2011) of the KfW De-
velopment Bank office in Kigali, Rwanda, dealing with the topics of develop-
ment cooperation. His research and teaching experience at various universities 
focus on the innovations of transnational cooperation, the political economy of 
aid, aid and development effectiveness, global public goods, rising powers and 
governance issues in sub-Saharan Africa. As a guest researcher, he developed 
close links with the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law 
(CDDRL) at Stanford University and the College of Humanities and Develop-
ment Studies at the China Agricultural University (CAU) in Beijing. Stephan 
Klingebiel is a senior lecturer at the University of Marburg and a regular visit-
ing professor at Stanford University (Bing Overseas Studies Program, Cape 
Town). 
 
Juliane Kolsdorf is Senior Policy Advisor in the division for Strategy, Policy 
and Risk Management of GIZ's Corporate Development unit. In that function, 
she has been in charge of the project ‘Managing ODA Graduation Processes’, 
which included this publication, and is part of the team conducting strategic 
foresight for GIZ’s corporate development purposes. Previously, she served as 
a desk officer in the division for global affairs, United Nations and development 
policy of the Federal Chancellery’s foreign and security department, dealing 
particularly with multilateral summits and issues, EU development policy, 
global health, the SDGs and crisis prevention. Coming from a peace and secu-
rity background, she was a study advisor on development policy at the Federal 
Academy for Security Policy (BAKS) from 2011 to 2014, planning and con-
ducting seminars and worldwide study trips for senior staff of ministries, civil 
society and the business sector. She first joined GIZ (then GTZ) in 2008 to 
coordinate regional projects and provide policy advice to the German govern-
ment on strengthening the African Peace and Security Architecture, including 
regular trips to that continent. Always fascinated by approaching a topic from 
various angles, Juliane studied the interdisciplinary courses of European 
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748908388, am 26.10.2021, 10:19:07
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
About the authors and contributors 
 
203 
Studies (B.A.) and European International Politics (M.A.) at the University of 
Maastricht as well as political science and economics at Pompeu Fabra Univer-
sity in Barcelona. 
 
Corinna Küsel is Director of the Regional Division South Asia within the De-
partment Asia, Pacific, Latin America and Caribbean of GIZ and is based in 
Eschborn, Germany. In this function, she is responsible for the overall manage-
ment and development of GIZ’s portfolio, mostly funded by the Ger-man gov-
ernment, in India, Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka. Additionally, between 
2017 and 2019, she coordinated an internal strategic project on the future of 
GIZ in the process of transition towards a perspective beyond and post-ODA. 
Prior to this, until early 2017, she was the Country Director of GIZ in Mexico, 
based in Mexico City. The sectoral focus of Corinna Küsel is private sector 
development, where she has worked both at GIZ Head Office (as head of the 
section for Economic Policy and Private Sector Development) and in the field, 
managing a programme for the promotion of small and medium enterprises in 
Vietnam. Prior to joining GTZ, Corinna worked for the United Nations Indus-
trial Development Organisation (UNIDO) in Vienna and Nepal for five years; 
she was also employed by a private consultancy company in Berlin. She holds 
a master’s degree in development sociology and has extensive work experience 
in Asia, Latin America and Africa. 
 
Yuefen Li is currently Senior Advisor on South-South Cooperation and Devel-
opment Finance of the Geneva based South Centre. She worked in the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) from 1990 to 
2014, and held various positions, including Head of Debt and Development Fi-
nance Branch, Senior Economic Affairs Officer as well as Manager of the 
UNCTAD Project on Promoting Responsible Sovereign Lending and Borrow-
ing, the Project on Sovereign Debt Workout Mechanism and the Project on 
Globalisation. She has been a guest professor at two universities in China. Ear-
lier she taught at the University of International Business and Economics in 
Beijing. She has published books, papers and articles in refereed professional 
journals and newspapers on issues relating to debt, development strategies, 
South-South cooperation, finance, trade, etc. She has contributed extensively to 
UNCTAD and South Centre publications and documents.  
 
Xiaojing Mao has been working in the Chinese Academy of International 
Trade and Economic Cooperation (CAITEC), the think tank affiliated to the 
Ministry of Commerce of China, since 2002. She is currently Deputy Director 
of the Institute of International Development Cooperation, where she is in-
volved in initiatives related to international development cooperation and 
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748908388, am 26.10.2021, 10:19:07
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
About the authors and contributors  
 
204 
China’s foreign aid policies. She recently participated in several aid policy stud-
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books on development topics such as ownership and political steering, triangu-
lar cooperation and global funds and networks. He collaborates regularly as a 
lecturer on development cooperation at the Technical University of Darmstadt 
(Germany) and in international academic institutions, e.g. the Instituto Mora 
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development, adaptation to climate change and sustainable forest use. Since 
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tion in Governance Programs” (2017) identifies principles for successful im-
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